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ABSTRACT 
Federalism has been widely acclaimed as a form of political organisation that is most 
suitable for plurinational states because of its potential to foster unity in diversity and 
peaceful co-existence among the diverse and territorially concentrated groups in a state. By 
having the ability to accommodate the combination of shared rule and self-rule among 
federating units, federalism has the potential to mediate or overcome the centri fugal forces 
tending to pull a state apart. As a result of this binding effect, federalism functions as a 
centripetal force that is able to keep a state together. This highly-praised potential function 
of federalism appealed to many states that have embraced the federal formula, especially 
erstwhile colonial African states, which contain within their boundaries culturally diverse 
and disparate ethno-religious groups partitioned into one political territory by the “colonial 
masters” without regard to geographical contiguity and the historical backgrounds of the 
groups. Thus, federalism was considered a viable and necessary option for state-building. 
The preoccupation of this study was to understand why Nigeria, one of the African states 
that embraced federalism, has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious 
conflicts, despite having a federal system in place. Taking a normative approach, this mixed 
methods case study, driven by a qualitative priority, sought to understand that puzzle by 
interrogating how the prevailing political culture of federalism among the population 
harnessed or hindered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism in the 
country. The findings suggest that there was a dearth of peace-enabling federative culture in 
Nigeria. This conclusion highlights the disjuncture between the designed aspiration of 
federalism and its outcome, and the challenge of post-colonial state-building in Africa. 
Hence, it is argued that for Nigeria to overcome this challenge, its people have to 
understand, accept and internalize the values and principles of federalism.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Föderalismus wird weithin als ideale Staatsform für Vielvölkerstaaten angesehen, da ihr ein 
großes Potenzial zugeschrieben wird, die Einheit trotz Vielfalt und ein friedliches 
Zusammenleben zwischen den unterschiedlichen im Raum verteilten Gruppen eines Staates 
zu fördern. Durch die Möglichkeit, in diesem Konzept sowohl gemeinsames als auch 
eigenständiges Regieren der föderalen Einheiten zu vereinen, hat der Föderalismus das 
Potenzial zwischen den zentrifugalen Kräften zu vermitteln bzw. diese zu überwinden, die 
tendenziell den Staat zerbrechen lassen würden. Als Ergebnis dieser verbindenden Wirkung 
wirkt Föderalismus als Zentripetalkraft, die den Staat zusammenhält. Diese mögliche 
Wirkung des Föderalismus erschien vielen Staaten attraktiv, die das föderale Konzept 
übernommen haben. Darunter befinden sich insbesondere ehemalige Kolonialstaaten 
Afrikas, die innerhalb ihrer Grenzen kulturell vielfältige und unterschiedliche ethno-
religiöse Gruppen beheimaten, die  ohne Berücksichtigung räumlicher Grenzen und 
historischer Verbindungen der verschiedenen Gruppen durch die „Kolonialherren“ in 
künstliche  politische Einheiten eingeteilt wurden. Folglich wurde der Föderalismus als eine 
tragfähige und notwendige Konzeption für den Aufbau der neuen unabhängigen Staaten 
erachtet. Das zentrale Anliegen dieser Forschungsarbeit war es zu verstehen, warum Nigeria 
als einer der afrikanischen Staaten, die einen föderalistischen Staatsaufbau gewählt haben, 
trotzdem tief gespalten und anfällig für ethno-religiöse Konflikte blieb. Mit einem 
normativen Ansatz will diese methodisch breit angelegte Fallstudie unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung qualitativer Ansätze Einblicke gewähren, wie die in Nigeria 
vorherrschende politische Kultur des Föderalismus die friedensfördernde und integrative 
Funktion dieses Konzepts im Land unterstützt bzw. behindert. Die Forschungsergebnisse 
deuten darauf hin, dass keine föderative Kultur vorhanden ist, die den Frieden zwischen den 
unterschiedlichen Gruppen wirksam fördern würde. Diese Schlussfolgerung unterstreicht die 
Kluft zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit des Föderalismuskonzepts als Herausforderung 
der postkolonialen Staatenbildung in Afrika. Daher wird die Ansicht vertreten, dass das 
nigerianische Volk die Werte und Prinzipien des Föderalismus verstehen, akzeptieren und 
verinnerlichen muss, um die Einheit des Landes langfristig aufrecht erhalten zu können.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.1. Introduction  
 The motivation of this study was to understand why the Nigerian state has remained 
deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal 
system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful 
coexistence. Through this mixed methods case study, the researcher sought to explore why 
in this context federalism has not been quite successful in delivering on its acclaimed peace-
promoting and integrative function. Specifically, the study was inclined to look beyond the 
institutional design and structural arrangement of the Nigerian federalism and interrogate 
how the prevailing political culture of federalism among the people harnessed or hindered 
this said function of federalism. It was expected that the understanding generated from this 
research would offer new insights into the challenges and prospects of post-colonial state 
building in Africa with respect to the issue of managing unity in diversity in ethnically and 
religiously divided societies. The research employed a mixed methods case study design 
with a qualitative priority, placing emphasis on qualitative methods and using a quantitative 
technique in a supplementary role, to explore the phenomenon under investigation. The 
sources of data for this study included interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, direct and 
participant observation, and document analysis.  
 This chapter lays out the context and background that frames the study. This is 
followed by the problem statement, the purpose of the study, and the research questions. 
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The chapter also includes a discussion around the general approach of the research, and the 
researcher’s perspectives and assumptions.  
1.2. Background and Context 
 In recent years, the issue of diversity and unity in federal states has increasingly 
cultivated the attention of scholars and practitioners across wide range of fields (Moreno & 
Colino, 2010; Caminal & Requejo, 2012). This growing interest stems from three 
developments: (1) the recognition that the state is no longer the domain of a homogenous, 
sovereign nation, but is marked by diversity and political complexity (Caminal & Requejo, 
2012, p. 1); (2) the pervasiveness of federalism even in this twenty-first century, 
encompassing more than half of the world’s space and almost half of its population (Watts, 
2008, p. 1; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 11); and (3) the grim reality of the persistence of 
ethnic, religious and secessionist conflicts around the world today (Brancati, 2009). 
Consequently, the management of national pluralism is considered to be a critical challenge 
of state building in heterogeneous societies. The implication is that the maintenance of 
internal peace is to a large extent determined by how well the state is able to accommodate 
its territorially concentrated diversities – including ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
economic pluralism.  
 Federalism has gained popularity as a structural and institutional political innovation 
for addressing this need. It is widely hailed as having the ability to foster unity in diversity 
and, by the same token, to promote peaceful coexistence among the various sub-national 
social formations in a state. The renowned American scholar of federalism Daniel Elazar 
even concluded that federalism is the only safeguard for peace and stability in a fast 
changing world (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 11).  
3 
 
 Many multinational states have embraced various models of federalism as a national 
unity enhancer and as an intrastate conflict mitigating mechanism (Brancati, 2009). Nigeria 
is among the countries that operate a federal system. In Nigeria, federalism was adopted as a 
mechanism for holding the country together to ensure that the various ethnic nationalities, 
religious groups and geographical regions transfer their loyalties to the state (Ayoade, 1986; 
Gana & Egwu, 2003b; Adibe, 2012). Adibe posited that: “Nigerians embraced federalism as 
a way for fashioning out ‘unity in diversity’ and managing the inevitable confl icts that result 
from the interaction of previously autonomous entities that were brought together into one 
state by the colonial order” (Adibe, 2012, p. 18). In this vivid description, Elaigwu and 
Garba summed up the imperative of the Nigerian federalism: 
Federalism was adopted in Nigeria as a mechanism for managing conflicts associated with the 
process of national integration. The current Nigerian State is a creation of British colonialism 
following the Berlin Conference of 1884. The artificial boundaries created by the European 
partitioning of Africa created culturally diverse states as they brought together strange ethno-
religious groups into one political territory regardless of geographical contiguity or even histori cal 
backgrounds of these groups. (Elaigwu & Garba, 2014, p. 120).   
Therefore, the underlying principle behind Nigeria’s federalism is the quest to promote the 
idea of national unity and peaceful coexistence among the country’s diverse population. 
This is why Rotimi Suberu asserted that: “Uniquely among African countries, Nigeria has 
consistently maintained a formal federal polity as a constitutional design for holding 
together this deeply divided society of three major ethnic groups, hundreds of smaller ethno-
linguistic communities, and almost equal numbers of Muslims and Christians” (Suberu, 
2009b). 
4 
 
 In spite of this, Nigeria has remained a highly divided state characterised by ethnic, 
religious and regional contestations (Ifeka, 2000) that frequently produce episodes of 
violence. Since the country’s transition from military dictatorship to democratic rule in 
1999, communal conflicts have raged like wild fire claiming several thousands of human 
lives and taking a debilitating toll on the country (Lewis, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 
2012). At least 700 incidents of communal violence have erupted in different parts of the 
country within this period (Lewis, 2012), most of which have been fought along ethnic and 
religious fault lines (Okafor, 2007; Marshall, 2008; Salawu, 2010). The conflicts usually 
involve adherents of the two main religions, Christians and Muslims, and because ethnic 
and religious identities overlap or crosscut each other (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005), such 
conflicts easily snowball into ethno-religious confrontations. This situation is compounded 
by the geographical dimensions of ethnic and religious distributions in Nigeria, which splits 
the country roughly into a Muslim dominated North and a predominantly Christian South.  
 Endemic ethno-religious conflicts have had appalling consequences on Nigeria and, 
coupled with other state dysfunctions, have crippled the “African giant.” Nigeria is the most 
populous country in Africa, and occupies a strategic place in international affairs as well as 
being a regional powerhouse. In the words of John Paden, an American scholar who has 
studied the country for decades, Nigeria is a “pivotal state” in the world (Paden, 2005; 
Paden, 2008). The country is endowed with vast natural and human resources, with huge oil 
reserves. Despite this endowment, development has continued to elude the country. As 
Suberu (2001, p. xii) opined, Nigeria may still be considered as a country with a turbulent 
and tragic political experience. This scenario was lucidly expressed by the Nigerian 
international law expert and Chairman of the Nigerian Human Rights Commission, Chidi 
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Anselm Odinkalu when he lamented: “How has a country so richly endowed blown the 
opportunities for itself and its generations yet unborn so spectacularly?” (Odinkalu, 2010, p. 
14). In addition to the crippling impact of endemic corruption, institutional weakness and 
leadership failure (Achebe, 2000; Odinkalu, 2010; World Bank, 2011), pernicious cycles of 
ethno-religious and sectarian conflicts have become threats to the country’s stability and 
human development. Tragically, the continuous assault on religious freedom has become a 
major setback to the country’s socio-economic development (see Grim, 2009; Grim & 
Finke, 2011).  
 As most indexes have shown, Nigeria’s records on human development and peace 
have either stagnated or slumped to frightening levels in the past few years. Nigeria still 
occupies a place among countries with low human development (153
rd
 position out of 172 
countries on the Human Development Report 2013).
1
 With regard to peace and security, the 
picture is also dismal. The country was ranked 16 out of 178 countries on the Failed State 
Index 2013, clearly a condition of alert.
2
 The country’s quality of democracy equally 
received a very low rating, having a democracy rank of 96 out of 104 countries.
3
 On the 
Global Peace Index 2014,
4
 the country was close to the bottom with a rank of 151 out of 
162, a less peaceful rating. Lastly, on the Global Terrorist Index 2013, Nigeria was ranked 4 
out of 162, a very scary picture.
5
 
 Concerns about the fate of the country due to the rising tides of religiously-related 
violence have increased significantly both internationally and domestically (Schwartz, 2010; 
                                                 
1
      URL: http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR2013_EN_Summary.pdf 
2
      URL: http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable 
3
      Democracy Ranking is an annual assessment of the quality of democracies (country-based democracies) 
worldwide. The Democracy Ranking 2012 is available at: 
http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?page_id=57 
4
      http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2014/NGA/OVER 
5
      URL: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/terrorism-index/2013/NGA/OVER 
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Bamidele, 2012). For example, the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCIRF) has in its 2013 Annual Report
6
 reiterated its call, since 2009, for 
Nigeria’s status to be changed from the USCIRF’s Watch List and be designated as a 
“Country of Particular Concern” due to increased violation of religious freedom fuelled by 
unabated cycles of religious-related violence that go on with almost complete impunity. 
Similarly, the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States and the European Union 
adopted a resolution on 30 May 2012 condemning the ongoing sectarian violence in Nigeria 
(ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 2012)
7
 and echoed the UN Security Council’s 
concern about the situation in the country (Security Council, 2011). In a recent press release 
the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that he has been and remains seriously 
concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Nigeria (Ki-moon, 2013). 
 Within the country there is a growing sense of apprehension and palpable fear about 
the future of the country among the population because of the upsurge of ethno-religious 
and sectarian violence. The Islamist group, Boko Haram has been waging a deadly 
insurgency in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram is an expression in Hausa which means 
Western education is an abomination. The group’s real name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings 
and Jihad). Boko Haram has been seeking to impose strict Shari’a and to create an Islamic 
state in northern Nigeria. The spiralling violence caused by the insurgency, since 2009, have 
led to loss of thousands of lives (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2013), 
large internal displacement of people (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013) 
and outflow of refugees into neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2013). Boko Haram has 
                                                 
6
      URL: http://www.uscirf.gov/images/2013%20USCIRF%20Annual%20Report%20(2).pdf  
7
      ACP-EU stands for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in cooperation with the European Union.  
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taken control of large swathes of territory, which it declared as a caliphate, and fighting to 
capture more towns and villages. As a consequence of these crises, a public debate, which 
has always been part of the political discourse, bordering on the propriety or otherwise of 
the country’s federal system and its existence in the present form and shape with its current 
constituent units was escalated.  
 It has become common to read and hear, in both social and mainstream media as well 
as in academic discourses, Nigerians revisiting the question of the amalgamation of the 
country by the British in 1914, and referring to the Nigerian state as a forced marriage 
between incompatible partners. Secessionist agitations from some regions of the country 
have become louder in recent times. Mounting calls for the convocation of a Sovereign 
National Conference (SNC) to decide on the country’s future have been reverberating across 
the country (Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu, & Sule, 2012). For example, in a swift reaction to the 
declaration of state of emergency on three north-eastern states by Nigeria’s President, 
Goodluck Jonathan in a bid to mob out Boko Haram insurgents from these areas, the Yoruba 
pan-cultural association Afenifere Renewal Group asserted that:  
Afenifere Renewal Group (ARG) would like to reinforce our position that the insurgency in the 
Northern parts of Nigeria is only a deep manifestation of the crises of nationhood bedeviling the 
country, which we have continually refused to fully address. There is no doubt that every part of this 
country is seething in anger for one reason or the other.  The Yoruba people for instance, do not only 
feel insecure within Nigeria, we do not feel that Nigeria, as it is presently structured can allow  the 
component nationalities and groups to find full expression for their aspirations. We the Yoruba are 
concerned and miffed that the present structure of the country is a hindrance to our developmental 
destination. We are constantly being constrained to move at the developmental pace envisioned since 
the advent of self-rule in the 1950s, therefore to project to a great future for our unborn generation is 
fast becoming a mirage. (Famoriyo, 2013, para. 3).   
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According to the group, the crises befalling the country provide a good opportunity for the 
various nationalities to come together and find ways to address the dysfunctionality of the 
present structure of the Nigerian state: 
The present situation in Nigeria is a watershed, which presents an opportunity to  seek a lasting 
resolution to how we want to live and co-exist as a country of distinct nationalities, interests and 
priorities, within this beleaguered contraption called Nigeria. To this end, we hereby call on 
President Goodluck Jonathan to immediately declare a State of National Emergency, and proceed to 
the National Assembly with an executive bill, with a view to preparing the grounds for the 
convocation of a Sovereign National Conference, which would bring all the peoples and ethnicities 
of Nigeria together at a roundtable to dialogue on the future of the country.  
 We are fully convinced that this action will save this country before its current chapter ends 
with…. there was a country [emphasis added]. (Famoriyo, 2013, para. 4-5).  
 The call for the convocation of a sovereign national conference did not only come 
from ethno-religious groups and regional associations, but it was also deemed by some 
scholars as a plausible way to address the lingering ‘national question’ manifesting itself in 
the ongoing insecurity in the country. Such scholars argued that the conference is urgently 
needed in order to address the imbalances in the way the Nigerian state is currently 
constituted and to chart a new future (Paki & Cocodia, 2012, p. 32).  
 January 2014 marked exactly 100 years since the merger of the southern and 
northern protectorates to form the present day territory of Nigeria by the British colonial 
Governor-General of Nigeria, Frederick John Dealtry Lugard. A more detailed analysis of 
this amalgamation is discussed later. The Federal Government of Nigeria has unveiled a 20 
month celebration plan christened “One People, Great Promise” (Federal Government of 
Nigeria, n.d.). Those in favour of the centenary celebration argued that minimally the fact 
that Nigeria still remains one country after 100 years calls for celebration; while those 
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opposed to it ask: Unity at what costs? Zasha and Shittu (2013) have analysed the 
juxtaposition of issues and the trend of the debates about the centenary celebration and their 
findings revealed how divided the country is. The questions still haunting the amalgamation 
of the country is revisited in subsequent chapters of this work.  
 The public debates and the agitations pertaining to the federal structure and unity of 
the country have brought to the fore what the American scholar, Dr. Peter Lewis referred to 
as the “sharp tension between Nigeria as a ‘geographic expression’ and a durable national 
idea” (Lewis, 2012, p. 19). This disjuncture also further poses another conundrum to state-
building with regard to state-nation relations, which the Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole 
Soyinka asked poetically: “Just when is a nation?” and “when is  a nation not?” (Soyinka 
2012). Against this backdrop, the need to interrogate the efficacy of a system put in place to 
foster unity in diversity and to serve as a conflict abating mechanism is quite compelling. 
As Hueglin and Fenna (2010, p. 55) have noted the jury is still out there on whether 
federalism fulfils this role. 
1.3. Problem Statement 
 Nigeria adopted its present federal system as a way to foster national unity, forestall 
secessionist attempts by any section of the country and to ensure peaceful co-existence 
among its diverse people (Gana & Egwu, 2003b, p. xvii). It has also been suggested that 
“federalism has developed [in Nigeria] in response to the need for the accommodation of 
basic territorial ethnolinguistic or religious diversity” (Suberu, 2001, p. 3). Despite the 
adoption of federalism, Nigeria has remained a highly divided country (Suberu, 2006) and, 
in recent years, continues to be torn from within by violent conflicts, which are waged along 
ethnic and religious fault-lines, unabatedly claiming thousands of lives and taking a 
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debilitating toll on the social fabric of the society (Okafor, 2007; Marshall, 2008; Falola, 
2009; Salawu, 2010). In addition to this human tragedy, Nigeria has cultivated the 
fascination of scholars due to its characteristically unusual brinkmanship (Suberu, 2009a; 
Campbell, 2011). For so long, the country shows palpable symptoms of state failure and 
dysfunctionality, yet it has continued to “dance on the brink” without falling off the cliff 
(Campbell, 2011). However, there is now a growing fear that the country’s ‘conflict-
carrying capacity’ is getting overwhelmed by a plethora of ethno-religious violence and the 
ongoing Boko Haram Islamic insurgency in the northern regions (Adesoji, 2010; Schwartz, 
2010; Onuoha, 2011; Bamidele, 2012). By conflict-carrying capacity it is meant “the ability 
of the state to regulate intense internal conflict without loss of system integrity” (Jenkins & 
Bond, 2001, p. 4). Here, the loss of system integrity, according to Jenkins and Bond, 
includes “the development of sustained insurgency, widespread human rights violations, the 
breakdown of basic political order, and political revolutions that deprive segments of the 
population of basic political and economic rights” (p. 4).  
 A key factor that has, time and again, been alluded to as contributing to the country’s 
conflict carrying capacity or its ability to restrain from succumbing to the “syndrome of 
state disintegration”, which had befallen other multiethnic African states, is its federal 
structure (Suberu, 2001; Gana & Egwu, 2003b; Gana & Egwu, 2003a; Suberu, 2009a) . 
There are also suggestions that that the federal system the country operates is either 
responsible for or has contributory effect on the recurrent ethno-religious and sectarian 
contestations and violence in the country (Ayokhai, 2009; Hassan & Issa, 2011; Paki & 
Cocodia, 2012; Omitola, 2012). If federalism works in Nigeria, why has the country 
remained, as Onuoha (2008, p. 40) described it, “a ‘precarious’ and ‘unfinished’ patchwork 
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in perpetuity”? This question reflects what Jonathan Rodden referred to as “a growing 
disappointment with decentralisation and federalism, especially among developing 
countries” (Rodden, 2004, p. 481).    
 There has been a resurgence of scholarly interest on the integrative and peace-
promoting function of federalism (Gromes, 2010; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010; Moreno & 
Colino, 2010; Caminal & Requejo, 2012; Christin & Hug, 2012; Iff, 2013). This interest 
highlights the increasing need for research on the nexus between federalism and the 
management of diversity in plurinational states (cf. Bird, Vaillancourt, & Roy-César, 2010). 
By implication, it calls for depth-oriented studies that enable us to better understand the 
relationship between federalism, national pluralism and conflict within a particular context 
and its wider repercussions (cf. Hay, 2010, p. 86). Blindenbacher and Watts (2003) put 
forward a conceptual framework in which they outlined two dimensions of federalism that 
are important to research. They identified structural characteristics and political culture as 
two dimensions of federalism. The two dimensions are interrelated and interdependent 
(Douglas-Scott, 2002). However, unlike the institutional dimension, the normative 
dimension of federalism, in particular the political culture of federalism, has received 
inadequate attention from contemporary studies  (Rocher, 2009; Máiz, 2013; Rocher & 
Fafard, 2013). As Ramón Máiz argued, “The implication of federalism reach beyond a 
particular design, or interactive sets of actors and institutions that articulate decentralization 
in decision-making and accommodation of ethnic or national diversity, to include 
interpretation or a federal vision of politics [emphasis in the original]” (Máiz, 2013, p. 83). 
“Yet much of scholarly literature on federalism and federations has a strong institutional 
bias” (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43).   
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 Understandably, Nigerian federalism has received significant attention from scholars 
in recent years. Some of the recent publications on the Nigerian federalism, which delved 
into the issues of integration and peace, include: Metumara’s (2010) “Democracy and the 
Challenge of Ethno-Nationalism in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Interrogating Institutional 
Mechanics;” Aiyedele’s (2011) “Federalism, power sharing and the 2011 presidential 
election in Nigeria;” Hassan & Issa’s (2011) “Federalism and the Ethnic Violence in 
Nigeria: Past and Present Issues;” Fawole & Bello’s (2011) “The Impact of Ethno -Religious 
Conflict on Nigerian Federalism;” Ejobowah’s (2012) “Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation: 
Assessing Citizenship in Nigerian Federalism;” Aleyomi’s (2012) “Ethno-Religious Crisis 
as a Threat to the Stability of Nigeria's Federalism;” Elaigwu’s (2013) “The Practice of 
Federalism in Africa, the Nigerian Experience and the Way Forward;” Suberu’s (2013) 
“Prebendal Politics and Federal Governance in Nigeria;” Iff’s (2013) “Peace-Promoting 
Federalism: Making Sense of India and Nigeria;” Elaigwu and Garba’s (2014) “Federalism 
and National Integration in Nigeria;” Omotso and Abe’s (2014) “Federalism, Politics and 
Governance in Nigeria;” Ibrahim’s (2014) “Towards an Integrative Federal Polity in 
Nigeria;” and Kendhammer’s (2014) “Citizenship, Federalism and Powersharing: Nigeria's 
Federal Character and the Challenges of Institutional Design.” The underlying denominator 
to all these studies on Nigerian federalism is the interrogation of the integrative and peace-
promoting function of the Nigerian federalism.   
  These studies offer us great deal of insights into different aspects of the conundrum 
of national integration and the context of federalism in Nigeria. There appears to be a 
consensus that the federal idea is the most suitable mechanism for fostering unity and 
diversity in the context of ethnic, religious and regional pluralities of Nigeria. Thus, it can 
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be said that the potential of federalism to contribute to national integration and promote 
peaceful coexistence is widely recognised. The sample of studies listed above also 
acknowledged that the full potential of federalism has not been harnessed in this context. To 
explore this phenomenon, the studies generally interrogated the structural characteristics 
and institutional processes of federalism, regime character and actions, constitutional 
development processes, and social vices such corruption, ethnicity and religious bigotry. 
Few studies have touched tangentially on how the political culture of federalism among the 
people impacts on the integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism. Despite the 
call made by Daniel Elazar more than twenty five years ago that Nigeria offers excellent 
possibilities for the exploration of the political-cultural basis of federalism, it can be seen 
from the literature that, as is the case elsewhere, the federal political culture remains a 
“relatively unexplored territory” (Rocher & Fafard, 2013).  
 As Máiz (2013) called for more research into federal political culture in order to fill 
the gap in our understanding of how federalism works in a given context. This research is a 
contribution in this direction. Another missing link is the dearth of insights from political 
geography, which provide a framework of investigation that helps us to understand how 
territorial and spatial identities in Nigeria are built around a shared sense of religious and 
ethnic belonging, as well as “the historical constitution of religious and ethnic identities in 
space and place” (Brace, Bailey, & Harvey, 2006, p. 30). The need for this type of research 
orientation has been underscored by Harvey Starr:  
Even though there is no denying the significance of time and the temporal context in social science, 
analysts need to pay more explicit and extensive attention to the spatial elements, or the spatial 
contexts, of social phenomena. Why? It is becoming clearer that time and space are two of the 
primary ways in which we contextualize social behaviour and interactions. (Starr, 2005, p. 393). 
14 
 
1.4. Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this mixed methods case study was to understand why the Nigerian 
state has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in 
place a federal system, which was purposely instituted as a mechanism of fostering unity in 
diversity and peaceful coexistence. Specifically, the study sought to understand how the 
prevailing culture of federalism among the Nigerian population harnesses or hinders the 
potential integrative and peace-promoting function of federalism. 
1.5. The Research Question 
 The motivating question behind this study is the puzzle: Why has the Nigerian state 
remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite having in place a 
federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and 
peaceful coexistence? This puzzle can be approached from several angles, but in this study I 
have chosen to explore it by interrogating how the prevailing culture of federalism among 
the population harnesses or hinders the peace-promoting and integrative function of 
federalism in the country. Specifically, the study is driven by the following questions:   
1. How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the Nigerian population in 
relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-
promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country’s return to 
democratic rule in 1999? 
2. What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and 
perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues? 
3. What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of 
federalism among the people? 
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4. Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular among Nigerians nowadays?  
5. What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their 
country? 
1.6. Research Approach 
 The researcher sought to understand in depth how the prevailing political culture of 
federalism among the Nigerian population harnesses or hinders the integrative function of 
federalism in the country by obtaining qualitative data from elite interviews, experts 
consultations, focus group discussions, direct observation, participant observation, 
documentary sources, and supplementing that with quantitative data from survey. This 
investigation represented a mixed methods case study, employing an embedded design 
driven by the qualitative strand. The quantitative strand was used in a supplementary role.  
 The whole research was divided into two parts. The first part was carried out as a 
desk study involving an extensive review of scholarly literature, including a very elaborate 
exploration of the development of key concepts of the research and the historical context 
and evolution of the Nigerian federalism. The desk study helped to set the stage for the 
overall research and to provide contexts, which is an essential key to understanding the 
complexity of the phenomenon under investigation. The second part was an empirical 
process carried out mainly during fieldwork in Nigeria. As a mixed methods case study, 
both the qualitative and the quantitative strands were carried out concurrently.  In-depth 
interviewing, focus group discussions, direct observation, participant observation and 
questionnaires were the primary data collection methods. To gather background and context 
information as well as official, policy and statutory positions, the review of documents was 
used as a secondary data collection method.  The data obtained from the primary and 
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secondary sources formed the overall basis of the findings of this study. Each interviewee, 
respondent and participant of focus group discussion was identified anonymously. 
Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed word for word. To better address some of the 
research questions, quantitative data generated through questionnaires was used to support 
or reach certain findings. This allowed the researcher to achieve triangulation of data and to 
simultaneously reap the benefits of using a mixed methods procedure.  
1.7. Assumptions  
 This study was carried out based on the assumption that a well designed federal 
system with the proper institutional arrangement and processes in place possesses the 
potential to promote unity in diversity and peaceful plurinational coexistence, but for it to 
be successful in performing this function there has to be an enabling federative culture. That 
is, in the absence of federal thinking, federal vision, and shared values, norms, attitudes and 
sentiments that reflect the principles of federalism among citizens, such as shared rule, self-
rule and respect and acceptance of unity and diversity, a particular federalism may not be 
worth its essence. This study, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that the recurrent 
ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, and sectarian violence, which Nigeria has been 
experiencing, were manifestation of a weak political culture of federalism or the lack of a 
federative culture among the population that would enable the federal system to perform its 
peace-promoting and integrative function optimally.  
1.8. Significance of the Study 
 This study was intended to contribute to a better understanding of why Nigeria has 
remained a deeply divided state and characterised by ethno-religious contestations and 
conflicts, despite having in place a federal system specifically adopted as a mechanism of 
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fostering unity in diversity and plurinational co-existence. The study’s normative approach 
would contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between designed aspiration 
of the Nigerian federalism and the political culture of federalism among the population. It is 
hoped that the insights generated from the study would also be useful to Nigerians, 
especially politicians, policymakers and the civil society as they continue to come to grips 
with the national integration conundrum and its debilitating consequences on the country. 
The insights generated from this case study would also add to the existing body of 
knowledge on the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism and the mutual 
interdependence between the institutional and normative dimensions of federalism.             
1.9. Structure of the Report 
 The report is divided into six chapters. Chapter one serves as the orientation and 
problem statement. Chapters two and three are literature review. The literature review is 
divided into two chapters to deal with different aspects. Chapter two deals with the 
evolution of state political system and the foundations, origins and meaning of federalism. 
Chapter three focuses on the evolution and development of the Nigerian federalism. The 
extensive review of literature on the historical background of the Nigerian federalism is 
considered a major part of the investigation. Chapter four is the methodology chapter, which 
provides a description of the research design and procedure. Chapter five contains the 
results of the study. The discussion of the findings, summary, conclusion, suggestions for 
further research and recommendations are presented in chapter six.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
STATE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE FEDERALIST IDEA 
  2.1. Introduction  
 The general preoccupation of this study was to understand why the Nigerian state has 
remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a 
federal system adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful 
plurinational coexistence. Specifically, the study focused on understanding how the 
prevailing political culture of federalism among the population harnesses or hinders the 
integrative and peace-promoting function of the federalism. In order to carry out this 
investigation, it was essential to conduct an extensive review of relevant literature. 
Consequently, this chapter and the next one have been dedicated to this purpose. This 
chapter provides insights into the historical, philosophical and theoretical foundations of 
federalism. A considerable attention has been given to the theological or covenantal roots of 
the federal idea because the study’s focus of interrogation is on the normative dimension of 
federalism. The chapter begins with an in-depth exploration of the concept of “state,” as a 
form of political organisation that emerged at a certain period in history, and how it evolved 
over time was explored in depth. The exploration of the literature also brought to the fore 
the emergence of federalism as a shift from statism to noncentralization, thereby 
underscoring the fact that the state is no longer a homogenous nation, but is defined by 
diversity. The implication of this for such concepts as “nation-state” and “nation” and 
national pluralism were examined as well. The chapter is organised under appropriate 
subheadings. From exploring global perspectives on federalism, the continues on the next 
chapter with a detailed examination of the background of the Nigerian federalism, including 
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the evolution of the Nigerian state as a colonial creation. Various historical antecedents that 
shaped the evolution of the federal solution, facilitated or hindered the development of a 
federative culture are explored from the literature.  
 This literature review process lasted from the preliminary phase of the work through 
the data collection, data analysis and synthesis stages of the study. To conduct this review of 
related literature, the researcher used multiple sources of information, including scholarly 
journals and working papers, conference proceedings, books, Internet resources, thesis and 
dissertations. These sources were accessed through Universitaetsbibliothek Tuebingen, 
ProQuest, Google Scholar, Scirus, Minority at Risk (MAR) Project, intute, and SciVerse 
ScienceDirect. Specific delimiting timeframe was not assigned to the search for literature, 
because of the importance of gaining an adequate picture of what is already known about 
the phenomenon under investigation and to ensure inclusion of substantial amount of 
relevant materials. 
 
2.2. Historicity and Evolution of the State Political System 
 In order to understand federalism one needs to have a modicum of knowledge about 
the state political system. The whole basis of understanding federalism as a form of political 
organisation rests with how well one is conversant with the modern political system, state, 
which has become the “building block of the world system” (Stavenhagen, 1996, p. 2). The 
state has not always been here with us. It emerged at a certain period in human history.  This 
section presents an extensive discussion of the emergence and development of the state 
political system.    
20 
 
 2.2.1. Defining the State. Before going into a discussion of the nature and 
implications of the evolution of the state, it is important to clarify the term “state” itself. 
Michael Mann referred to the state as “undeniably a messy concept” because the majority of 
definitions contain two different levels of analysis in which the state is conceived either in 
terms of what it looks like or what it does (Mann, 1984, p. 187). For example, in his lecture 
to the Free Students Union of Münich University in 1918 around the period of the German 
Revolution, Politik als Beruf (Politics as a Vocation), Max Weber (1864-1920) argued that 
the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends, but only in terms of the specific means 
peculiar to it, that is, the use of physical force (Weber, 1946 [1919]). Weber noted that 
although force is definitely not the normal or the only means of the state, but it is  a means 
specific to the state. For Weber, the modern state is a “human community that (successfully) 
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 
1946 [1919], p. 78). Weber pointed out that institutions and individuals may have the right 
to use force only to the extent to which the state grants it. Therefore, the state is the only 
source of the right to use force. For Weber, therefore, politics is the act of “striving to share 
power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among 
groups within a state” (Weber, 1946 [1919], p. 78). Weber saw the state as a coercive 
creation:  
 ...the modern state is a compulsory association which organises domination. It has been successful in 
seeking to monopolise the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a 
territory. To this end, the state has combined the material means of organisation in the hands of its 
leaders, and it has expropriated all autonomous functionaries of estates who formerly controlled 
these means in their own right. The state has taken their positions and now stands in the top place. 
(Weber, 1946 [1919], p. 83) 
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 When one analyses the Weberian conception it would yield several salient features of the 
modern state, but can also be characterised as depicting a “heuristic, ideal type state” 
(Migdal, 2001, p. 14). For Mann (1984), Weber’s notion of state was the more plausible 
approach compared to other scholars’ because it is a mixed, but chiefly institutional, 
conception. Drawing from the Weberian conception, Mann (1984, p. 188) identified four 
features of the state, encompassing both institutional and functional elements:  
a) a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
 b) centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from the centre to 
cover 
c) a territorially-demarcated area, over which it exercises  
d) a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the 
means of physical violence.  
Undoubtedly, Weber’s classic definition and conception of state have had profound impact 
on twentieth-century social science, and even today maintain a wide currency in shaping the 
way the state is understood (Migdal, 2001). The Weberian idea of the state has continued to 
resonate with contemporary scholars. For instance, Pierson (2011) dissected the Weberian 
conception and added to the Mann’s list above the so-called rational elements. According to 
Pierson, the most important defining features of the modern state based on the Weberian 
conception are (Pierson, 2011, p. 6):  
1. Control (monopoly) of the means of violence; 
2. Territoriality; 
3. Sovereignty; 
4. Constitutionality; 
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5. Impersonality; 
6. The public bureaucracy; 
7. Authority/legitimacy; and  
8. Citizenship 
9. Taxation (Pierson’s own addition)  
Both Mann and Pierson aligned themselves with the Weberian conception. In general, both 
embraced the Weberian conception of state, but differed in the aspects they emphasised. 
Both agreed that bureaucracy, territoriality, authoritative binding rule, and monopoly of the 
use of physical force are defining features of the state. Mann’s use of the word “centrality” 
is very important for understanding the deviations between the Weberian ideal type state 
and many variants of it, such as the more decentralised or federalised political systems. In 
reality, “Actual states are deviations from the ideal or corrupted versions of the ideal” 
(Migdal, 2001, p. 14).    
 A contemporary definition in concurrence with the Weberian conception was given 
by Vujakovic (2005). Following the sociological theorist Anthony Giddens’ conceptual 
approach, Vujakovic referred to the “state” as “a bounded space, or territory, which is 
controlled by a single sovereign power with a monopoly of the means of violence needed to 
achieve control” (Vujakovic, p. 153). Vujakovic explained that the sovereign power here 
refers to a formal government, which, ontologically, represents the state and has control 
over resources and population, and makes and implements laws that delineate the criteria for 
full membership of the state or citizenship.   
 The two definitions above are to be taken with a caveat – because of how states have 
evolved over time no single definition of the state is adequate – since “the state is multi-
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faceted and contested” (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts & Whatmore, p. 723). The state is 
also to be taken as a normative ideological construction in that it thrives on: 1) the belief 
that states are legitimate and universal institutions endowed with unquestionable right to 
wield power over individuals; and 2) the fictitious historicised claim of “naturalness and 
historical permanency” (Gregory et al., 2009, p. 723).  
 One important point to note with the regard to the power of the state, as Mann (1984) 
and Penrose (2002) have posited, is the essentiality of the geographical concept of 
“territoriality” (cf. White, 2007). Territoriality involves asserting influence and control over 
people, phenomena and relationships by exercising claim over a geographical space backed 
by state sovereignty (Sack, 1983 & 1986; Smith, 1990).  Or as Edward Soja defined it, 
territoriality refers to “a behavioural phenomenon associated with the organisation of space 
into spheres of influence or clearly demarcated territories which are made distinctive and 
considered at least partially exclusive by their occupants or definers” (Soja, 1971, p. 19). 
According to Rivera, such definition underlines the fact that territory is not fixed but a 
socio-political “construct where power is exercised” (Rivera, 2013, p. 28). As Rivera 
posited, territory is, therefore, produced, maintained, modified and reproduced concomitant 
with social context and historical process.  
 Territoriality is generally construed as a rational strategy (Sack, 1983; Sack, 1986; 
Smith, 1990; Vujakovic, 2005; Rivera, 2013). Some even argue that state territory is to all 
intents and purposes political (Rivera, 2013). Thus, the state’s attempt to controls access to 
a defined space by invoking its sovereign power and deploying its assets of coercion 
(institutions, policies, and actors) is a means by which it can effectively monopolise, 
regulate and control the content (resources, population, infrastructure) of the territory 
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(Vujakovic, 2005; Rivera, 2013). To this extent, therefore, the state has been described as a 
“power container,” with the ability to appropriate a broad range of social functions by 
exercising territorial control  (Vujakovic, 2005). This implies that state territorial control is 
oriented toward the pursuit of the objectives of the state. State territoriality, therefore, is 
linked to the functions of the state. These functions are territorially and spatially bound. For 
instance, Mann (1984, p. 196) identified the multiplicity of state functions which include: a) 
The maintenance of internal order; b) Military defence/aggression; c) The maintenance of 
communications infrastructures; and d) Economic redistribution. Similarly, Vujakovic 
(2005) categorically asserted that the main functions of the state are: “the waging of war, 
the management of the economy, the propagation of national identity, and the provision of 
social services” (p. 154).   
 2.2.2. Historicity and Evolution of the State. The state, which has become the 
dominant political unit of the past three centuries (Cerny, 1990; Storey, 2012) and the 
“building block of the world system” (Stavenhagen, 1996, p. 2), has undergone significant 
transformation (Cerny, 1990; Elazar, 1996b; Anderson B., 2006; Flint & Taylor, 2007; 
Antonsich, 2009). Increasingly, form and functions of the state are now being challenged 
and redefined (Gregory et al., 2009). For example, Ibrahim (2003) even stated categorically 
that the nation-state is in trouble. This development reinforces what Cerny (1990) meant by 
saying that states are not finished products. To be sure, states are human creations and not 
“natural” entities (Storey, 2012). As, Pierson (2011) and Storey (2012) have both noted, 
states, as it were, came into existence at certain points in human history and evolved over 
time. Therefore, it is important to note that:  
The state is not an eternal and unchanging element in human affairs. For the most of its history, 
humanity got by (whether more happily or not) without a state. For all its universality in our own 
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times, the state is a contingent (and comparatively recent) historical development. Its predominance 
may also prove to be quite transitory. ( (Pierson, 2011, p. 28). 
There were examples of different forms of states throughout history (Storey, 2012). The 
American political scientist Francis Fukuyama, in his recent work, The Origins of political 
Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (2012) has given an extensive 
exposition of how the world’s basic political institutions developed. He explained that, 
contrary to the widely held understanding that “the primordial human social organisation 
was tribal”, the first form of political system among hunter-gatherer societies was the 
preagricultural family-and-band level political organisation (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 53). 
According to Fukuyama, the transition from band level societies to tribal societies was 
facilitated by “the emergence of settled societies and the development of agriculture around 
nine thousand years ago” (p. 53). Fukuyama pointed out that the preagricultural band 
societies were not characterised by political inequality because there was no private 
ownership of property as obtained in the modern time. Therefore, territoriality and land 
annexation were not pronounced in preagricultural societies. Further, he argued that band 
societies also did not have systems that resemble modern economic exchange and modern 
individualism. Fukuyama described the state of affairs in band societies as follows: 
There was no state to tyrannise over the people at this stage of political development; rather, human 
beings experienced what the social anthropologist Ernest Gellner has labelled the “tyranny of 
cousins.” That is, your social world was limited to the circles of relatives surrounding you, who 
determined what you did, whom you married, how you worshipped, and just about everything else in 
life. Both hunting and gathering are done on a group basis by families or group of families. Hunting 
in particular leads to sharing, since there is no technology for storing meat , and hunted animals must 
be consumed immediately. (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 54).     
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The moral rules of such societies does not revolve around preventing individuals from 
stealing other people’s property, but chastising those who refuse to share food and other 
necessities because the refusal to share under conditions of scarcity was deemed threatening 
to collective survival (Fukuyama, 2012). Wilson (2003) has enumerated a number of studies 
that showed how some hunter-gatherer societies function as moral communities and how 
they have used the mechanism of religion to establish regulatory apparatus that fosters 
collective welfare.  
 The egalitarianism of hunter-gatherer societies also has ramifications that go beyond 
food sharing to social relationships (Wilson, 2003). Wilson posited that in such societies, 
the request “take me to your leader” would elicit great bewilderment among hunter-
gatherers because, as Fukuyama also noted in the quotations above, there are no leaders 
besides “those who have earned the respect of their peers by being models of good conduct, 
and who can only advise and not dictate” (Wilson, 2003, p. 21).  
Band-level societies are highly egalitarian. The major social distinctions are based on age and sex; in 
hunter-gatherer societies, the men hunt and the women gather, and there is a natural division of 
labour in reproductive matters. But within the band, there is relatively little differentiation between 
families, no permanent leadership, and no hierarchy. Leadership is vested in individuals based on 
qualities like strength, intelligence, and trustworthiness, but it tends to migrate from one individual 
to another. Apart from parents and their children, opportunities for coercion are very limited. 
(Fukuyama, 2012, p. 54).     
For example, a study carried out by the British anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard in the 
1930s among the traditional Nuer people of South Sudan revealed the social organisation of 
the people to be segmentary (Fukuyama, 2012). Evans-Pritchard’s attempt to identify 
leaders among the Nuer people yielded a surprise – the people pointed someone who was 
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called a leopard-skin chief that turned out to be simply a specialist in conflict resolution 
(Wilson, 2003).  
 The lessons that can be learned from such social organisation are relevant to 
understanding the nature politics in Nigeria today. For instance, Gana & Egwu (2003) 
argued that the political economy of a society has to be interrogated in order to understand 
the challenge of managing diversity and plurality in a state. Empirical evidence exists in 
support of the postulation that “the new pattern of accumulation, especially the 
transformation of the agrarian based state into a rentier state, following the oil boom of the 
seventies, has accentuated the struggle for ethnic ascendance, geo-political advantage, 
personal accumulation and class consolidation” (Gana, 2003, p. 23).   
 As highlighted earlier, the transition from band to tribes was made possible by the 
emergence of settled societies and agriculture. Tribal societies emerged as the next level 
above the band (Fukuyama, 2012). According to Fukuyama, the two common characteristics 
of this second level of social organisation of human society are: 1) they were segmentary 
and 2) based on the principle of common descent (p. 56). The term “segmentary” was 
employed by the sociologist Emile Durkheim to describe societies that are “based on 
replication of identical small-scale social units, much like the segments in an earthworm” 
(p. 56). Fukuyama explained that such societies had no overall centralised political 
structure, were characterised by what Durkheim referred to as “mechanical solidarity,” and, 
as such, had no high degree of functional differentiation like the modern division of labour. 
The form of segmentary differentiation obtained in such societies has been described as a 
kind “where every social subsystem is the equal of, and functionally similar to, every other 
social subsystem” (Buzan & Albert, 2010, p. 318). As Durkheim argued, societies 
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characterised by “mechanical solidarity” are held together and defined by a collective 
conscience, which embodies the totality of shared beliefs and sentiments common to the 
people and exists as an independent structure across space and time (Durkheim, 1997 
[1893]; Buzan & Albert, 2010). As Buzan and Albert posited, this totality is what forms the 
basis of social formation or identity, transcending the individual. 
 It has been suggested that religion has existed in and shaped society since time 
immemorial. For example, Fukuyama (2012) posited that religion played a part in shaping 
the form of social organisation that took hold across human societies. He noted that the 
worship of ancestors began in band-level societies. According to him, however, later 
religion became progressively complex and institutionalised that it shapes other institutions 
including leadership and property. Thus, the role of religion in shaping social relationships 
and political affairs has a long history: “It is belief in the power of dead ancestors over the 
living and not some mysterious biological instinct that causes tribal societies to cohere” 
(Fukuyama, 2012, p. 60). Although religion and kinship are intimately connected in tribal 
societies, religious beliefs have had far-reaching impact on all social formation and identity 
building. It has been noted, for example, that religious belief in dead ancestors has had a 
huge social binding effect on individuals in tribal societies, where religion is more 
entrenched, than in family or band-level societies. Religion, therefore, expanded the scope 
of one’s social world beyond the circle of relatives, and led to the formation of commun ity:  
The “community” is not only present members of the lineage, clan, or tribe; it is the whole rope of 
descent from one’s ancestors to one’s unborn descendants. Even the most distantly related kin feel 
they have some connection and duties toward each other, a feeling that is reinforced by rituals that 
apply to the community as a whole. Individuals do not believe they have the power of choice to 
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constitute this kind of social system; rather, their roles are defined for them by the surrounding 
society before they are even born. (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 62).        
 This means religion is a great binding force; it binds people (community) together. For 
example, in his classical study of religion, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, 
Durkheim referred to religion as “an eminently collective thing” (Durkheim, 1954 [1912], 
p.47). His famous classical definition of religion underscores this binding characteristic: “A 
religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, 
things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite in one single moral 
community ..., all those who adhere to them” (Durkeim, 1954 [1912], p. 47). As a 
consequence of its ability to mobilise people on a large scale, religion is believed to have 
made tribal societies militarily more powerful than in band level societies (Fukuyama, 
2012). Thus, the relationship between religion and power in tribal societies was located in 
the former’s ability to facilitate large scale collective action.  
 Tribal societies, according to Fukuyama, are created at particular historical juncture 
and thrived under certain environmental conditions, and are preserved on the basis of certain 
religious beliefs. Fukuyama argued that if those beliefs are altered as a result of the 
introduction of a new religion, in that case the tribal form of social organisation will break 
down and be replaced by “more flexible and scalable forms of organisation,” as witnessed in 
barbarian Europe after the advent of Christianity (p. 63). As Fukuyama noted, tribal 
societies evolved from their strict adherence to genealogical basis of segmentary lineage to 
cognatic tribes and tribes that included members that have no actual kinship or lineal 
connection. In this sense, a tribe can be broadly defined as a human grouping that includes 
“not just kin claiming common descent but also patrons and clients linked through 
reciprocity and personal ties” (p. 78). According to Fukuyama, even when this change took 
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place, tribalism subsists as “one of the great constants of political development”. Tribalism 
(tribal ties) and patronage (who scratches whose back) exist in developing countries and 
advanced democracies respectively in this twenty-first century (Fukuyama, 2012; Ornstein, 
2014).  
 The transition from tribal societies to state-level political organisation represented a 
remarkable political development – “we exit out of kinship into the realm of political 
development proper” (Fukuyama, 2012, p. 81). It is, however, to be noted that tribal 
societies did not evolve automatically into the form that modern states have taken. Several 
precursors of the modern state are known throughout history. Storey (2012) has noted that 
Ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome as well as other parts of the world had early examples of 
states. These precursors of the modern state were small city-states and large empires. For 
instance, Greece had series of city-states (Polis) and Rome was organised as a spatially 
extensive empire (Storey, 2012). As already mentioned, such political organisations existed 
in different parts of the world. In precolonial Africa, for example, the political institutions 
were “existing in innumerable lineage and clan groups, city-states, kingdoms, and empires 
without any fixed boundaries” (Boahen, 1987, p. 95). Many scholars, including historians, 
have acknowledged that before European colonialism, Africa consisted of a wide variety of 
very large and very small states (Boahen, 1987; Herbst, 1997; Herbst, 2000; Diertz & 
Foeken, 2001; Reid, 2012).  
 Fukuyama (2012, p. 80-81) has delineated what distinguished state-level societies 
from tribal ones. The characteristics that distinguish the state from a tribal-level society 
include:  
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1. Possesses a centralised source of authority that enforces rules on the whole of 
society, trumps all other authorities within its territory, and therefore, is sovereign. 
The source of authority is presided over by a King, president or prime minister 
supported by hierarchy of subordinates. Lower administrative levels including lesser 
chiefs, prefects or administrators draw their authority from the sovereign.  
2. The source of authority is backed by the monopoly of the means of coercion. That is, 
having control over the police and the military. Thus, the state has the means of 
coercion to prevent or suppress segments, tribes, or regions from seceding.  
3. The authority of the state is territorial and not kin based. This means membership in 
a state is not contingent on kinship and, therefore, it can outsize a tribe.  
4. States have more pronounced social stratification and inequality than tribal societies, 
often manifested in the rulers and their administrators, who in some instances 
become hereditary elite, detaching themselves from the rest of the society. It was 
suggested that slavery and serfdom thrived more under the aegis of states than in 
tribal societies. 
5. States are legitimated and undergirded by far more elaborate forms of religious 
belief. Hence, a distinct priestly class exists as the guardian of the state. The 
relationship between the priestly class and the state differ from one instance to the 
other. If the priestly class takes power directly, then the state is a theocracy; when 
the state is controlled by a secular ruler, then it is labelled caesaropapist; and a 
hybrid scenario is obtained where power sharing between the priestly class and 
secular rule exists. 
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How do states come into being? Anthropologists and archaeologists have grappled 
with this question. Two basic types of state formation namely, primary (pristine) and 
secondary (competitive) state formation, are broadly identified (Chase-Dunn & Inoue, 2012; 
Fukuyama, 2012). Primary (pristine) state formation is the emergence of new state out of a 
tribal-level society or in the context where there are no pre-existing states. Secondary 
(competitive) state formation occurs where a stateless polity that is in interaction with one 
or more already-existing states – states are typically much better organised and powerful 
than stateless polities – becomes a state as a result of either being conquered or absorbed, or 
by emulating extant states in order to avoid getting conquered. Chase-Dunn & Inoue have 
noted that pristine state formation is much more challenging, from organisational and 
resource points of view, because it occurred in regions that had no prior knowledge of 
managing large settlement (a city) and without pre-existing states to emulate.  
Newton & Deth (2010) have identified three general patterns of state formation. 
First, there are states that arose on the gradual transformation of existing political units. 
This pattern is referred to as Transformation. According to Newton and Deth, Medieval 
monarchies became states in this way. This pattern began in the Middle Ages and the 
development of states that underwent this pattern took several centuries. Britain and France 
are examples of this pattern. The second pattern identified by Newton and Deth is called 
Unification and occurred mainly in the nineteenth century. Here, states emerged through the 
unification of independent political units. Germany and Italy are examples of this pattern. 
Lastly, states also arose from Secession or break-up of independent political units such as 
empires and large multinational states into one or more states. This is the pattern that was 
witnessed after the First World War with the breaking up of Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
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the Ottoman Empire. Newton & Deth also noted that secession was the means through 
which several states in Africa and Asia came into existence following decolonisation after 
the Second World War. It is important to note that this is also the pattern that has produced 
states in recent times. For example, South Sudan was formed after it seceded from Sudan in 
2011 (Rothfuss & Joseph, Forthcoming).  
Many explanations have been adduced in an attempt by scholars to account for what 
gave rise to state formation. Fukuyama (2012) has synthesised the various explanations of 
the factors that influenced or led to state formation into the following categories:  
1. “The State as a Voluntary Social Contract” – as implied in the ideas of Hobbes, 
Locke and Rousseau, the state is viewed as the outcome of agreement entered in by 
individuals to surrender their rights to a sovereign.  
2. “The State as a Hydraulic-Engineering Project” – proponents of this explanation 
argue that state formation was driven by the need for large-scale irrigation in which a 
central bureaucracy was deemed necessary (Karl Wittfogel’s “hydraulic” theory of 
the state).  
3. “Population Density” – population increase and population densities, considered as 
drivers of technological innovation, large-scale irrigation, high-yielding crop 
cultivation, and development of modern tools, promoted state formation by allowing 
specialisation and division of labour between elites and non-elite groups (this view 
was advanced by the demographer Ester Boserup).  
4. “State as the Product of Violence and Compulsion” – this view is shared by those 
who believe that all human societies have engaged in violence,  and therefore 
hierarchy and the state emerged when one tribal segment conquered another one and 
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exerted control over its territory. Thus, it was the imperative of sustaining this 
political control over the conquered territory that compelled “conquerors to establish 
centralised repressive institutions, which evolved into an administrative bureaucracy 
of a primitive state” (p. 85). 
5. “Circumscription and Other Geographical-Environmental factors” – the protagonist 
of this view, anthropologist Robert Carneiro argued that warfare might have 
universally and necessarily, but not sufficiently, influenced state formation. 
According this position, state formation was rather brought about by increases in 
productivity that take place in a geographically circumscribed area, such as places 
bounded by a river valley, ocean, desert or mountain valleys, where the option of 
moving away did not exist.  
6. “The State as the Product of Charismatic Authority” – this is an alternative view to 
the materialistic explanations that regard environment and level of technology as 
contingent factors in state formation. Proponents of this position argue that cultural 
factors such as religion were instrumental in state formation. Charismatic leaders – 
the Greek term charisma means “touched by God” – were believed to possess the 
religious authority that enabled them to unite a group of autonomous tribes and 
“create a centralised military machine that can conquer recalcitrant tribes as well  as 
ensure domestic peace and security” (p. 87). Fukuyama suggested that once this 
conquest is achieved a new form of religion that overcomes the particularistic forms 
of the uniting tribes would develop to consolidate the emergent state-level 
organisation.   
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 The various explanations above have to be considered with a caveat because they are 
not resting on conclusive anthropological and archaeological evidence (cf. Fukuyama, 
2012). Furthermore, “States originate in many different ways and their development  follows 
no single pathway” (Newton & Deth, 2010, p. 23). As earlier suggested, states are not 
universal because they failed to emerge in certain parts of the world, and tribal societies still 
persist in some regions (Fukuyama, 2012; Storey, 2012). The types, patterns and the 
precipitating factors of state formation highlighted above have not adequately captured the 
role of colonialism in imposing the state political system on some parts of the world. As 
discussed in the subsequent chapter, the Nigerian state, like many erstwhile colonies, was 
created by European imperial fiat.  
 Although early or ancient states existed in different parts of the world (Held, 1989; 
Storey, 2012), the history of the modern state can be traced back to between the twelfth and 
the sixteenth century in medieval Europe (Newton & Deth, 2010). The modern state system 
first emerged in Europe “as a sort of intermediate form between small city-states and larger 
empires” (Storey, 2012, p. 34). This development has been attributed to the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648 at the end of Europe’s Thirty Years War (Hassan D. , 2006; Straumann, 
2008; Newton & Deth, 2010; Storey, 2012). The Treaty of Westphalia “helped set the scene 
for a territorial apportionment of land between European rulers” (Storey, 2012, p. 34). 
According to Storey (2012), it was from this point onward that territorialisation or the 
politicisation of space became entrenched, and space became subjected to, or to put it in 
another way, “amenable” to, measurement, mapping, demarcation, control, and bordering 
practices (Elden, 2007). This set the stage for the compartmentalisation of territories into 
polities (Storey, 2012). Thus, it can be said that the modern state emerged as a by-product of 
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the political order engendered by the Treaty of Westphalia (Held, 1989; Newton & Deth, 
2010; Vaughan, 2011; Storey, 2012). The role of geographers and others in shaping this 
process and developing theories of state formation and evolution has been well 
acknowledged (Driver, 1991; Storey, 2012).   
 However, it is important to note that there was a lengthy and broad historical 
transition from the early or traditional states to the modern states (Pierson, 2011). 
Traditional states had “generally lacked conception of sovereignty, monopolistic authority, 
nationality, constitutionality and so on” (Pierson, 2011, p. 31). They were also not 
conscious of their existence as states among other states, which is an important attribute of 
the state in modernity.  A cursory look at the forms or clusters of state systems identified by 
Held (1992) will help one to appreciate the evolution of the modern state from the early 
forms that are considered its precursors. The stages identified by Held are presented in 
Figure 1 as the timeline of the evolution of the modern state from its precursors.  
 
Figure 1. Timeline of the Emergence of the Modern State. State forms and 
historical periods from the early precursors of the modern state to its 
emergence through the centuries (adapted from Held, 1992, p. 78).  
*Part of the feudal system at certain stages. 
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According to Held, the absolutist states were the direct precursors of the modern 
state, and it was the fundamental crisis which befell absolutism and religious tradition that 
paved the way for political transformation of the state (see also Pierson, 2011). As Held 
(1992) has argued, the divine rights of the monarch and the treatment of individuals as 
subjects, whose duty is to obey the ruler without question, had to be overturned: 
 The idea of an impersonal and sovereign political order, that is, a legally circumscribed structure of 
power with supreme jurisdiction over a territory, could not have predominate while political rights, 
obligations and duties were closely tied to property rights and religious tradition. Similarly, the idea 
that human beings as ‘individuals’ or as ‘a people’ could be active citizens of this order – citizens of 
their state – and not subjects of a monarch or emperor could not develop under such conditions. 
(Held, 1989, p. 11).  
In a later publication, Held described the fundamental changes that ushered in the modern 
state political order:   
 The proximate sources of the modern state were absolutism and the interstate system it initiated.  In 
condensing and concentrating political power in its own hands, and in seeking to create a central 
system of rule, absolutism paved the way for a secular and national system of power. Moreover, in 
claiming sovereign authority exclusively for itself, it threw down a challenge to all those groups and 
classes which had had a stake in the old order (the polity of estates), and to all those with a stake in 
the new developing order based on capital and the market economy. It forced all these collectivities 
to rethink their relationship to the state, and to re-examine their political resources. In addition, the 
myriad battles and wars fought out in the interstate system altered fundamentally the boundaries of 
both absolutist states and the emerging modern states - the whole map of Europe changed as 
territorial boundaries progressively became fixed borders.  
  Although the transition from the absolutist to the modern state was marked by dramatic 
events and processes such as the English (1640-88) and French (1769) Revolutions, an exclusive 
focus on these hinders an understanding of the way in which the absolutist state itself was crucial in 
the development of modern political rule. It was the confluence of 'internal' transformations in 
38 
 
European states with shifting geopolitical relations and forces which provided a, if not the, key 
impetus to the formation of the modern state. (Held, 1992, p. 87).  
Held has also catalogued other factors that have precipitated the transformation of absolutist 
states into modern states. The historical developments that facilitated this process 
represented a watershed in the political transformation of the modern state. Held posited 
that:  
 The historical changes that contributed to the transformat ion of medieval notions of politics were 
complicated. Struggles between monarchs and barons over the domain of rightful authority; peasant 
rebellions against the weight of excess taxation and social obligation; the spread of trade, commerce 
and market relations; the flourishing of Renaissance culture with its renewed interest in classical 
political ideas (including Athenian democracy and Roman law); changes in technology particularly 
military technology; the consolidation of national monarchies (notably in England, France and 
Spain); religious strife and the challenge to the universal claims of Catholicism; the struggle between 
Church and State – all played a part. (Held, 1992, p. 83).  
 It is important, for our purpose here, to note that all modern states, which emerged between 
the eighteenth and twentieth century, are nation-states (Held, 1992). The next section 
examines briefly the rise and crisis of the nation-state.   
2.3. Nation-State and National Unity: Myths and Realities 
The foregoing discussion has focused on the development of the state political system and 
the emergence of the modern state. A look at the nation-building project and its spread from 
the West to the entire world may help us to understand better the challenge of diversity and 
conflict to the modern state, and to also appreciate why federalism came to be increasingly 
viewed and embraced as a viable alternative to the nation-state. The Norwegian political 
scientist and sociologist Stein Rokkan (1921-1979) identified two processes associated with 
this development; they are state building and nation building (Rokkan, 1999). State building 
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is mainly concerned with the creation of state institutions, bureaucracy and a system of 
government, while nation building involves “welding the population of the state into a 
single ‘people’ with a shared sense of belonging that often comes from a common language, 
religion, education, historical heritage and culture” (Newton & Deth, 2010, p. 24). The 
fusion of state building and nation building represented one of the political escapades of the 
modern history. As Linz (1993) noted, state building has to do with the creation of what is 
artificial. He argued that the state is not associated with the idea of nature or of being born, 
but it is simply created. Linz further argued that the creation of the state went on for 
centuries before the idea of the nation caught the imagination of intellectuals and the rest of 
the people. For example, Rokkan noted that the crucial phase of state-building was from 
around the eleventh to the eighteenth century (Rokkan, 1999, p. 150). It is noteworthy to 
mention that there is no precise origin of nation building; although there is a suggestion that 
it emerged from the second half of the nineteenth century (Linz, 1993). Even though it has 
been noted that proto-national sentiments in form of a strong identification with a state or 
loyalty to the monarchies by subjects was witnessed even by early sixteenth century in 
Europe (Greenfeld, 1992 & 2003), the idea of nation building, which began in Europe and 
spread to many parts of the world, only became entrenched in the last two centuries (Linz, 
1993; Greenfeld, 2003). Rokkan’s assertion that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars planted a time bomb in form of the idea of the nation-state and popular sovereignty 
supports this historical account (Rokkan, 1999).   
 The phenomenon of nation-building has impacted on the political development of 
African states in significant ways (Gana & Egwu, 2003a and 2003b). This is why it deserves 
to be given attention in a study focused on the Nigerian state. For instance, Linz noted: 
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“African states were created on the basis of colonial boundaries and the complexity of 
building nations on the homogeneous ethnic, linguistic and tribal basis has led African 
politicians to agree to defend the inviolability of state boundaries” (Linz, 1993, p. 357). 
Ironically, African leaders chose to turn their backs on the diversities of political 
organisations that characterised pre-colonial Africa (Herbst, 2000, p. 99). In The Black 
Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, Basil Davidson captured this quite 
vividly:  
 Broadly, the educated elites in West Africa – for a long time, it would be much the same in South 
Africa – saw Africa’s own history as irrelevant and useless ... when it came down to brass tacks, to 
the question of who should take over from the British when the British withdrew, they demand ed a 
more or less complete flattening of the ethnic landscape. (Davidson, 1992, pp. 102-103).    
The leaning of African elites towards nation-statism, as Davidson described above, was 
problematic. As Laitin (2007, p. 88) argued, majority of the post-colonial states in Africa, 
like Nigeria, have arbitrary boundaries, which do not reflect national cultures, and, hence, 
are suspect as nation-states. Antonsich (2010) described the claim of spatial congruence 
between the state and nation by national political elites as fictitious and also as a powerful 
hegemonic discourse employed as a means to legitimise the coexistence of the state and 
nation. In what follows, an attempt is made at examining how the concept of nation-state 
has been deconstructed in the literature before returning to its implications for African  states 
like Nigeria. 
 The premise that the boundaries of the nation and the state should become 
commensurate (Laitin, 2007), has informed the conception of: “A state based on the 
acceptance of a common culture, a common history and a common fate, irrespective of 
whatever political, social and economic differences may exist between the members of the 
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nation-state” (Newton & Deth, 2010, p. 23). Thus, the thesis of commensurability of the 
state and nation has been described as a myth, so also has the conception of the nation-state 
come under barrage of attacks. For instance, David D. Laitin referred to one of the myths of 
the nation-state as the belief that “states are natural, in the sense of correctly encompassing 
well-defined nations within the boundaries of a recognized state” (Laitin, 2007, pp. 82-83). 
Laitin asserted that: “The classical nation-state, one where a nation and state are 
commensurate, in which the national will is embodied in a state of its name, is today largely 
a nostalgic myth” (Laitin, 2007, p. 100). In his famous exegesis on nationalism, Imagined 
Community, Benedict Anderson portrayed the nation-state as a myth. He described nation as 
a “historical fatality” and an “imagined political community – and imagined both inherently 
limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). Anderson considered the idea of the nation, 
which is moving progressively down and up history, as specifically analogous to the notion 
“of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time” 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 26). For Anderson, nations are inventions of imagination. He argued 
that nations are imagined, modelled, adapted and transformed, and they command a sense of 
attachment among peoples. At the same time, “nations inspire love, and often profoundly 
self-sacrificing love” (Anderson, 2006, p. 141). Anderson conceded that it is hard to explain 
how people develop such an attachment with the inventions of their imaginations and are 
willing to die for the inventions. Despite privileging the newspapers in Europe as the basis 
of his analysis, Anderson’s “framework of bound in relationship to unbound seriality allows 
him to discuss the complicated forces acting upon the construction of national identity in 
postcolonial contexts” (Birth, 2013, p. 217). Anderson’s argument, therefore, insisted that 
processes of nation building, which emerged in Europe and spread throughout the world by 
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colonialism, have become “constitutive of collective identities in the process of 
decolonization and in the formation of identities after independence was achieved” (p. 
217.). Thus, the idea of the nation-state became so powerful that it impacted on the political 
trajectories of states in many parts of the world. For example, as Laitin (2007) explained, 
the nation-state project was grounded in a strong vision shared by its protagonists:  
 In the mid-nineteenth century the German romantics saw the reconciliation of the state and nation as 
the fulfilment of a natural historical process. After World War I, the US President Woodrow Wilson 
saw the equation of the state and nation as the key to democracy and peace. And after the Russian 
civil war of 1917-23, the Communist victors saw recognition of national republics as a necessary step 
on the route to communism. In the waning moments of World War II, the national project was central 
to anticolonial mobilization in South Asia and subsequently Africa. (Laitin, 2007, p. 81) 
 Beyond being a myth, the nation has implications both as a concept and in practice. 
As a concept, the nation is a fluid and malleable, quite distinct from the notion of the state 
(Smith A. D., 2003; White, 2007). As earlier highlighted, the state is a spatialised “power 
container” (Vujakovic, 2005). On the other hand, the nation delineates the cultural 
association between people and geographic locations and territories (Vujakovic, p. 161). For 
instance, White argued that:  
 Using the term nation as a synonym for such words as country and state  rather as a human group 
identity, and country and state as a politically organised territory shows that human identity is 
closely tied to place and territory. Indeed, the term nation-state reflects the intimate bonds of people 
and place. (White, 2007, p. 3).  
Noting the difficulty associated with defining the nation, Adam D. Smith posited that the 
attempt to define a nation has to involve the construction of an ideal-type based on the 
visions of the nationalists and the processes involved in forming the kind of human 
association that are referred to as nation, such as myth-making, memory selection, 
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territorialisation, cultural unification, to name a few (Smith, 2003). Taking these into 
account, Smith argued that the nation “is neither ‘natural’, nor ‘essential’; indeed, it does 
not constitute a once-for-all goal, or fixed target, but a series of processes towards a goal 
that ever eludes its pursuers” (Smith, 2003, p. 24). Hence, Smith referred to a nation as “a 
named human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and 
memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members” (p. 24). This 
definition brings out the difficulty that a state like Nigeria is bound to encounter when it  
adopts the nation-state project. National identity is inherently conceived, according to this 
definition, as a solvent that dissolves diversity. Just like the term nation, national identity is 
also a contested, if not elusive, concept (Smith, 2003; Wodak, Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 
2009). Smith again described “national identity” as the “maintenance and continual 
reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that form 
the distinctive heritage of the nation, and the identification of the individuals with tha t 
heritage and its patterns” (Smith, 2003, p. 25). It is important to note that self-definition 
matters here because nations define themselves in varying ways (White, 2007). Symmons-
Symonolewicz made the attempt to come up with a blended definition that knits the nation, 
national identity and national unity together. Symmons-Symonolewicz’s definition brought 
out the quest of nations to have sovereignty over a territory and to pursue self-government: 
 A territorially-based community of human beings sharing a distinct variant of modern culture, bound 
together by a strong sentiment of unity and solidarity, marked by a clear historically -rooted 
consciousness of national identity, and possessing, or striving to possess, a genuine poli tical self-
government. (Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1985, p. 221).  
Symmons-Symonolewicz’s definition is a reminder that the modern nation is not just a 
myth; it is real in the challenge that it poses to the state. As nations aspire to assert 
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themselves and seek to control a territory in order to craft their own laws to protect their 
culture, conflict is bound to creep in (White, 2007). This challenge has become the bane of 
the nation-state, which has historically been construed as a sovereign state inhabited by a 
group of people who viewed themselves as one (Connor, 1972; Ma, 1992; Murphy, 1996). 
The fact that many so-called sovereign states are ethnically and nationally heterogeneous, 
even if they seek to fashion themselves otherwise, makes the nation-state project 
problematic (Murphy, 1996).    
 As earlier noted, Africa’s experience with the nation-building project has been 
marked by grim outcomes. In his widely cited article, “Nation-Building or Nation-
Destroying,” Walter Connor argued that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, “The prime cause of 
political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments o f 
the population” (Connor, 1972, p. 353). “As a consequence of the opportunistic and 
arbitrary way in which colonial powers assembled their possessions, most of these states 
brought together disparate cultures and communities” (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 55). Thus, 
as Connor (1972) pointed out, in such states primordial loyalties tend to be stronger than 
loyalty to the state, and even political parties are mere means of masking primordial 
rivalries. A number of African countries, including Nigeria, had experienced civil war as a 
result of this phenomenon (Connor, 1972; Murphy, 1996). Antonsich (2010) has described 
the manifestations of the crisis of the nation-state as the “crisis of the hyphen.” The “crisis 
of the hyphen”, that is, “the increasingly problematic convergence between nation and state” 
is a worldwide phenomenon (Antonsich, 2009, p. 790).  
 For  example, Gana (2003), drawing from Deutschian tradition – based on the notion 
of stages of nation-building popularised by Karl Deutsch and some historically oriented 
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political scientists in the mid twentieth century – posited that the Nigerian state appears to 
have failed to realise K. C. Wheare’s (1970) dream that that the federal formula will propel 
a state to attain the stage of integration – “a stage at which regional, religious and ethnic 
walls collapse and a pan-Nigerian identity is on the verge of consolidation” (Gana, 2003, p. 
29). The persistence of conflict along regional, religious and ethnic lines in Nigeria has not 
only cast shadow on the country’s federalism, but remains a stark reminder of the 
unrelenting and vexatious National Question, which squarely and continuously puts the very 
formation of the Nigerian state in the crucible of political discourse. About a decade ago, a 
Nigerian writer, Jibrin Ibrahim described this as an African crisis and wrote this prognosis: 
The crisis of the state, nation, community and contesting cultures is particularly profound in 
contemporary Africa and the continent must confront the necessity of redesigning and saving its 
political future or face the risk of systemic collapse. For a very long period, African ruling classes 
have been propagating the virtues of national unity and the necessity of developing the nation -state. 
The reality of the continent, however, is that commitment to and identity (sic) with the state has 
always been very low. Indeed, the post-colonial state is currently undergoing an existential crisis. 
The African continent has been subjected to such terrible forces of repression, of exclusion of ethnic 
and religious groups, of destruction of her human and natural resources, that anarchy, ethnic 
cleansing, warlordism and the decomposition of political communities have become integral part of 
the political agenda for many countries. That is the path of despair and hopelessness that must be 
averted. The way forward is the struggle for renewal in which democracy is a critical instrument that 
could lead to the reconstruction of politics and the state, culture, economic organisation and 
production. At the heart of that search for democratic renewal, in the context of risi ng identity 
conflicts, is the question of federalism. (Ibrahim, 2003, pp. 116-117). 
This vivid depiction of the political reality of Africa, and Nigeria in particular, clearly 
shows the failure of the nation-state project on the continent. 
46 
 
 Anthony D. Smiths pointed out that “two of the nation’s most important cultural 
resources and traditions are constituted by ‘ethnicity’ and ‘religion’” (Smith, 2003, p. 25) , 
which are intertwined (Smith, 1978; Smith, 2003). For instance, Joseph Raune and Jennifer 
Todd posited that religion and ethnicity intersect, and each can act as a powerful basis for 
identity, group formation and communal conflict. (Ruane & Todd, 2010a). In another work, 
Ruane and Todd (2010b) highlighted the importance of ethnicity and religion in state-
building and nation-building. Ruane and Todd pointed out the ubiquitousness of ethnicity 
and religion in today’s conflicts. The fusion of ethnicity and religion, and their role in the 
formation of national identity make them important resources for group mobilisation, 
contestation and conflict, especially in multinational state like Nigeria (Bruce, 2003; Ruane 
& Todd, 2010a).  
 The bifurcation of the concept of nation into a cultural-ethnic ensemble and a civic 
vocabulary has been adopted as an innovative way of overcoming the crisis that has befallen 
the nation-state (Antonsich, 2009). In their quest to create “national unity,” Western 
politicians have embraced a concept of nation that is “based on a legal-political community, 
common culture and a civic ideology” (Vujakovic, 2005, p. 161). The Western model 
emphasises common values (such as passion for liberty, sense of duty, commitment to 
tolerance and fair play), shared interests and upholding the place of vital common 
institutions (Antonsich, 2009, p. 792). On the other hand, the non-Western model defines 
the nation in cultural-ethnic terms: “the nation as a community of common descent, a 
‘super-family’ or a ‘folk’ (Vujakovic, 2005, p. 161). The commonality between the two 
models is that they are each grounded in the idea of a national territory or homeland; their 
major difference is that while the civic model permits the transfer of allegiance between 
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nations, the ‘folk’ model does not. The next section looks how federalism became a 
practical mechanism of managing the challenge of diversity. 
2.4. Paradox of Federalism: Blending Unity and Diversity  
In his article, “From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift” (1996), Daniel Elazar noted 
that the nation-state was undergoing a significant transformation, which he characterised as 
a paradigm shift. The old paradigm, according to Elazar, was portrayed in the manner that, 
“states strove for self-sufficiency, homogeneity, and with a few exceptions, concentration of 
authority and power in a single centre” (Elazar, 1996, p. 419). Conversely, “under the new 
paradigm all states have to recognise as well their interdependence, heterogeneity, and the 
fact that their centres, if they ever existed, are no longer single centres but parts of a multi -
centred network that is increasingly noncentralised” (p. 419). Elazar acknowledged that the 
paradigm shift does not eliminate completely the challenge that comes from ethnic conflicts. 
He accepted the inevitability thesis of social conflict by arguing that the potential for  ethnic 
groups to have conflict with the state and with each other always exists. Elazar observed 
that ethnic conflicts have received increasing attention as a result of the horrendous 
consequences that they have produced at the time. For example, the genocide in the former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, which claimed an estimated two hundred thousand lives, and 
Rwandese genocide in 1994 in which nearly a million died, were examples of how ethnic 
nationalism reared its ugly head in recent history (Brancati, 2009; Prunier, 2009; Stein, 
2012).   Elazar contended that the resurgence of ethnic strife, in defiance of the hope that 
modernisation will usher in an era in which primordial attachments will be abandoned, gave 
rise to a widely shared belief in federalism as antidote  to ethnic conflicts. However, Elazar 
also noted the dialectical relationship between ethnicity and federalism – while ethnic 
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cleavages and agitations make federalism necessary, in some way render it especially 
difficult and less likely to be successful. According to Elazar, proponents of ethnic self-
determination and of federalism have to confront this paradox and its “polar” realities.  Is 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria a quintessence of these “polar” realities? This is the 
question at the heart of this study. 
2.5. Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Federalism 
 Despite the large volume of published studies on federalism, there is  a seeming 
underappreciation of the history of its roots in theological-political tradition (McCoy & 
Baker, 1991; Elazar, 1996 and 2000; Baker, 2000; Lépine, 2012). Majority of writings about 
the origins of federalism, like those of William Riker and many of his contemporaries as 
well as present-day writers, tend to start and end with a consideration of the circumstances 
and motives behind the creation of modern federations. Few scholars have delved into the 
legacy of Reformed and post-Reformed theology on modern federalism. This omission 
prompted Charles McCoy and Wayne Baker to ask whether it is due to amnesia or deliberate 
attempt to deny religion the credit it deserves for laying a foundation of what is centra l in 
shaping the modern society (McCoy & Baker, 1991). Perhaps, this might have been 
informed, as David Elazar opined, by the attempt of modern theorists and practitioners to 
secularise the borrowed covenant idea that served as the kernel of modern federalism 
(Baker, 2000, p. 25). In defence of the omission of religion in scholarly analysis, Max 
Frenkel, for example, argued that religious elaboration of federalism was no more relevant 
because its ideological point of departure is too restrictive (Frenkel, 1986).     
 In their groundbreaking work, Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and 
the Covenantal Tradition, McCoy and Baker (2000) took on the task of tracing the origin of 
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political federalism to its original roots in covenantal thought in the religious and 
theological traditions, in particular to the Reformed and post-Reformed tradition of the 
Christian faith. McCoy and Baker’s work was an attempt to help scholars, as they put it: “to 
overcome whatever it is that blocks out an understanding of this movement which is so 
important for understanding our history, our society, and our own existence” (McCoy & 
Baker, 1991, p. 9).  McCoy & Baker explained how federal theology tradition inspired 
federal political philosophy and served as the foundation of modern federalism. They traced 
the intellectual foundation of the federal movement to Heinrich Bullinger’s treatise De 
testamento seu foedere Dei unico et aeterno (1534), translated as The One and Eternal 
Testament or Covenant of God (McCoy & Baker, 1991, p. 9). McCoy & Baker asserted that, 
contrary to what is generally held, the basic ideas of human nature on which Western 
societies are founded did not spring out from liberal individualism but from federal tradition 
which had predated it. For example, Johannes Althusius, who was the first systematic 
expositor of the federal political philosophy, underscored the symbiotic nature of humans 
and spoke of humans not as individuals but as symbiotes. McCoy & Baker posited that the 
very ideas of government based on covenant or compact was entrenched in the federal 
tradition before Hobbes and Locke came up with what may likely be considered as later 
variants of federal thought (see also Baker, 2000, p. 26). Even the ideas of division of 
powers and the need for checks and balances attributed to Montesquieu were well-
articulated in the federal tradition before his widely quoted formulation of them. Although 
Montesquieu is also regarded as the first to pioneer and conceptualise the idea and 
semantics of federalism in modern political thought through his The Spirit of Laws (1748) 
(Lépine, 2012, p. 30), it was the great transformations spurred by the Reformed 
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Protestantism resting on covenant theology in the sixteenth century that inspired a 
revolution in political philosophy (Elazar, 1996). Therefore, the influence of covenant 
theology of early Reformed Protestantism can be said to even surpass that of ancient and 
medieval contributions as the basis for the development of modern federalism (Elazar 1996; 
Baker 2000). 
 McCoy and Baker described Bullinger’s treatise as the “point of origin or the 
fountainhead of federalism” because it is the first attempt to organise “the understanding of 
God, creation, humanity, human history, and society around the covenant” (McCoy & 
Baker, 1991, p. 9). To understand how the concept of federalism is related to the idea of 
covenant requires a close look at the etymology of federalism. The word “federal” is a 
derivative of the Latin foedus, which means covenant. Thus, McCoy and Baker asserted: “A 
covenantal order is federal. A federal order is covenantal” (McCoy and Baker, 1991, p. 12). 
They also noted that while the concepts of “federalism” and “covenant” are intertwined, 
political thought has appropriated the former and biblical studies and theology have isolated 
the latter as a purely biblical concept and a Reformation and post-Reformation Christian 
doctrine. This bifurcation has blurred the commonality of federal terminology, including 
such words as covenant, compact and contract, to both theological and political writers. 
Disciplinary borders, even as they are today, are not water-tight. McCoy and Baker 
highlighted this by pointing out that between the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries when the institutions of the modern world began to take shape, federal theologians 
delved into political and ecclesiastical issues and political philosophers were concerned with 
both societal covenants and religious issues. For example:   
Heinrich Bullinger and Samuel Rutherford were primarily religious leaders but did not hesitate to 
spell out the political implications of their theological federalism. On the other hand, political 
51 
 
thinkers like Johannes Althusius and Thomas Hobbes focused on the political order but included 
much that now would be regarded as in the domain of theology. All four are deeply immersed in the 
covenantal or federal tradition. (McCoy & Baker, 1991, p. 12).       
 Bullinger’s treatise, albeit not conceived as a political philosophy, contains the four 
out of the five elements of later federalism, namely: 1) envisions of society formed on the 
basis of the covenant; 2) views human nature as the imperative for the covenant; 3) 
emphasises the collectivity or community; and 4) upholds the need for the community to be 
governed by God’s laws (Baker, 2000, p. 27).  Baker observed the absence of checks and 
balances in Bullinger’s system. Instead, Bullinger assumes faithfulness in the covenant on 
the part of the community and its leaders, and makes only a suggestion of a check to the 
authority exercised by the magistrate through the threat of divine punishment. However, 
Phillippe du Plessis Mornay advocated the idea of strong check by asserting that any ruler 
who violates the covenant loses legitimacy and should be deposed. Mornay’s (1579) 
Defense of Liberty against Tyranny: or of the lawful power of the prince over the people, 
and the people over the prince (Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos: sive, de principis in populum, 
populique in principem, legitma potestate) demonstrates his belief that in both religious and 
political covenants, the civil ruler is both accountable to God and to the people (Baker, 
2000, p. 28). Mornay’s position was that political sovereignty resides with the citizens 
(Hall, 1997). Clearly, Mornay’s covenantal thought has a conjoined view of religious and 
political life within the federal framework.  Although he talked about obedience to God as a 
source of legitimacy, Mornay’s idea of popular sovereignty radically conceives of ultimate 
political sovereignty in the citizens (Baker, 2000). Mornay raised and answered some 
pertinent questions, which led him to propose a framework of justification for striping a 
ruler of his authority based on the violation of the covenant (Hall, 1997, p. 9):  
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 Are kings themselves above the law? 
 May the prince make new laws, or are they made by the people? 
 Does the ruler have power of life and death over his subjects? 
 May the king ignore the law in granting pardon to those found guilty? 
 Does the property of the people belong to the king? 
 Is the king the lawful owner of the kingdom? 
 May the king use the property of the people for his own ends? 
These questions, whose answers very obvious, establish the limit of the authority of the 
ruler and affirm the people’s sovereignty. Here Mornay’s position aligned with John 
Locke’s thesis of the revocability of the social contract in contrast to Thomas Hobbes’ 
absolutizing arbitrary will of the sovereign (cf. Hall, 1997, p. 9; Stanlis, 2003, p. 23).     
 At this point, a brief exposé on the covenantal logics of federalism is worthwhile. 
McCoy and Baker (1991) use six arguments to show the covenantal logics of federalism. 
This is summarised as follows: 
1. First, the term “federal” and “covenant” are closely related and interchangeable. The 
word “federal” is a derivative of the Latin foedus, which means covenant. Federalism is 
therefore a covenant.  
2. Second, federalism is explained in terms of the relationship between God, humans and 
nature (land) based on covenant. Biblically, humans enter into a covenant in order to 
shape economic, political and familial relations. “The relation of God with the creation 
and with humanity is depicted in covenantal terms” (p. 12). Biblical examples this 
covenantal relationship: God’s covenant with Noah, all humanity, and nature after the 
flood; God’s covenant with Abraham and his descendents; and God’s covenant with 
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Hebrew people after their deliverance from captivity in Egypt. Thus, a parallel can be 
drawn between the conceptions of covenant in federal theological thought and federal 
political philosophy. For instance, just as federal theologians assert that “God’s covenant 
is originally with nature, and with humans in creation and that subsequent covenants 
continue, renew, and respond to the compact by which the world was created” (p. 13) so 
also do federal political philosophers affirm this pattern in varied forms. McCoy and 
Baker cited the example of the Hobbesian genesis of the state. In the Leviathan, Hobbes 
“understood the state as created by human compact in way parallel to God’s covenantal 
fiat creating the world” (p.13). There are even federal thinkers who understand the 
Trinity, that is, the relations within the Godhead among the three persons, The Father, 
The Son and The Holy Spirit, as social, federal or covenantal relations. In federal 
perspective, the most deep-seated affirmation about God for Christians is that God is 
always faithful and keeps covenants. 
3. Third, federalists understand the inner nature of social groups and the relationships 
among members as covenantal. For example, primary social groups such as families, 
congregations, occupational groups, and community organisations live by virtue of the 
unspoken and explicit compacts defining relations among their members and committing 
them to the group. In the case of a political organisation the compact is among the 
collectivities that make up the larger entity – for a example, a town is based on a 
compact among families, a province is based on a compact among towns, a 
commonwealth is based on a compact among provinces, and international relations is 
based on a compact among commonwealths. “The element of voluntary participation, of 
the rights and responsibilities of membership, of commitment to the group and its 
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patterns of governance, and of holding leaders to their covenanted obligations are central 
to the federal order whether ecclesiastical, economic, or political” (p. 13). 
4. Fourth, division of powers is a concomitant component of federalism. Federalism insists 
on division of powers at and between all levels of organisation. This is to ensure: 1) 
check and balances in order to guide against excessive concentration and misuse of 
power; 2) functional efficiency; and 3) appropriateness of action. It appears that the 
concept of division of powers and check and balances have dominated the understanding 
of federalism and relegated other aspects, blurring the broader and more accurate 
picture.  
5. Fifth, federalism and federal relations are to be regarded as dynamic concepts rather than 
static pattern or design. Therefore, federalism is, first and foremost, a process of 
federalizing a political community – a process that brings a number of political 
communities into a compact in order to solve problems, adopt joint policies and make 
decisions on problems that affect them. It is also a process that brings about the 
differentiation of a unitary political community into a federally organised whole. Since 
federal relations are dynamic it is, therefore, incumbent on every federally organised 
community to brace itself with the instrumentalities for continuing improvement. The 
implication of this is, no federal design is perfect and timeless; adapting to changes and 
improvements make it work.     
6. Sixth, federalism, implicitly or explicitly, subscribes to the view that human nature and 
history are intertwined. McCocy and Baker explained this logic in a rather philosophical 
manner: 
 Both humanity and history are understood developmentally, as moving toward fulfilment, and 
humans are understood as social and covenantally shaped and committed. The mix of good and evil 
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in history and the compound of original goodness and fallen sinfulness in human nature  eliminates 
the possibility of an easy optimism or a notion of automatic progress with reference to  the future. Yet 
there is, among federalists from Bullinger to Jahannes Althusius, John Winthrop, and James 
Madison, a strong element of hope within republics shaped for the federal perspective.  (McCoy 
& Baker, 1991, p. 14).   
 While some of the ideas above may seem to espouse what Frenkel (1986) feared as 
the restrictive ideological point of departure of federal theology, they have nevertheless 
informed the underlying logic of modern federalism. A number of scholars have affirmed 
the influence of these ideas even on seemingly more secular federations (Elazar, 1996; Hall, 
1997; Everett, 1997; Elazar, 2000; Baker, 2000; Freitas & Raath, 2009). 
 Daniel J Elazar’s “From Biblical Covenant to Modern Federalism: The Federal 
Theology Bridge” (2000) has collaborated McCoy & Baker’s attempt to fill the missing link 
between federal theology and modern federalism. Elazar has argued that covenant or federal 
theory was not the exclusive domain of philosophers, theologians and intellectuals alone, 
but has had wide adaptations and applications in public enterprise including the creation of 
unions, governments and corporations. Elazar pointed out numerous classical examples in 
which Americans made covenants to create new civil societies regularly. The examples cited 
by Elazar have one common denominator: they are analogous to and inspired by biblical 
concept of covenant. 
The examples cited by Elazar (2000, p. 2-3) include: 
The Mayflower Compact 1620: 
In The name of God, Amen. We whose names are under-written,... Having undertaken for the Glory 
of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage 
to plant the first colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and 
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mutually in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a 
civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid.   
Virginia Bill of Rights 1776: 
[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, 
when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity, 
namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety. 
The Vermont Declaration of independence 1777: 
We,...the inhabitants, [of the New Hamshire grants] are at present without law or government, and 
may be truly said to be in a state of nature; consequently a right remains to the people of said Grants 
to form a government best suited to secure their property, well being and happiness.  
The Constitution of Massachusetts written by John Adams 1779: 
The body politics is formed by a voluntary association of individuals. It is a social compact by which 
the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be 
governed by certain laws for the common good. It is  the duty of the people, therefore, in framing a 
Constitution of Government, to provide for an equitable mode of making laws, as well as for 
impartial interpretation and faithful execution of them, that every man may, at all times, find his 
security in them.    
Lyndon Johnson’s Inaugural Address 1965: 
They came here – the exile and the stranger, brave but frightened – to find a place where a man could 
be his own man. They made a covenant with this land. Conceived in justice, written in liberty, bound 
in Union, it was meant one day to inspire the hopes of all mankind; and it binds us still. If we keep 
its terms, we shall flourish. 
 Elazar used the above excerpts to demonstrate how the covenant principle has 
underpinned the foundation of American politics. According to Elazar, while the 
interpretations of the covenant principle may differ among theologians, there are broad 
areas of agreement among political leaders, who had been inspired by religious principles 
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and those within a secular political setting. All those who subscribed to the covenant 
principle based on either religious or secular persuasions agree on: “the importance of 
popular or republican government;” the necessity to diffuse power;”  “the importance of 
individual rights and dignity as the foundation of any genuinely good political system;”  and 
“the existence of inalienable rights was not an excuse for anarchy just as the existence of 
ineradicable human passions was not an excuse for tyranny” (Elazar, 2000, p. 4).  
 Although Elazar used the American examples to drive his point home, he 
acknowledged that the relationship between covenant and politics is as old as political life 
itself. He traced the origin of the use of covenant in politics to over four thousand years ago 
in ancient Mesopotamia. He credited the advancement of the political idea of covenant, 
where polities are created based on cooperative partnership, to the Jewish people. In the 
Jewish sense, covenant, which is called brit in Hebrew, “signifies a voluntary partnership, 
often meant to be perpetual (or “until death do us part”) between peoples or parties having 
independent, though not necessarily equal, status” (Elazar, 2000, p. 5). The purpose of such 
association, according to Elazar, was to “provide for joint action or obligation to achieve 
defined ends (limited or comprehensive) under conditions of mutual respect which protect 
the individual integrates of all the parties” (p. 5).   
 Implied in the writings of Elazar, the medieval and ancient background of 
contractualism are important insofar as they help us to understand the original ideas of 
covenantal politics, but “the basis for the development of modern federalism was the 
covenantal theology of early Protestantism” (Baker, 2000, p. 25). Thus, Elazar’s opinion 
was that modern theorists and practitioners of federalism basically embraced the theological 
covenantal idea and secularised it.  Elazar, like McCoy and Baker, acknowledged Bullinger 
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as the first to lucidly elaborate a theology of conditional covenant and to utilise it as a 
framework for the Christian community. Some of the early attempts to introduce the 
covenant idea to civil politics, according to Elazar, were made by: Oecolampadius (1525), 
who talked about a Natural Law Covenant predicated on the love of God that was to form 
the basis for civil covenant; Theodore Beza (1574), who advanced the notion of civil 
covenants to justify resistance to tyranny and insisted that rulers must obey God’s covenants 
and civil covenants with the people; and Phillipe du plessis-Mornay (1579), who advocated 
a tripartite notion of covenant between God, the king and the people and advanced the ideas 
of religious and civil liberties (Elazar, 2000, p. 8). However, Elazar noted, it was in 
Johannes Althusius’ (1603) work that the concept of civil covenant attained “its fullest 
expression” (p. 8). It was Althusius that was credited with the conceptualisation of proper 
human relationships, including the family and the creation of polities, in terms of covenants. 
 To summarise the foregoing discussion on the philosophical and intellectual origins 
of political federalism, we turn to Baker (2000). Baker identified the epochal and 
intellectual faces of federalism in six sequential orders as follows:  
1. Bullinger’s One and Eternal Testament or Covenant of God as “The original face of 
federalism” – Bullinger was the first to develop the concept of covenant or federal 
theology in 1525 in Zurich. 
2. Mornay’s Defense of Liberty against Tyrants as “The early political face of 
federalism” – For Mornay, religious and political covenants made civil rulers 
accountable to both God and people, and ultimate political sovereignty resides with 
the people.     
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3. Althusius’ Politics as “The bridge between the religious covenant and political 
federalism” – Althusius made the first connection between religious covenant and 
political federalism. 
4. Hobbes’ Leviathan as “The dark face of federalism” – Hobbes had a dark view of 
human nature and believed that the absolute state personified by the “mortal god” 
was the only guarantee of peace and order in society. 
5. Locke’s Second Treatise of Government as “A new face of federalism” – Locke’s 
political theory encapsulated the basic elements of federalism including the necessity 
of a social covenant or compact to bind political community and the indispensability 
of political sovereignty, which is subject to revocability where the sovereign 
authority becomes tyrannical.  
6. “The American face of federalism” – the covenant made by the Pilgrims aboard the 
Mayflower in 1620 and the sermon of John Winthrop in 1630 in preparation for the 
establishment of the colony of Massachusetts represented a “rudimentary theory of 
social compact to build a political community on the religious covenant” and Thomas 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence was “a more sophisticated theory” ushering 
the new American face of federalism.    
 Two salient points are worth mentioning here. First, covenantal federal ideas had 
deep roots in early federations such as in Switzerland (1291). Second, contractual political 
theorists tried to secularize covenantal federal principles, but have not succeeded in 
obliterating it completely. In spite of the attempt by social contract theorist such as Hobbes 
(1151), Locke (1690), Montesquieu (1748), Rousseau (1762) and others to secularize 
covenant, covenant political principles became the basis of formation of latter federations 
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such as the United States (Elazar, 2000). The next chapter would help one to judge whether 
or not covenantal political principles influenced Nigeria’s federal bargain, considering the 
fact that the British effectively governed the country into federalism (Ajayi, 1962). In what 
follows, the factors that motivate states to adopt federalism are examined. 
2.6 Motives behind the Adoption of Federalism 
 The work of William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964), 
has been acknowledged by several scholars as one of the most influential contributions to 
the study of federalism (Volden, 2004; Rodden, 2004; Filippov, 2005; Burgess, 2006; 
Kleinerman, 2009). Riker was widely regarded as one of the founders of the methodology of 
rational choice in the study of politics (Filippov, 2005; Kleinerman, 2009).  He insisted that 
political phenomena should be studied through the application of scientific methodology.  In 
Federalism, Riker sought to demonstrate the promising application of scientific 
methodology to research on federalism; and, by doing so, he was prepared to stir up a new 
controversy among his contemporaries. Riker’s scientific approach in Federalism aimed at 
reaching tested and testable conclusions about the conditions under which federations are 
created. First, he agreed that each “federal bargain” was shaped by “unique historical 
contexts” (Burgess, 2006, p. 77), but insisted that there are generalisable conditions or 
common factors to the origins of federations. Riker analysed the “bargain invented at 
Philadelphia” and examined all cases of creation of a federation from 1786 to 1964. This led 
him to formulate two propositions that, according to him, constitute the two conditions 
behind the bargain of federalism: 1) the expansion condition and 2) the military condition 
(Burgess, 2006, p. 77; Volden, 2004, pp. 91-92; Dikshit, 1971, p. 182). In Riker’s own 
words, the two predispositions that are always present in the “federal bargain” and are 
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conditions that are necessary for the creation of any federalism are (as cited in Volden, 
2004, p. 91-92): 
1. The politicians who offer the bargain desire to expand their territorial control, usual ly either to 
meet an internal military or diplomatic threat or to prepare for military or diplomatic aggression and 
aggrandizement. But, though they desire to expand, they are not able to do so by conquest, because 
of either military incapacity or ideological distaste . . . .  
2. The politicians who accept the bargain, giving up some independence for the sake of union, are 
willing to do so because of some external military-diplomatic threat or opportunity. Either they 
desire protection from an external threat or they desire to participate in the potential aggression of 
the federation.  
Riker’s assumption in the statement above was that “federalism is an outcome of 
institutional bargaining among politicians” (Filippov, 2005, p. 95). As Burgess (2006) 
observed, Riker’s approach had a rational view of political actors – “that men in politics 
behave rationally in making bargains that involved mutual benefits” (p. 78).    
 Riker was not the first and the last to mention the importance of military and 
expansion conditions in the origins of federations. Some scholars before him, including 
H.R.G. Greeves, William P. Maddox, and K.C. Wheare also advanced arguments 
highlighting a military condition or external threat in the origins of federalism (Volden, 
2004; Dikshit, 1971). However, Riker’s position differed from the one they espoused. While 
the others argued that the military and expansion conditions are two of the many efficient 
agents in the creation of federalism, Riker was obviously the first to pinpoint that they are 
“necessary” but “not sufficient” conditions for the origins of federalism (Volden, 2004, p. 
91; Dikshit, 1971, p. 182). Riker’s assertion that the two conditions were necessary for the 
creation of federations triggered further debate on the motives behind the creation of 
federations (Burgess, 2006, p. 78). For example, Anthony Birch reassessed Riker’s 
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propositions with reference to Nigeria, East Africa and Malaysia. Birch contradicted Riker’s 
account that the ambition of Ghana through Nkwame Nkrumah’s emphasis on pan-
Africanism was an external threat to the Western region of Nigeria (Dikshit, 1971, p. 183). 
Birch, who served as the legal consultant for the Western region of Nigeria during the 
federal negotiations, countered Riker by pointing out that the negotiators at the time neither 
had any concern of external threat from Ghana nor entertained any sympathy for Nkrumah’s 
ambitions. Likewise, in the case of Malaysia, Birch argued that Riker looked only at “the 
possibility of Indonesian aggression as the only threat,” and ignored the presence of internal 
threats. Based on these two disconfirming cases, Birch came to the conclusion that the 
desire to deter internal threats and external threats are relevant to the formation of 
federalism (Volden, 2004, p. 93; Dikshit, 1971, p. 183). Hence, Birch expanded Riker’s 
conditions to include (1) the desire to deter internal threats and (2) the willingness to have 
them deterred (Burgess, 2006, p. 78; Volden, 2004, p. 93).  
 Birch’s argument did not seem to weaken the Rikerian thesis. Some even suggested 
that it rather reinforced it (Dikshit, 1971). For example, Ramesh Dikshit observed that Birch 
himself has acknowledged that Indonesia posed an apparent threat to Malaysia, even if the 
threat was not as potent as was portrayed by Riker. In the case of Nigeria, Dikshit suggested 
that the external threat was not ruled out. The mere fact that the three regions of Nigeria 
were surrounded by the French cultural empire in West Africa was enough to constitute an 
external threat.  Dikshit opined that: 
This geographical location may well have prompted some sense of solidarity and of the need for 
union at least among the elites. Because of the strongly divisive elements in their politico-geographic 
makeup, however, these units could not form a unitary state, so they chose instead t he federal form 
of organisation. (Dikshit, 1971, p. 184).  
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 Geoffrey Sawer, on his part, was not comfortable with what he considered as Riker’s 
overemphasis on the military condition (Volden, 2004) and viewed Riker’s ‘defence-and-
diplomacy’ as “rather over-stressed” and based on quite a loose conception of federalism  
(Burgess, 2012). This concern was also shared by Dikshit, who cited the lack of compelling 
evidence of the military conditions in the cases of Germany and Austria.  Dakshit (1971) 
offered two negative proofs against Riker’s military interpretation of federal constitutions 
and his claim that the two conditions he named must be present before any federation will 
be established under all circumstances. Dakshit, like other scholars, accepted that external 
threat may be one of the most compelling agents in the creation of a federation, but objected 
to the Rikerian thesis of the necessity of the military and expansion conditions. According 
to Dikshit, the experience of two post-World War II European federations, Germany and 
Austria appear to disagree with Riker’s necessity hypothesis. Dikshit provided an elaborate 
analysis of the German and Austrian federal bargains to question the Riker’s necessity 
hypothesis of military and expansion conditions in the origins of federalism. Dikshit’s 
conclusion was that:  
Federalism is in fact a complex structure born in response to a set of peculiar spatial arrangements 
and shaped by the interactions of economic, political, and cultural factors. To single out any one of 
these sets of factors to explain the whole structure is bound to give results that are only partially true. 
Federalism is an integrated phenomenon, and it should be seen in its entirety if we want to arrive at 
valid conclusions. (Dikshit, 1971, p. 189).  
 Dikshit further argued that there is a considerable difference between the raisons 
d'être of earlier federalism and modern federalism. According to him, while the raisons 
d'être of earlier experiments with federalism may necessarily be predicated on the need for 
military alliance against a common enemy, modern federalism, on the other hand, arose 
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from multiplicity of needs and not just military security. In a nutshell, he argued that: “The 
primary objective of modern federalism is to create a body politic—an integrated and fully 
functioning political unit. Hence the purposes that bind the prospective partners together 
cannot be narrowly political or military” (Dikshit, 1971, p. 189).  
 Burgess (2006) attempted to synthesise the various arguments on the motives behind 
the origins and formation of federation. He critically analysed the different postulations that 
had been advanced by early authorities including Wheare, Deutsch, Riker, Birch and Watt. 
First, Burgess noted that generally scholars tend to identify two predominant motives behind 
the origins of federalism, which are “defence and security” and “economic and commercial” 
motives.  The defence and security goals have led to the formation of a defence union for 
military purpose (a Kriegsverein), and the economic and commercial objectives gave rise to 
a customs union for economic benefits facilitated by increased flow of trade and commerce 
(a Zollverein) (p. 76). Burgess also observed that the defence and security consideration was 
regarded by majority of scholars as the critical factor in the origins of both confederations 
and federations.  Burgess went a step further by attempting to synthesise the ideas of 
previous contributors to the debate on the origins of federation. He proposed what he 
described as “a set of historical factors that pertain in various ways to every modern 
federation in its origins and formation and that contain sufficient scope and flexibility to 
facilitate, in each case study, a different hierarchy of causes” (Burgess, 2006, p. 99). His 
proposal began with a classification of these historical factors into two broad categories, 
namely, “perceived common interests” and “real or imagined external and/or internal 
threats.” Burgess produced a list of the constitutive elements of the two categories by 
largely drawing from the contributions of previous scholarship. The constitutive elements of  
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the “Common Interest” category include: shared political values; expectations of stronger 
economic ties and associated benefits; a multiplicity of ranges of communications and 
transactions; the desire for political independence; prior political association; strategic 
(territorial) consideration; geographical proximity; common cultural-ideological factors, 
such as nationalism, religion and inherited traditions and customs; political leadership and a 
broadening of the political elite; similarity of social and political institutions; the appeal of 
federal models; the culmination of historical processes that were founded upon prior 
political commitments. The “External and /or Internal Threats” comprise of the following 
constitutive elements: A sense of military insecurity real or imagined; a sense of economic 
insecurity real or imagined; a sense of cultural insecurity real or imagined; and a perceived 
threat to the stability of the existing political order.  
 Although Burgess has claimed that his schema of circumstantial causation would 
apply to every modern federation since 1789, he admitted that the debate was far from being 
over. What he was able to achieve was to establish a ground for the rejection of Riker’s 
federal bargain hypothesis of the necessity of military and expansion conditions in the 
origins of federations. Burgess’ historical analysis of selected case studies led him to 
conclude that “a complex amalgam of socio-economic, historical and political variables 
were present at the creation” of every modern federation (Burgess, 2006, p. 101). Burgess’ 
proposed theory of circumstantial causation contains what he referred to as “sufficient scope 
and flexibility” that allows for the determination of hierarchy of causes in the formation of 
every federation. However, his exclusion of old Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil and Nigeria 
because of their experience with military rule posed a challenge. He asserted that: “Such 
coercive unions certainly exhibited federalism but were not real federations” (p. 98). He 
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further argued that “Federations are voluntary unions based upon liberal democratic notions 
of constitutional government” (p. 98).  
 This delineation raises an implication for the meaning of federalism and federation. 
It can also be said, for example, that Nigeria’s federalism “died” when the military struck 
(cf. Alli, 2003, p. 71), but “resurrected” when the country returned to a democratic 
dispensation in 1999 (cf. Watts, 2008). Another challenge inherent in the Burgess’ 
conception is that it is also problematic to claim that all federations are formed as voluntary 
unions because: “Many multinational states are formed not by voluntary bargains but by the 
vagaries of conquest and colonialism. A federal bargain becomes necessary to hold the 
multinational state together and assuage fears of interethnic exploitation” (Rodden, 2004, p. 
489).  
 Finally, Ronald Watts shifted attention from the classical debate on motives to 
interrogating the contemporary relevance of federalism. Watts (2008) offered numerous 
explanations for the contemporary appeal of the federal idea. Watts observed that the 
concept of nation-state, developed in the seventeenth century, is increasingly regarded as 
obsolete by a growing number of people around the world. The indication of this, according 
to Watts, is that “we appear to be moving from a world of sovereign nation-states to a world 
of diminished state sovereignty and increased interstate linkages of a constitutionally federal 
character” (Watts, 2008, p. 4). The reasons suggested by Watts, as responsible for the 
increased international appeal of federalism and devolution within states, are summarised as 
follows (pp. 5-7): 
1. Modern developments in areas such as transportation, social communications, 
technology and industrial organisation have posed a challenge to both larger and smaller 
67 
 
political organisations. The larger political units in both Western and non-Western 
societies are facing pressure from their people’s desire for better life, social justice and 
influence in an increasingly interconnected world, where advanced technology makes 
both mass destruction and mass  construction feasible. Smaller political units on their 
part have the desire to increase government’s responsiveness to the individual citizen 
and to increase recognition for primary group attachments such as linguistic, cultural  
ties, religious connections, historical traditions and social practices, which are necessary 
for ensuring a community’s sense of identity and aspiration for self-determination. As a 
consequence, more and more people worldwide have come to see federalism as the 
answer to these dual pressures because it allows for a combination of shared rule (for 
defined common purpose) and self-rule (by constituent units in order to maintain 
regional diversity). Federalism, therefore, is embraced as an institutional framework 
better adapted to accommodating the multicultural and multidimensional complexities of 
today’s world.   
2. The global economy has unleashed both economic and political forces that 
simultaneously reinforce international and local pressures that undermine the traditional 
nation-state. Global communications and comsumership have triggered the desire in 
even the remotest places around the world for access to good and services obtainable in 
the global marketplace. Consequently, governments are faced with the growing desire of 
their people to be at once global consumers and local citizens. This phenomenon has 
been referred to as glocalisation. This phenomenon makes it increasingly difficult for the 
nation-state, which ironically appears both too small and too large, to fulfil its citizens’ 
desire. Thus, the traditional nation-state appears inadequate to: cope with recent 
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development of the global market economy; meet the aspirations of its people for better 
living standards and job security; and allow people control over decisions that 
significantly affect them. In this context, “federalism with its different interacting levels 
of government has provided a way of mediating the variety of global and local citizen 
preferences” (p.6).  
3. The expansion of market economies is engendering socioeconomic changes that are 
compatible with the federal political principle. These new conditions include emphasis 
on: contractual relationships; recognition of the non-centralised nature of a market 
economy; entrepreneurial self-governance and consumer rights awareness; markets that 
adapt to diversity rather than homogeneity, embrace interjurisdictional mobility, and 
foster both competition and cooperation; and the recognition that differences do not 
hinder exchange of mutual benefits. In the light of this third reason, there is a claim of 
strong nexus between federalism and market economy. It has been suggested that federal 
states are more likely than non-federal ones to have a market economy. 
4. Technological changes have generated new models of industrial organisation that are 
more decentralised and based on horizontal non-centralised interactive networks. Such 
models have inspired attitudes that are more favourable to federal (non-centralised) 
political organisation. 
5. The principle of subsidiarity (the idea that a higher political body should only carry out 
actions that lower political bodies cannot accomplish on their own) has been gaining 
increasing popularity from the public. Thus, the decentralised orientation of the 
subsidiarity principle has influenced a growing interest in federalism. 
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6. Classical federations, such as the United States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia as well 
as Germany, have shown resilience, flexibility and adaptation to changing conditions. 
These federations are testaments of the enduring character of the federal political model. 
While these federations have maintained constitutional and political stability over a long 
period of time, the same cannot be said of other federal states like Nigeria.  
7. Eight federations have maintained positions among the top 21 of 174 countries in the 
United Nations annual human development ranking, which is based on the assessment of 
economic welfare, human rights and quality of life in each sovereign state. This has 
given credence to the idea that the federal model is better oriented to foster human 
development than non-federal one. However, this claim has a limitation because a 
number of federal states like Nigeria have dismal records of human development.            
 To this point, the debate about the precipitating factors in the formations of 
federalism has remained unresolved. A detailed examination of the of the historical context 
and factors that influenced the formation of Nigerian federalism in the next chapter would 
be a modest contribution of this case study to the undestanding of the origins of federalism. 
In order to gain a deep insight of the meaning and dimensions of federalism, the next 
section looks at how the term “federalism” has been deconstructed by various scholars.  
2.7. Deconstructing “Federalism” 
 Federalism has several implications in meaning and practice. To bring out these 
implications, various deconstructions of the meaning of federalism are examined below. 
Beyond adopting federalism as a system of shared rule and self-rule, it compactual or 
covenantal nature imposes on it some implications that have real significance in the 
operation and understanding of federalism in a given context.    
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2.7.1. Federalism as social solidarity. An elaborate discussion of the roots of the 
political principle of federalism in federal (or covenant) theology was presented at the 
beginning of this chapter. Etymologically, “federalism” was derived from the Latin word 
foedus (Elazar, 2000; Rodden, 2004; Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). Hueglin and Fenna (2010) 
gave the English equivalent of foedus as a league, treaty or compact. They asserted that “the 
most far-reaching yet often least appreciated dimension of federalism is its inherent 
commitment to social solidarity” (p. 51). They argued that as opposed to a liberal contract, 
foedus is a partnership, a mutual aid, a protection or cover for all irrespective of which part 
is stronger or weaker. This compassionate view of federalism view it as distinct from the 
unhealthy competition implied in a liberal contract. According to Huegelin and Fenna, in 
liberal contract “you only get what you can pay for” and “you can choose whether you want 
to share or not” (p. 51).  
 Hueglin and Fenna further elaborated how the notion of social solidarity relates to 
federalism and the political process. They pointed out that the original idea of a federal 
compact is based on the recognition that different federating units have different 
endowments (fortunes and resources) and a federal “commonwealth” fosters social sharing 
as part of the political process. The idea of social solidarity as implied by federal compact is 
quite distinct from the idea of the modern welfare state in that “social solidarity is not 
extended to individuals but to spatial collectivities – regions, provinces, states, Länder, or 
cantons.” This distinction is very important. It implies that federalism is primarily 
concerned with people groups rather than individual rights. Therefore, it is argued that: 
What the social compact dimension of federalism guarantees is the collective social and cultura l 
well-being of the people living in different parts of the country. The constituent members of a federal 
system acquire a right to economic viability and social stability (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, pp. 51-52). 
71 
 
It is however important to note that the recognition of group identity does not eliminate the 
concern with individual rights. Federalism has been noted to guarantee more individuals 
rights than other forms of political systems (cf. Kincaid, 2005). For example, Moreno & 
Colino argued that the federalism of the United States has very little to do with group rights 
instead: 
Liberal individualism, the protection of individual rights, and the construction of robust national 
defence were the main principles behind the US federal Constitution. In recent decades, the public-
choice model of federalism has put the emphasis on aggregations of individual preferences rather 
than on collectives’ diversities. (Moreno & Colino, 2010, p. 7). 
 Michael Burgess has provided a more integrative answer to this question. Burgess posited 
that federalism “recognised the inherent human condition of both individual and shared 
needs and identities (Burgess, 2006, p. 3). He further stressed that federalism is “concerned 
with specific forms of human association, with how we organise human relations in order to 
achieve welfare” (Burgess, 2006, p. 3).      
 Hueglin and Fenna (2010) identified a number of federalist commitments that are 
reflective of the principle of social solidarity. First, federations create larger markets  while 
at the same time maintain regional autonomy. Larger markets are more efficient in 
generating wealth and growth. However, such benefits are unevenly distributed. Yet, the 
desire to belong to and remain in a federal union would depend on an equitable distribution 
of its benefits for all. For this reason, the federal principle is essentially committed to the 
pursuit of a common good, albeit the commitment to a common good is not peculiar to 
federal states. Some unitary states are also committed to the common good. For example, 
Hueglin and Fenna observed the case of the Scandinavian welfare states that seem to be 
even more egalitarian due to their commitment to individual and social welfare rather than 
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territorial bias. According to Hueglin and Fenna, territorial bias of federal states may 
includes deliberate policies of development and fiscal redistribution that are regionally and 
territorially focused without a concern about how the policies shape income distribution and 
welfare of persons within  the respective sub-national units. This attempt to promote even 
development and equitable distribution is predicated on the premise that the greater wealth 
generated by the federal union creates more common wealth. This is however, a challenge 
for rentier states, like Nigeria, where due to mismanagement of the common wealth regions 
that are endowed with the resource, such as oil, accounting for the bulk of the country’s 
foreign earning, clamour for resource control. George Anderson has characterised this 
challenge in the following way: 
In many countries, oil is at the centre of national politics and economic policy, but managing oil 
wealth presents challenges that have sometimes made it more a curse than a blessing. The success of 
a country in meeting these challenges will depend on many factors, including the nature of its 
political institutions, one of which can be a federal system. (Anderson, 2012, p. 1).     
  Secondly, in keeping with the idea and principle of social solidarity and sharing, a 
federal state is supposed to be committed to “Regional Equality” by adopting a multi-
centred approach to the distribution of public services and career opportunities (Hueglin & 
Fenna, 2010). Hueglin and Fenna contrasted the case of a unitary welfare state like France 
and that of federal Germany. In France, there is a dominant centre, Paris : “Almost 
inevitably, a successful education and career requires relocation to Paris” (p. 52). However, 
in Germany, there is no such dominant centre; opportunities are not concentrated in one 
place. It is this commitment to the provision of equitable life chances and decent living 
conditions in all parts of a country that underscores the concept of social solidarity behind 
the meaning of federalism.  
73 
 
Thirdly, according to Hueglin and Fenna, federal states demonstrate their commitment to the 
principle of social solidarity by also adopting Fiscal Equalisation policies, which is aimed at 
ensuring that citizens in all parts of the federation have comparable access to social 
amenities and vital infrastructure. Therefore, the federal government has to adopt measures 
to share and distribute financial resources in order to avoid lopsidedness in the access of 
different parts of the federation to public services and social amenities. This sort of 
commitment to fiscal redistribution varies from one federation to the other. 
 A fourth expression of commitment to social solidarity, according to Hueglin  and 
Fenna, is the development of Regional Policy that is designed to even out the disparities of 
regional economic strength due to unequal resource endowment, peripheral location, and 
disparities in population size. Such a commitment would also seek to address the imbalances 
and inequalities that a capitalist market economy may typically create. Regional Policy may 
be pursued through the development of certain regional development strategies including 
sharing and joint financing of social development projects. “The ultimate goal, however, is 
not individual income stabilization but the socio-economic empowerment and stabilization 
of subnational collectivities” (p. 53). This, Hueglin and Fenna noted, is perhaps the most 
contentious aspect of federalism because such spatial equalisation policies in a federal 
system may undermine the principle of comparative advantage, which is part of the market 
allocation of resources. It is also feared that a commitment to sustained payments of 
substantive regional transfer as part of a spatial equalisation policy is likely to engender 
“transfer dependency” and make peripheral governments and populations less enthusiastic 
about finding self-sufficient development options and, hence, “even indulging in a kind of 
self-inflicted culture of poverty” (p. 53). On the contrary, Hueglin and Fenna argued, in the 
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absence of equalising transfers, people living in peripheral regions may migrate to more 
endowed locations. Since federalism inherently seeks to guarantee spatial integrity, such 
equalising transfer may serve as a way of making people able to maintain social and cultural 
connection to their home territory. As Hueglin and Fenna opined, within a reasonable limit, 
social solidarity in a federation is an entitlement.            
 2.7.2. Federalism as a Morally Binding Agreement. Daniel Elazar offered insights 
into the moral dimension of federalism. According to him, the word foedus from which 
“federalism” was derived from refers to a covenant. He noted that covenant has several 
applications; but in politics it signifies “a voluntary establishment of a people and body 
politic” (Elazar, 1998, p. 29). Here, Elazar affirmed the voluntaristic character of covenant. 
People enter into covenant by their own will and not compelled by others to do so. This 
assertion has to be tampered with a caveat. As Rodden (2004) and Hueglin and Fenna 
(2010) noted, there are exceptions to this voluntaristic thesis. Many states, like Nigeria, are 
products of conquests and colonialism, and the decision to adopt a federal political system 
was not entirely without the interference of an annexing external power.  Or the choice of 
federalism seemed to be the only alternative to coping with the anomaly created by the 
colonisers. Hueglin & Fenna describe this phenomenon in the following way: 
A century ago, there were a mere nine federations in the world; there are now 26 ... Much of what 
has been called the ‘federalist revolution’ of the twentieth century had to do with the breakdown of 
colonial empires and the formation of a multitude of newly independent states after 1945.  As a 
consequence of the opportunistic and arbitrary way in which colonial powers had assembled their 
possessions, most of these states brought together disparate cultures and communities. Federalism 
seemed to be the most promising way to accommodate this incongruence of colonial territory and 
plural identity. (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 55). 
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Notwithstanding the above exception, as Elazar asserted, federal unions are , under normal 
circumstances, supposed to be voluntarily established. Elazar cited the example of the 
American Declaration in which the different inhabitants of the colonies coming together 
consented to become one people. In his opinion, Abraham Lincoln captured it vividly when 
he described federalism as analogous to marriage. In a marriage the partners are committed 
to the covenant that binds them together and strive to make it work, albeit there are ups and 
downs. 
 Furthermore, Elazar explained the relationship between covenant and constitution. 
He asserted that “covenants beget constitutions almost as a matter of course but also 
influence every dimension of constitutionalism” (Elazar, 1998, p. 29). To elaborate this 
point, he marked out what he described as the three dimensions of every political system, 
based on Aristotelian political doctrine, namely: its moral constitution; its socioeconomic 
constitution; and its frame of government. According to him, the moral basis of the 
constitution defines the generally accepted ideas of how citizens of a given political entity 
should live and the widely held conception of justice as well as the general understanding of 
what is politically and socially right and good. The socioeconomic basis of the constitution 
refers to the ways that citizens live in reality. “It includes such things as class structure, 
ethnic composition, type of economy, and the actual distribution of power; in other words, 
who is important and influential and why” (Elazar, 1998, p. 29). Lastly, the frame of 
government pertains to the institutions and structures that the government is made up of as 
well as statutory documents that define the institutions of government, establish the scope 
and limitation of their power, and specify who shall have authority and the criteria for 
choosing who shall occupy the position of authority. Elazar argued that only covenant 
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addresses all three dimensions of the political system because it defines the system’s moral 
foundation, provides mechanism for building the institutional system’s frame of 
government, and put forward a behavioural dynamic that shapes the system’s socioeconomic 
basis.  
 Elazar has also tried to shed more light on what he described as the ambiguous 
relationship between covenant, compact and contract. He noted that both compact and 
contract are related to and derived from covenant. Although the three terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably, they have differences worth clarifying. According to Elazar, both 
compact and contracts are derived from covenant. He observed that covenant and compact 
are constitutional and public in character, whereas contract is private. For this reason, 
“covenantal or compactual obligation is broadly reciprocal;” and parties “bound by one or 
the other are obligated to respond to each other beyond the letter of the law rather than limit 
their obligations to the narrowest contractual requirements” (Elazar, 1998, p. 31). Herein 
then lies the differences between covenant and compact, on the one hand, and contract, on 
the other. Elazar opined that covenant and compacts have essentially dual character – being 
flexible in certain respects and firm in other areas. Conversely, contract, as an expression of 
private law, is characteristically interpreted as narrowly as possible in order to set a limit to 
the obligations of the contracting parties. Therefore, while contract can be revoked 
unilaterally by one of the parties, covenant and compact require mutual consent before they 
can be annulled, because they are “designed as they are to be perpetual or of unlimited 
duration” (p. 31).  
 Despite their similarities, covenant and compact have differences as well. Elazar 
explained that, unlike in a compact, the morally binding dimension of a covenant has 
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primacy over its legal dimension.  Therefore, a compact rests heavily on legal ground, albeit 
still indirectly dependent on a moral (or ethical) base. Therefore, it safe to say that compact 
is a secular synonym of covenant in modern politics. As Elazar noted, “compact” gained a 
widespread use around the mid-eighteenth century during the spread of Enlightenment 
secular thought of the Revolutionary epoch. This is how Elazar described the phenomenon 
that shaped this development:  
Those who saw the hand of God in political affairs in the United States continued to use the term 
covenant, while those who sought a secular grounding for politics turned to the term compact. While 
the distinction is not always used with strict clarity, it does appear consistently. (Elazar, 1998, p. 31).              
Furthermore, Elazar posited that social contract, a highly secularised concept with less 
moral undergird than covenant and compact, was popularised by the Rousseauistic and 
Jacobinistic intellectual movements flourishing during the revolutionary period, particularly 
in France but received with less enthusiasm in the United States. However, eventually 
“social contract” became the dominant political concept worldwide. Notwithstanding this 
development, Elazar argued, covenant has remained the foundation of political order.
 Kincaid (2005) has subscribed to Elazar’s conception of the moral dimension of 
federalism. For Kincaid, a covenant signifies a binding partnership among coequal partners 
who have agreed to create a new identity while at the same time retaining their individual 
identity and integrity. He asserted that in a body politic, the constitution serves as the 
supreme legal framework, which defines this partnership and the political organisation. He 
argued that because federalism is a covenant, it is a morally binding commitment that 
behoves on the parties to treat each other according to the spirit of the law and not just the 
letter of the law. Also, according to Kincaid, Federalism is not a momentary creation 
because: “A covenant commits the parties to an enduring, even perpetual, relationship and 
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to an obligation to cooperate to achieve the ends of the agreement and to resolve peacefully 
the conflicts that invariably arise in every relationship” (Kincaid, 2005, p. 8). Burgess 
(2006) has also affirmed the moral dimension of federalism. He viewed the fundamental 
purpose of the federal principle as essentially moral. He argued that: “Its raison d'être is to 
furnish the basis for order and stability but in a framework that formally acknowledges, 
protects and promotes human dignity, difference and diversity. This is its moral content and 
purpose” (Burgess, 2006, p. 3). 
 2.7.3 Federalism as Decentralisation? Federalism and decentralisation are so 
intertwined that, in political discussion, the two concepts are easily conflated (Rubin & 
Feeley, 2008). There is also the tendency to define federalism as a degree of 
decentralisation. This is why Osaghae (1990) asserted: “To conceive of federalism as an 
unqualified degree of decentralisation is to say that every governmental system is a variant 
of federalism” (p. 84). As Hueglin and Fenna (2010) and Blume and Voigt (2011) pointed 
out, both decentralisation and centralisation may exist in unitary, federal and confederal 
states. Hueglin and Fenna cited the following examples to buttress this point: 1) The United 
Kingdom has been traditionally a very decentralised unitary state; 2) Sweden is a 
decentralised unitary state; 3) France is a unitary and centralised state; 4) Germany 
embodies both centralisation and decentralisation, and therefore is sometimes referred to as 
a “unitary federal state;” 5) Australia is a very centralised federal state; 6) Canada is 
remarkably a decentralised federal state; and 7) the European Union is very much 
decentralised (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, pp. 35-36). This is, therefore, why it has been argued 
that the fundamental difference between the two opposites, unitary and federal states, is not 
defined by the scope of decentralisation, but by “the constitutional guarantee of autonomy 
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for the constituent governments in the responsibilities they perform” (Watts, 1998, p. 124), 
“their constitutional division of powers” (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010, p. 36)  or “the allocation 
of fundamental competence” (Blume & Voigt, 2011). For example, in the case of a unitary 
state, because ultimate decision-making power resides with the central government it can, at 
will, rescind the decision to decentralise (Watts, 1998; Blume & Voigt, 2011). Conversely, 
federalism creates geographic subdivisions with constitutionally allotted jurisdictions, that 
is, the central (federal) government has no right to usurp the decisions that are reserved to 
the sub-national governments (see Rubin & Feeley, 2008).  
 Blume & Voigt have, therefore posited that the most basic distinction between 
federalism and decentralisation is that the former is “a constitutional-level characteristic,” 
while the latter is “a policy choice at the post-constitutional level” (Blume & Voigt, 2011, p. 
242). This distinction was highlighted by Osaghae, who argued that “decentralisation is best 
applied and understood in relation to federation when its usage is restricted to the 
policymaking and administrative aspects rather than the legal and constitutional aspects of 
federalism” (Osaghae, 1990, p. 84).   According to Blume & Voigt, the implication of this is 
that a federal structure can be leveraged to implement a decentralisation policy because the 
two are not mutually exclusive, but a federal structure does not automatically guarantee the 
necessary condition for the implementation of decentralisation. For Rubin & Feeley (2008), 
“Decentralisation is a managerial strategy by which a centralised regime can achieve the 
results its (sic) desires in a more effective manner” (p. 171). Ghanaian decentralisation 
expert, Kwamena Ahwoi, has thrown light on the essence of decentralisation as a 
managerial strategy. He described decentralisation as a tool of public administration, which 
involves the transfer of roles, responsibilities, power, skills, competences, means and 
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resources to lower governmental tiers or other spheres of governance. He illustrated this 
idea with the different typologies of decentralisation being implemented in his country:  
In Ghana’s decentralisation programme, local authorities are the dest inations of the decentralised 
functions. The programme seeks to transfer functions and powers in a programme of political 
decentralisation; to transfer skills and competences in a programme of administrative decentralisation 
and decentralised planning; and to transfer means and resources through a programme of fiscal 
decentralisation. (Ahwoi, 2010, p. 5).                
 To be sure, decentralisation is not the opposite of centralisation as the two can exist 
simultaneously in any political system. Hence, some scholars have suggested that the term 
“noncentralisation,” which is the antithesis of centralisation, should be considered as a more 
appropriate defining feature of federalism (Elazar, 1987; Osaghae, 1990; Elazar, 1997).  
Elazar (1997) explained that in an ideal type federal model, there is no centre; it operates as 
a noncentralised and multifaceted framework. Elazar was quick to add that in practice there 
may be differences. He noted that: “In the comparison between uni tary and federal systems, 
we are dealing not only with different forms of polity but with different ideal types, each of 
which has its own integrity and emphases as well as its own weaknesses and deficiencies” 
(Elazar, 1997). Apart from reflecting the noncentralised and diffused nature of federalism, 
the concept of noncentralisation also captures the essence of federalism because it best 
expresses the legal and constitutional aspects of it (Osaghae, 1990). Osaghae argued that 
any attempt to reduce federalism to decentralisation and to divorce federalism from the 
principle of noncentralisation is counterproductive to its essence. Osaghae delineated 
decentralisation as simply a “dispersal of power from a central government to other units or 
agencies of government” (Osaghae, 1990, p. 84). He categorised decentralisation into two 
types: 1) Discretionary decentralisation, in which decentralisation is not constitutionally 
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guaranteed but is entirely contingent on the grace of the central authority and its 
consideration of expediency; and 2) Constitutionally guaranteed decentralisation, wherein 
the dispersal of power to constituent parts is obligated by the constitution. Osaghae noted 
that it is the second kind of decentralisation that falls within the purview of federalism.  
 Both Elazar and Osaghae believed that decentralisation accentuates a “core-
periphery” dichotomy or a “hierarchical” model that inherently implies the existence of a 
powerful central authority from where power flows to the subordinate governmental levels. 
Noncentralisation, on the other hand, entails that regardless of how certain powers are 
divided between the central and constituent governments at any point in time, the authority 
to exercise such powers cannot be withdrawn from either without their mutual agreement 
(Elazar, 1987, p. 166). To sum it up, it can thus be said that “federalism involves both 
centralisation/decentralisation and noncentralisation” (Osaghae, 1990, p. 85). Osaghae 
posited that, however, it is noncentralisation that appropriately expresses the constitutional 
arrangement in a federal political system because of its non-hierarchical power sharing 
orientation.  
 This chapter has presented a general review of literature on federalism, the 
development of the state political system, and the challenge of managing diversity. It can be 
seen from the review that federalism is more than just an institutional design or political 
organisation. Its concept goes beyond the latter of the constitution, which specifies the 
federal arrangement. Federal political system, thus, has a compactual basis, where the 
commitment of the parties to it embraced not only the legal wordings but also the spirit of 
the compact. Hence, federalism is a morally binding arrangement. Federalism is also a 
social solidarity. By coming together, federating units stand together with one another, 
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pulling resources together to support the weak and by so doing become strong together. 
Through noncentralization, the federating units maintain their regional autonomy; while at 
the same time participating in the unity that the federal union creates. This is the genius of 
the federal formula. This is why it is considered to be better suited for managing unity in 
diversity, especially in plurinational polities. The next chapter is considered to be a 
significant component of this investigation in that it explores from the literature the 
background of the Nigerian federalism, from the evolution of the Nigerian state as a 
colonial creation to the many historical antecedents that defined and shaped the Nigerian 
federal experiment. The global and theoretical perspectives gained in the present chapter are 
intended to serve as lenses to aid a reading of the Nigerian federal experiment.                      
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CHAPTER THREE 
FEDERALISM AND STATE BUILDING IN NIGERIA  
A Chequered History or a Wobbly Coexistence Project? 
        
3.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter examines at great length the historicity and the evolution of the state 
political system and the development of the federal idea. This chapter zooms in on Nigerian 
federalism and the national integration conundrum befalling the country by exploring 
historical accounts, analyses and the conclusions of previous studies. The chapter begins by 
looking at the historical background of Nigerian federalism, giving snapshots of major pre- 
and post-Independence historical developments. The chapter also examines the challenges 
of integration that the Nigerian federation continues to grapple with. Sources of disunity and 
contention, including ethno-religious conflicts, are discussed.            
3.2. Historical Antecedents of Nigerian Federalism  
One obvious characteristic of the literature on Nigerian federalism is the inescapable 
interest of scholars in the history of state building and its impact on the origin and trajectory 
of the federal system. The late Nigerian novelist and poet, the author of Things Fall Apart, a 
widely read book on modern African literature, Professor Chinua Achebe, has explained the 
reason for this inescapable interest in history in a proverbial manner by asserting that “a 
man who does not know where the rain began to beat him cannot say where he dried his 
body” (Achebe, 2012, p. 1). This statement figuratively illustrates the importance of history 
when it comes to understanding the present. The Danish philosopher and theologian Søren 
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Kierkegaard (1813-1855) underscored the primacy of history when he stated that: “Life can 
only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards” (quoted in Mills, 2013, p. 
279) The relevance of history to the understanding of contemporary political systems and 
social phenomena is not confined to one state alone, but it applies to every polity in the 
world (cf. Fukuyama, 2012). However, for Nigeria, and other countries that were created by 
colonial fiat, history had had a different and decisive role in shaping its contemporary 
political trajectory. Again, Achebe used the rain analogy in a satirical manner to argue that:   
 The rain that beat Africa began four to five hundred years ago, from the “discovery” of Africa by 
Europe, through the transatlantic slave trade, to Berlin Conference of 1885.  That controversial 
gathering of the world’s leading European powers precipitated what we now call the Scramble for 
Africa, which created new boundaries that did violence to Africa’s ancient societies and resulted in 
tension-prone modern states. It took place without African consultation or representation, to say the 
least. (Achebe, 2012, p. 1).  
In the above statement, Chinua Achebe bravely indicted the colonial history of Africa in 
creating what he referred to as “tension-prone modern states.” This means that any 
interrogation of the crisis of statehood bedevilling African states that overlook the nexus 
between this history and political developments is an exercise in futility. For example, the 
historian Richard J. Reid of the School of Oriental and African Studies argued that “Africa’s 
twentieth century cannot be understood in isolation from its nineteenth century” (Reid, 
2012, p. 1).  
 It is therefore imperative, for the purpose of this study, to explore the historical 
antecedents that shaped contemporary political developments in Nigeria. This imperative 
was underscored by Alli (2003) when he argued that “The foundation and general outcome 
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of what we have today as Nigerian federalism was laid in the colonial era” (p. 85). In what 
follows, such historical antecedents are discussed in relation to the Nigerian federalism.      
3.2.1. Establishment of British Colonial Rule.  As Chinua Achebe asserted, European 
colonialism had had a decisive role in the histories of modern African states. At the official 
end of the British transatlantic slave trade in 1807, Britain and other European powers 
devised what they deemed to be a more profitable strategy, that is, using African labour in 
Africa to extract and supply raw materials to Europe’s growing industries, and, 
consequently, they established colonies by late nineteenth century (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 
2008). Thus, the abolition of slave trade was followed by emerging interest in pursuing 
“legitimate” trade or commerce (Falola & Heaton, 2005). Reid (2012) described the shift 
from slave trade to “legitimate” commerce, where the export of human beings was 
supplanted by meeting the European demand for raw materials, natural resources and 
agricultural produce, as a “conquest.” Indeed, the so-called “legitimate” commerce was 
questionable and consequential in not only economic but also political and moral terms: 
 It was assumed at the outset of the nineteenth century that “legitimate” commerce would bring 
stability and peace to Africa, and that the doctrine of “free trade” (rather loosely interpreted, 
admittedly) would allow the economic exploitation of Africa with minimum of political commitment. 
But it was increasingly clear that this was not the case, and that if trade was to flow freely, if 
resources were to be profitably exploited, if Africa was to constitute a stable market for European 
products, if capital investment was to be protected, then political control was required. Again, this 
linked with burgeoning racial thought, which now assumed that Africans were childlike and 
irrational, incapable of modernizing themselves, or of stabilizing their war -torn, bloodied, and 
splintered kingdoms and societies. It was, again, the most extraordinary exercise in objectification... 
(Reid, 2012, p. 116).          
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As Reid explained in the above quoted statement, the economic and political  drives of 
European incursion into Africa were intrinsically intertwined. Through “legitimate” 
commerce, European colonial powers extended their interest from coastal areas to 
hinterlands, and targeted areas with fertile agricultural land, places that are rich in mineral 
deposits, and settlements with large populations that could provide a source of labour 
(Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008; Turaki, 2010). It was the ardent of competition for territory 
and resources that led to what is notoriously known as the Scramble for Africa among 
European powers (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008; Achebe, 2012).  
 At the Berlin Conference in 1884-85, European powers partitioned Africa, except for 
the West African coastal state of Liberia, which was inhabited by former slaves from United 
States, and the East African state of Ethiopia (then Abyssinia) that successfully repelled the 
early attempt of Italy to colonise it (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008). This partitioning has been 
described as responsible for the “demarcation of some of the most bizarre territorial entities 
in modern global history” (Reid, 2012, p. 117). The boundaries and territorial divisions 
imposed by the European colonisers are said to be at the roots of many of the current 
problems of Africa (Pulsipher & Pulsipher, 2008). Another source of contention is the fact 
that, “the major consequence of such [European] involvement was the creation of 
centralised, essentially mercantilist states, characterised by their fusing of political and 
economic power, and territorial expansion at the expense of smaller, weaker or stateless 
communities” (Reid, 2012, p. 26). This convergence of economic and political interests was 
inspired by the principle of the “dual mandate” agreed upon by the European conferees at 
the Berlin Conference – “that the interest of both Europe and Africa would be best served 
by maintaining the free access to Africa for trade and in turn providing the continent with 
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the benefits of ‘European civilization’” (Adibe, 2012, p. 11). It can be gleaned from the 
elaboration of the conception of the dual mandate by the British High Commissioner of 
Northern Nigeria who later became the Governor-General of Nigeria, Lord Frederick J.D. 
Lugard, in his Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (Lugard, 1922), that the dual 
mandate was rather a philosophy of benevolent imperialism. This is how Lugard described 
the dual mandate:   
Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never 
will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that 
Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in 
their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and 
desire of civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate.  (Lugard, 1922, p. 617).     
 In the Scramble for Africa, Nigeria ended up as a possession of Britain. The 
communities that inhabited the territories that came to be known as Nigeria were effectively 
made subjects of the British Empire by the end of the nineteenth century (Ayandele, 1980). 
The period between 1861 and 1903 was a watershed in the effort of the British to estab lish 
colonial rule over the territories and to turn the inhabitants into subjects of the crown 
(Falola & Heaton, 2008). The Nigerian historian Toyin Falola posited that: “Colonialism 
was achieved in Nigeria either by the use of war or by surrender because of the threat of 
war” (Falola, 2009, p. 1). The instrumentality of violence was legitimised by the colonial 
intruders, who had to employ their superior power of force to break the back of  any 
resistance from the indigenous peoples, especially local rulers who had opposed the ensuing 
political, economic and social order (Afigbo, 1980; Falola, 2009; Reid, 2012). Falola’s 
(2009) Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria chronicles the long list of casualties that 
colonial invaders inflicted on indigenous communities, who were resisting the intrusion of 
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the colonisers into their societies. For this reason, Falola asserted that “Modern Nigeria is, 
to a large extent, a product of violence” (p. 2). Falola further noted that violence was 
deployed, in greater portion, as a tool of domination by the colonial intruders, and, to a 
lesser extent, as an instrument of resistance against colonial rule by indigenous 
communities. Also, the colonial administration employed violence in maintaining control 
over the colonial state:  
 Colonial states aimed to establish territorial hegemony, which meant the ability to exercise practical 
political sovereignty – in effect the possession of a legal monopoly on the use of force – within a 
defined area. The militarism of the colonial state was inherent, in most cases flowing directly from 
the violence involved in the creation of the state itself  [emphasis added]... Violence, or threat of it, 
was the means by which control was maintained... (Reid, 2012, p. 117).   
The picture painted in the above quotation by Reid on how the “colonial masters” generally 
employed violence to invade and establish dominion over African territories  agrees with 
Tamuno’s description of the use of violence by the British colonisers in Nigeria: 
 A succession of British officials used coercion and diplomacy in former Northern and Southern 
Nigeria to reduce African opposition to a minimum. By 1914, Britain has succeeded in making 
herself the new paramount ruler over most of Nigeria. Pockets of resistance continued after 1914...  
These and other instances of relentlessness under increasing colonial rule were forcibly suppressed 
with assistance of the military and police resources at the disposal of the government. British rule in 
Nigeria was in the final analysis buttressed by force or by the threat of using it  [emphasis added]. 
(Tamuno, 1980, p. 394). 
  It is worth noting that British officials used both coercion and diplomacy to 
neutralize any African opposition. The diplomatic overtures of the British officials helped 
them to induce African rulers and brought them on their side against their own people  (cf. 
Reid, 2012, p. 118). However, as Maier (2002) and Momah (2013) noted, the kind of 
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diplomacy that the British used was “gunboat diplomacy” – where the British invaders 
subdued the local chiefs by using, at once, inducement and a conspicuous display of the 
threat of force. Richard J. Reid has even argued, without discounting the superiority of the 
colonialists’ brutality, that Europeans may not have succeeded in establishing colonial rule 
over vast swathes of the African continent without the cooperation of Africans, who adopted 
the colonial system to their own ends (Reid, 2012, pp. 117-118). Falola (2009) gave a 
detailed account of the various roles played by indigenous “collaborators” in aiding the 
British invaders. However, the role of these so-called “collaborators” and the notion of 
“voluntary surrender” are to be considered with a caveat. The British had clearly an upper 
hand for their military superiority. The supply of millions of gallons of cheap gin to induce 
indigenous leaders (Maier, 2002, p. 10), a classic example of bribe, was not adequate to 
fetch the loyalties of “collaborators” and secure “voluntary surrender” if the British did not 
possess military superiority (see Falola, 2009, p. 16-25). Therefore, it can be argued that 
while it is true that some indigenous leaders, traders and other greedy individuals sided with 
the British invaders for reasons of personal economic advantages and the lure of power,  
there is no doubt that the fear of facing brutality, which had befallen other territories that 
resisted the British invasion, was the overriding wisdom behind the actions of the 
“collaborators” and those who surrendered “voluntarily.”  
 Remarkably, the “collaborators” did not only aid and abet the intruders, but they also 
remained under the tutelage of the British and began to learn the rule of the game. It  is in 
this regard that Richard Reid asserted that: “Ultimately, European intrusions were absorbed 
into long-term African processes of internal change” (Reid, 2012, p. 118). For Nigeria, it is 
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believed that one area that this reality is manifest is in the entrenchment of the colonial 
legacy of violence as a strategy of politics till the present time:  
 The colonial system thrived on the use of violence; the postcolonial era sees the mono poly of 
violence as a tool for creating a stable nation-state. Unresolved issues including the conflicts they 
generated, have a bearing on contemporary problems and their attendant revolts and other violence. 
(Falola, 2009, p. 181).  
For example, the ubiquitousness of ethno-religious conflicts in the country may be viewed 
as a manifestation of the enduring legacy of violence. This view was expressed by Falola 
when he argued that: “The fragmentation of Nigeria’s nationalism into ethnic and religious 
nationalisms has ensured the continuity of violence” (p. 181). This phenomenon has had 
grave implications for the making of modern Nigeria, and for state building and the 
country’s democratic experience (Aluko & Ajani, 2009).     
  Another key feature of British colonialism in Nigeria, which also impacted on state 
and citizens relations, is its ability to adapt to the disparate spatial contexts of the colony. 
For instance, Ayandele (1980) noted that the colonial intruders adopted varied patterns of 
intrusion, which were largely contingent on geographical location and historical accident, 
across the country:  
 Thus the Niger Delta peoples, within reach of the gunboat, were the worst hit. They had no choice 
but to painfully accept the new order of things, under which the European intruders began to subvert 
indigenous culture, bully the rulers and interfere in purely political affairs. Thus Yorubaland became 
the biggest theatre of the whiteman’s intrusion and intervention in the interior of Nigeria in the pre-
Scramble era, thanks to their geographical proximity to the sea, the bitter inter -state and internecine 
wars they went on fighting, leading to large-scale sale of themselves across the Atlantic and the 
return of the Saro elements to their fatherland. Thus the luckiest peoples in the interior were those 
situated north of the Niger-Benue, thanks to their remoteness from the sea and the anti-infidel 
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prejudices that had been fostered in them for a long time by the Islamic religion. (Ayandele, 1980, p. 
368).   
The British, therefore, had the task to overcome the peculiar challenges posed to the 
colonial project by the different territories, and they did that effectively as it suited them. It 
can, thus, be said that the creation and administration of the colony conformed to 
geographical, economic and political exigencies, and to the desire of the British to establish 
effective occupation and secure full international recognition for their “acquisition” 
(Ayandele, 1980; Turaki, 2010; Adibe, 2012; Reid, 2012).  
 Having removed all visible indigenous opposition to the imposition, expansion and 
consolidation of their rule over the territories, from 1898 onward the British began to 
establish and maintain a colonial state in Nigeria (Tamuno, 1980). This process was 
initiated with the merger of several protectorates, which were under the charter of the Royal 
Niger Company into two main Protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria (Abubakar, 
1980; Turaki, 2010; Adibe, 2012). The Royal Niger Company was “a mercantile company 
chartered by the British government in the nineteenth century, which formed the basis of the 
modern state of Nigeria” (Adibe, 2012, p. 12). By 1900, the British formed the Protectorate 
of Northern Nigeria and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, although the former was only 
on paper until couple of years later when it was brought under British control through 
military campaigns led by Lugard (Abubakar, 1980b, p. 449). The latter was carved out 
from the merger of the Niger Coast Protectorate, which was established earlier in 1891 as 
Oil Rivers Protectorate, with territories chartered by the Royal Niger Company below 
Lokoja on the River Niger (Tamuno, 1980). Then in May 1906 Lagos Colony and 
Protectorate was merged with the Southern Nigeria Protectorate and officially renamed the 
Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (Tamuno, 1980; Olusanya, Constitutional 
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Development 1861 - 1960, 1980b). As Jideofor Adibe asserted, in effect, the formation of 
these protectorates signified the bringing of the regions into “a viable territorial unit under 
effective British political control” (Adibe, 2012, p. 12).  
 The British adopted two systems of rule to govern the two protectorates , Direct and 
Indirect Rule. In the South, the British initially experimented with Direct Rule, but later 
resorted to Indirect Rule system. However, in the North, the British used mainly Indirect 
Rule (Turaki, 2010; Adibe, 2012). The British adopted Indirect Rule on the Northern 
Protectorate because even though they had conquered the Sokoto Caliphate and the 
Sultanate of Kanem-Bornu, which used to be “the largest and most powerful Islamic states 
in West Africa” (Turaki, 2010, p. 114), the challenge of governing such a vast region was 
gigantic. Turaki pointed out that the British decided that it was more convenient to work 
with existing structures since the Muslim states had already centralised and bureaucratic 
institutions and governments. He also noted that the British’s decision to administer the 
region through the role of indigenous chiefs or rulers was a pragmatic consideration. The 
British tampered with their plan to bring about radical social and political reforms by 
embracing the philosophy of “gradualism,” that is, pursuing social and political change in a 
gradual manner. Dudley (2012) supported Turaki’s position when he argued that: “If 
‘Indirect Rule’ was a product of circumstances, the decision politically to separate the two 
protectorates of Nigeria was consciously taken” (Dudley, 2012, p. 18) According to Dudley, 
the adoption of Indirect Rule was in furtherance of the policy of preserving what has been 
described as “the very special identity” of the North, considered poles apart from that of the 
South. It has been suggested that contemporary inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts 
have roots going back to periods before and during colonialism (see Harnischfeger, 2008; 
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Turaki, 2010). This issue is explored further later within a broader discussion of how 
colonialism shaped inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the country. In what follows, 
the merger of the Northern and Southern Protectorates to form the territorial entity Nigeria 
is examined. 
3.2.2. Amalgamation. The formation of two main protectorates, the Northern and Southern 
Protectorates of Nigeria by the British has been described as a scripted and choreographed 
move towards the creation of a single territorial entity. Tamuno (1980), for instance, noted 
that a special committee set up by the colonial government had in August 1898 already 
recommended the amalgamation of the “Niger Territories,” – this was the name given to 
what later became Nigeria – and that amalgamation was carried out gradually, beginning 
with the merger of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and Lagos Colony and Protectorate 
to form the Protectorate and Colony of Southern Nigeria in 1906. The year 1914 has been 
described as a watershed in Nigeria’s history (Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014; Ogbogbo, 2014; 
Oyeweso, 2014). On 1 January 1914, the British colonial government amalgamated the 
Northern and Southern Nigeria, a decision that was exercised through a colonial fiat without 
consulting Nigerians (Tamuno, 1980, p. 394).  
 It is important to step back a little and take a good look at the background and the 
context leading to the amalgamation. First, this is necessary in order to understand how the 
amalgamation impacted on the relations between Northern and Southern Nigeria even to the 
present time. Secondly, doing so will shed light on the colonial foundations of Nigerian 
federalism. The amalgamation of the Northern Protectorate and the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria has been characterised as a “‘marriage of convenience’ contrived for the disparate 
nationalities that were brought together under the new arrangement” (Adibe, 2012, p. 13). 
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British economic interest was the main driving force behind the amalgamation: “When the 
British took power in Nigeria, they saw their job to create an administrative superstructure 
that would preserve law and order, serve British economic interests and ultimately become 
financially self-supportive” (Falola & Heaton, 2005, p. 6). For example, Tamuno (1980) 
contended that the British motive for the amalgamation of 1914, as the one in 1906, was 
economic:  
The primary aim of the government in 1906 was economic – to use the better financial position of the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria to cover the costs of administration and development in the 
financially weak Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, then saddled with the while elephant of a railway 
in need of extension since 1901. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 394). 
Similarly, the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in 1914 has been 
attributed to the consideration of the British colonial administration to “bail out” the north, 
which was operating on a budget deficit and grappling with serious financial challenges:  
 Compared with the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, the Protectorate of Northe rn 
Nigeria proved a relatively poor neighbour. Without direct access to the sea, with a larger area and 
population, with costly railway construction and river dredging projects, the Protectorate of Northern 
Nigeria experienced serious financial difficulties only slightly relieved by the annual grants-in-aid 
from the Imperial Treasury. Northern Nigeria’s annual share (about ₦140,000 since 1906) of customs 
receipts collected by Southern Nigeria and the loan of over ₦2 million from the latter for railway 
developments in the north did not, and could not, end its financial embarrassment. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 
394)       
The above view of the economic motive for the unification was echoed by Karl Maier in his  
The House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis as he opined that:  
 In 1914 he [Lugard] amalgamated the northern and southern territories in the name  of the British 
Crown, setting the borders of what became Nigeria. The joining was not for the purpose of nation-
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building. The simple reason was that the north’s colonial budget was running at a deficit and only a 
link with the profitable south could eliminate the needed British subsidy” (Maier, 2002, p. 10).  
Further, it has been suggested that the British undertook the amalgamation not only for the 
aforementioned economic reasons but also for administrative convenience (Fwatshak & 
Ayuba, 2014). Oyeweso (2014, p. 2), for example, contended that the British had to resort to 
the merger because they had insufficient manpower to administer the huge and well 
endowed colonial territory of Nigeria.  
 It is at this juncture appropriate to highlight a few points regarding the 
amalgamation, which are germane to this study. The points to be established here 
underscore the assertion of Fwatshak & Ayuba (2014, p. 1), in a symposium to mark the one 
hundred years of Nigerian amalgamation organised by the Historical Society of Nigeria, that 
the amalgamation remains an “unsettled issue.” First, regardless of the rationale behind the 
amalgamation, it ushered in the modern state of Nigeria and cemented the fate of its diverse 
inhabitants (Oyeweso, 2014). Chinua Achebe underscored this when he asserted that: “If the 
Berlin Conference sealed her fate, then the amalgamation of the southern and northern 
protectorates inextricably complicated Nigeria’s destiny” (Achebe, 2012, p. 2). As earlier 
noted, it was rather bizarre that the British colonial administration took such a significant 
and consequential decision without the agreement of the indigenous inhabitants of the fused 
territories (Tamuno, 1980; Achebe, 2012). Even the name “Nigeria” was an imposition by 
the “colonial masters.” The name is widely credited to Miss Flora Louise Shaw, a British 
journalist and writer, who was the colonial editor of The Times (Chuku-Okereke, 1997; 
Maier, 2002; Campbell, 2011; Kwarteng, 2012; Momah, 2013). It has been suggested that 
although the words “Nigeria” and “Nigerians” were first used between 1859 and 1860 by a 
Liverpool trader, William Cole to refer to events, things and the people that inhabited the 
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area watered by the Niger, it was Flora Shaw who canvassed, in her article on 8 January 
1897, that the name “Nigeria” be applied to the Royal Niger Company Territories (Chuku-
Okereke, 1997). In her own book, A Tropical Dependency, Flora Shaw gave an insight into 
the flippant and blasé attitude, with which the name was adopted, and i ts meaning and 
implications: 
 Nigeria – as we call our latest dependency – is not properly a name. It cannot be found upon a map 
that is ten years old. It is only an English expression which has been made to comprehend a number 
of native states covering over 500,000 square miles of territory in that part of the world which we 
call Western Soudan. (Shaw, 1905, p. 7).      
As Flora Shaw revealed in the above statement, the name itself was applied in an attempt to 
make sense of a complex acquisition that contrasts with the geographical, cultural and 
political diversities the British had encountered in other parts of Africa. However, as Flora 
Shaw acknowledged, the name had become a reality:  
 England, in general, knew as little of Nigeria and its possibilities at the end of the nineteenth century 
as it knew of India sixteenth century. The territories over which these powers were granted were at 
first known by the name of the “Territories of the Royal Niger Company.” A little later this title was 
changed for the more convenient name of Nigeria. (Shaw, 1905, p. 356). 
By perfect coincidence, Flora Shaw later, in 1902, married the first colonial administrator of 
amalgamated Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, and from then she became well known as Lady 
Lugard (Kwarteng, 2012; Momah, 2013). Lady Lugard dedicated her book to her husband, a 
gesture that he reciprocated later when he published his own book, The Dual Mandate in 
1922.  
 The second point to highlight is the so-called idea of “voluntary consent of natives” 
obtained by the “colonial masters” who laid the foundation of the modern state of Nigeria. 
No one has given an honest account of what actually transpired in this regard than the very 
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architect of the amalgamation, Lugard himself. In The Dual Mandate, Lugard noted that the 
Berlin Conference gave a tacit approval of the proposal of the principle of voluntary consent 
put forward by the American delegate, Mr. Kasson, whereby the powers can establish 
“effective occupation” by securing the consent of natives, whose country is taken possession 
of, provided they (the natives) have not provoked the intruders’ aggression  (Lugard, 1922). 
Lugard revealed the fraudulent manner in which the so-called treaties were made. For 
examples, Lugard admitted that: “The civilised nations entered for the competition 
[Scramble for Africa] with avidity. Treaties were produced by the cartload in all the 
approved forms of legal verbiage – impossible of translation by ill-educated interpreters” 
(Lugard, 1922, p. 15). It can, thus, be said that the verbosity and creative ambiguity with 
which the treaties were laden represented a grand act of deception. Lugard explained how 
this scheme had worked against the natives: 
It mattered not that tribal chiefs had no power to dispose of communal rights, or that those few 
powerful potentates who might perhaps claim such authority looked on the white man’s ambassador 
with contempt, and could hardly be expected to hand over their sovereignty and lands or other assets 
had they understood what was asked of them. (Lugard, 1922, p. 15). The Sultan of Sokoto, for 
instance, regarded the subsidy promised to him by the chartered company as tribute from a vassal.              
Besides the ambiguity of the texts, the treaties were also made under fraudulent 
circumstances. Lugard stated that the treaties were sealed by a cross, purporting to represent 
the assent of the native chiefs. He also confessed that, in some cases, the native chiefs were 
induced to assent to the treaties by gifts of a pair of boots, bottles of gin, and opera-hats. 
This is a classic example of bribery. Sadly, this foundation of corruption that was laid by the 
“colonial masters” and the local chiefs has normalised and elevated to a way of doing 
business in Nigeria even today. In other instances, the “colonial masters” obtained the 
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“assent” of the natives through coercion, and by making nebulous promises that were not 
recorded and later simply retracted or ignored (Lugard, 1922, p.16).          
 Third, it has been pointed out that the British introduced the European approach to 
territorialisation and spatial organisation based on the nation-state model, which is alien to 
pre-existing indigenous societies. For example, Asiwaju (1997) analysed the impact of the 
colonial logics of territorialisation and spatial organisation on Nigerian cultures.  Asiwaju 
argued that: 
 ...the new rulers’ radically different approach to spatial organisation with particular reference to the 
making of new political and administrative boundaries led, in certain cases, to a virtual dissolution of 
the interconnection that had served to mediate, if not eliminate, cultural differences; and, in other 
cases, the new boundary arrangements functioned to force incompatible and, sometimes, mutually 
antagonistic groups into common administrative units. Above all, colonial rule in particula r led to an 
unprecedented politicisation of culture, especially the conversion of distinct cultures into “tribes” at 
the local level and, at the overall territorial level, the forging of the “tribes” into a single “nation”. 
(Asiwaju, 1997, p. 31).  
Several writers have shared the concern raised by Asiwaju in the above quoted statement.  
The manner in which the British “colonial masters” peopled Nigeria as a political unit, as 
depicted in Asiwaju’s words above, can be gleaned from the work of Nigerian scholar, 
Gloria I. Chuku-Okereke. Chuku-Okereke (1997) explained that prior to the advent of 
colonialism, the inhabitants of the territories that later became Nigeria were organised as 
“various nationalities, states, empires, emirates, chiefdoms, kingdoms and village-groups, 
each operating as an independent and autonomous functional socio-political entity” (Chuku-
Okereke, 1997, p. 1). Chuku-Okereke argued that: 
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 In the pre-colonial times, what we had were myriads of groups, some of which spoke variants of the 
same language and possessed certain common or similar cultural traits. But, identity or similarity of 
language and culture did not result in common political action as a matter of routine.    
Chuku-Okereke reinforced Asiwaju’s claim that the European intervention in identity 
formation, among the hitherto independent socio-cultural groups that occupied the 
geographical area that came to be known as Nigeria, introduced a new notion of political 
organisation and territorialisation:        
 It could be argued that the origin of the names for such Nigerian peoples as the Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa, 
Fulani, Efik, Ibibio, Ijo, Tiv, Idoma, Ebira, Igala, Itsekiri, Jukun, Bini, Esan, Isoko, Urhobo and so 
on, are traceable to the emergence of the colonial state of Nigeria. These peoples did not begin to 
identify themselves in the above terms; but it was European visitors, traders and writers who first 
began to refer to the whole conglomerate in terms of the language they spoke. Thus, when they 
referred to the Yoruba or Hausa, they meant those who spoke Yoruba or Hausa languages 
respectively, and not a single politically-coherent group. This is why it is argued that “Nigerians” are 
essentially linguistic and cultural groups... (Chuku-Okereke, 1997, p. 2).  
 Chinua Achebe, for instance, wondered why the British bundled cultures, which are 
distinct from each other, together: “Animists, Muslims and Christians alike were held by a 
delicate, some say artificial, lattice” (Achebe, 2012, p. 2). Karl Maier also expressed the 
same opinion with regard to the cultural incongruity of the ethnic ensemble or amalgam of 
Nigeria: 
 For Nigeria, like the other modern African states with the exception of Ethiopia, was the bastard 
child of imperialism, its rich mosaic of peoples locked into a nation-state they had had no part in 
designing. Before the European conquest, Nigeria was home to an estimated three hund red ethnic 
groups of sometimes widely differing languages and systems of internal rule. Although its 
constituents had traded and often lived among each other for centuries, the land of Nigeria had never 
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existed as one political unit. The peoples gathered within its borders had different cultures and stood 
at very unequal levels of development... (Maier, 2002, pp. 7-8).   
The American scholar and diplomat, John Campbell, who served in Nigeria as a political 
counsellor from 1988-1990, and as ambassador from 2004-2007, wrote in his Nigeria: 
Dancing on the Brink that the indigenous empires and kingdoms in territories that later 
became Nigeria made no effort at wielding the peoples into a single political unity and did 
not try to create an overarching cultural unity among the hundreds of disparate ethnic 
groups that became part of the state of Nigeria (Campbell, 2011). Campbell argued that 
“The nation and the concept of a Nigerian national identity are British creations without 
indigenous roots” (p. 1). Again, the man who implemented the amalgamation, Lugard also 
admitted this: “They were vaguely demarcated by lines of longitude and latitude regardless 
of tribal limits, or by reference to physical features which later exploration sometimes 
proved to be scores of miles from their supposed position, and even non-existent” (Lugard, 
1922, p. 12). As the architect of the amalgamation, Lugard, divulged, the arbitrariness of the 
colonial boundaries portended conflict right from the start.  
 Lugard’s wife, Flora Shaw gave a preview into the diversity – political and cultural 
incongruity – that existed among the peoples that inhabited the territories that became 
Nigeria. Her characterisation of the difference between the peoples of Hausaland and Bornu 
of Northern Nigeria gave a startling revelation that can help one to deduce or imagine the 
wider cultural and political gaps among different provinces. Although heavily laden with  
racist and vilifying words (that an attempt has been made here to filter), Lady Lugard’s 
description helps us to appreciate the incongruence that existed between even those living in 
proximity of each other: 
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Although lying in geographical juxtaposition between the parallels of 9° and 14° N. latitude, and now 
united within the limits of the British protectorate , Bornu and Haussaland are two very distinct 
countries inhabited by people of wholly different  race, having their own traditions and their distinct 
history. Except when, as a consequence of border wars, there has been a temporary overlapping of 
the frontier, they have always possessed their distinct territories ... he [Hausa] has nevertheless 
continued to preserve a clearly defined political individuality. He [Hausa] has always been merchant, 
peasant, soldier, and artisan... According to circumstances his territory has contracted or expanded, 
but in the Haussa nation the life of the individual appears to have been so little dependent on the 
political development of the race... [emphasis added]. (Shaw, 1905, pp. 237-238).                  
 A fourth point that has been raised with regard to the amalgamation was its impact 
on political culture and organisation of the regions. Before examining this point, a brief 
discussion of the pre-colonial political experiences of the territories that were later united 
under the colonial state of Nigeria is worthwhile. It has been suggested by several Nigerian 
historians that perhaps amalgamation was on course among some of the territories that 
formed the present state of Nigeria even before the intervening period of colonialism. For 
instance, the Oyeweso (2014) and Ogbogbo (2014) have both argued that some processes of 
amalgamation or merger among the territories that later became Nigeria was on course even 
prior to the advent of British colonialism. Oyeweso pointed out that, for example, the Oyo 
Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate were established through the merger of several states that 
were conquered by warfare. The Benin Empire, according to Oyeweso, evolved from the 
merger of Edo, Urhobo, Yoruba and some Igbo speaking peoples. Similarly, Ogbogbo noted 
that the emergence of empires in Oyo, Nupeland and Igalaland was part of the process of 
agglomeration taking place before colonialism. It has also been emphasised that Usman dan 
Fodio Fulani jihad of the 19
th
 century, which played a major role in “pulling together 
hitherto autonomous groups under one political umbrella called the Sokoto Caliphate,” 
102 
 
served as “a major building block in the march towards what came to be known as Nigeria”  
(Ogbogbo, 2014, p. 4).  
 Looking back at these processes of merger, some scholars have contended 
counterfactually that multi-national states would still have emerged even without the 
intervention of the British (Asiwaju, 1997; Ogbogbo, 2014; Oyeweso, 2014). Assuming that 
this counterfactual scenario was the case, it was unlikely that the mergers would have led to 
the creation of a large single state that is co-extensive with the present state of Nigeria; 
because it can be argued that the so-called mergers that occurred before the advent of 
colonialism did not point to a direction in creating a single political unit. As Maier (2002, p. 
7-8) noted, despite the trade relations and interactions among the constituents of Nigeria for 
centuries, they had, by and large, remained autochthonous and autonomous. Maier noted 
that the regional groupings that emerged, such as empires and the Caliphate, can be said to 
have only consolidated regional cultural and political differences, but not a complete 
unification of all the regions. The only pattern of agglomeration that has been observed took 
roughly a regional dimension (Maier, 2002, p. 8). The word “roughly” is key here because 
the so-called three regions, north, east and west, which Maier alluded to as largely defining 
independent Nigeria, were not homogenous and unified. Chinua Achebe described the 
regional and sub-regional differences in the following words: 
The northern part of the country was a seat of several ancient kingdoms, such as the Kanem-Bornu – 
which Shehu Usman dan Fodio and his jihadists absorbed into the Muslim Fulani Empire. The 
Middle Belt of Nigeria was the locus of the glorious Nok Kingdom and its world -renowned terra-
cotta sculptures. The southern protectorate was home to some of the region’s most sophisticated 
civilisations. In the west, the Oyo and Ife kingdoms once strode majestically, and in the Midwest the 
incomparable Benin Kingdom elevated artistic distinction to a new level. Across the Niger River in 
the East, the Calabar and the Nri kingdoms flourished. (Achebe, 2012, pp. 1-2).  
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Achebe (2012) argued that the uniqueness of the different cultural groupings would have 
been maintained had they not been pulled together by British colonialism.  
 For example, although a bulk of the north housed peoples that were “linked 
culturally, religiously, and economically,” and particularly connected by Islam, which was 
brought by the Arabs from North Africa, the region was far from being unified (Maier, 
2002, p. 8). The Sokoto Caliphate, a huge Islamic state, was created through the 
instrumentality of the Fulani led jihad, a “holy war,” of 1804-1808 (Abubakar, 1980a). 
Abubakar’s (1980a) contribution in the Groundwork of Nigerian History and Turaki’s 
(2010) Tainted Legacy contain very detailed studies of the influence of the Caliphate in 
Northern Nigeria. The Sokoto Caliphate was a theocratic empire organised around the 
Islamic principles of government and ruled by Shari’a law, albeit it was based on religion it 
had strong social, economic and political motivations (Turaki, 2010). The emirates that the 
Caliphate brought under its sphere of influence included; Gobir, Zamfara, Kebbi, Daura, 
Katsina, Kano, Kazaure, Ngourma, Gwandu, Wase, Zaria (Zauzzau), Sokoto, Hadeja, 
Katagum, Gombe, Bauchi, Fombia, Hamarua, Agei, Lapai, Lafiagi, Yawuri, Nupe, Ilorin, 
Misau, Jama’are, Azare, Pategi, Muri, Kontagora, and Adamawa (Fombina) (Abubakar, 
1980a; Turaki, 2010). It has been argued that “Islam served as a political ideology that 
united these multi-ethnic states across a vast geographical region of West Africa” (Turaki, 
2010, p. 70).  
 Not all the states listed above were conquered during the Fulani jihad of 1804-1808; 
the processes of expanding the frontiers of the Caliphate continued into the late 1850s 
(Abubakar, 1980a). Besides those that were conquered, the rest of the emirates were brought 
under the influence and authority of the Caliphate through the surrender or submission of 
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their emirs to the Caliph symbolised by obtaining his blessings and flags (Abubakar, 1980a; 
Turaki, 2010). Despite its vast penetration into the northern territories, the Caliphate did not 
cover all the territories that later became delimited as Northern Nigeria by British colonial 
rule. Several parts of the north, particularly the territories that are referred to as the Middle 
Belt, which formed a separation between the far-north and south, were not under the 
influence and authority of the Caliphate (Abubakar, 1980a; Maier, 2002; Truaki, 2010). For 
instance, Turaki noted that: “The areas that resisted the Fulani jihads and claimed 
independence were Abuja, Argungu, Maradi and Damagaram (Niger), parts of Gbagyiland, 
Plateau, some parts of southern Zaria, some parts of Bauchi, Adamawa, Benue and the 
Niger Valley” (Turaki, 2010, p. 70). Shaw (1905) and Lugard (1922) both consistently, in 
their rather condescending manner, referred to the autochthonous and autonomous territories 
of the central Nigeria region as independent pagan countries that were quite distinct from 
the Islamic areas of the north.  
 A recent work by Professor Monday Yakiban Mangvwat, “The Middle Belt and 
Lugard’s Amalgamation: A Centenary Reflection” provides insights into the peculiarity of 
the Middle Belt in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times. The Middle Belt, 
according to Mangvwat (2014), was a constant target of, and bastion of resistance against, 
trans-Saharan slave trade from around the fifteenth century, trans-Atlantic trade from the 
eighteenth century and domestic slave raiding from the jihadist forces of the Caliphate in 
the nineteenth century. Remarkably, the Middle Belt was able to stand its ground against 
these destabilising forces and even put up a good opposition to British occupation. As 
Mangvwat noted, “The Sokoto jihad which founded the Sokoto Caliphate at the beginning 
of the 19
th
 Century had not been able to successfully penetrate the Middle Belt except in a 
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few instances – Wase, Kanam, Lafia, Keffi, Nassarawa, and Illorin – due to the stiff 
resistance from the communities of the Middle belt” (Mangvwat, 2014, p. 6). Mangvwat 
argued that the Middle Belt was even able to put up stronger resistance to colonial invasion 
than the bigger and more powerful states in the north: 
This in part, was because once the armies of the centralized state systems were defeated, the whole 
edifice collapsed whereas with the independent numerous mini-states, chieftets and chiefdoms in the 
Middle Belt, the British army had to conquer these village by village since no community owed 
allegiance to one another thereby prolonging the conquest of the region beyond surrender of the 
bigger state systems. (Mangvwat, 2014, p. 5). 
Furthermore, Mangvwat argued that the enduring legacy of the Middle Belt communities 
was their fierce “resistance to alien rule and domination by whatever means”  (p. 6). It was 
against the backdrop of their characteristic desire to maintain their cultural and political 
independence by resisting alien rule that the “colonial masters” looked upon them with 
distain. Turaki (2010) and Mangvwat (2014) gave heart-rending descriptions of the jihadist 
and colonial perceptions of the Middle Belt respectively. Turaki explained that as a result of 
the jihad there was a bifurcation of the north into Dar al-Islam (house of God) and Dar al-
Harb (house of war, or areas belonging to kuffar, that is, unbelievers or infidels). Turaki 
argued that this binary distinction led to the following scenario: 
...in Northern Nigeria the Middle Belt was designated Dar al-Harb and Hausaland as Dar al-Islam. 
The Muslim Hausa-Fulani lived in the Dar al-Islam, while the non-Muslims lived in the Dar al-
Harb. The Hausa-Fulani colonies that scattered throughout the Middle Belt were seen as little 
pockets of Dar al-Islam.  (Turaki, 2010, p. 52).   
 The mischaracterisation of the Middle Belt appeared to have been sustained by the 
“colonial masters” due to the unyielding attitude of the Middle Belt communities to 
domination (Mangvwat, 2014). Mangvwat (2014) argued that, as a result of their resistance 
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to alien rule, the Middle Belt polities incurred negative colonial perception, and were in 
certain instances placed “under nearby emirate systems thereby sowing the seeds of future 
discord and resentment” (Mangvwat, 2014). Lady Lugard and her husband gave insights 
into the colonial mischaracterisation of the Middle Belt communities (see Shaw, 1905; 
Lugard, 1922).  
 The foregoing discussion has focused at length on the Sokoto Caliphate because of 
the suggestion by the historian J. F. Ade-Ajayi and other scholars that the: 
Uthman dan Fodio jihad of the 19
th
 century with its consequence of pulling together hitherto 
autonomous groups under one political umbrella called the Sokoto Caliphate represents a major 
building block in the march towards what came to be known as Nigeria  (Ogbogbo, 2014, p. 4).     
In a nutshell, the Sokoto Caliphate, which was the largest pre-colonial empire in Nigeria, 
was not successful in bringing all the territories of the north under its sphere of influence. In 
addition, several scholars have described the Sokoto Caliphate as a loose ensemble of 
polities (Abubakar, 1980a; Campbell, 2011; Turaki, 2010). Like the Sokoto Caliphate, none 
of the other empires, such as Oyo and Benin, indicated the tendency or demonstrated the 
capacity to colonise or merge their neighbouring independent polities to form a single state. 
Campbell argued this point of view clearly: 
Ancient civilisations and empires shaped the peoples where they held sway. But none of the early 
empires incorporated into a single political unit all the territory of  the present state – nor was there 
an overarching cultural unity among the hundreds of different ethnic groups that were later found in 
the state of Nigeria. The nation and the concept of a Nigerian national identity are British creation 
without indigenous roots.  
 For administrative expediency in 1914, the British cobbled together their Nigeria colony out 
of three disparage but adjacent territories they had acquired over a century as they moved inland 
from the Gulf of Guinea and the older Lagos colony. (Campbell, 2011, p. 1)       
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Thus, as Campbell asserted, the empires that existed on the territories that became present 
Nigeria prior to British colonialism cannot be said to have served as precursors of the 
modern state of Nigeria. This is because the modern state of Nigeria was built on the 
European modern concept of the state system “without indigenous roots” (Campbell, 2011, 
p. 1). The colonial administrator who presided over the amalgamation and became the first 
Governor-General of the state of Nigeria, Lugard, did not shy away from this fact: “The 
advent of Europeans has brought the mind and methods of Europe to bear on the native of 
Africa for good or for ill, and the seclusion of ages must perforce give place to modern 
ideas” (Lugard, 1922, p. 5). To drive home this view point, Lugard smugly asserted that:  
In brief, we may say that the eighteenth century was chiefly remarkable for the acquisition of large 
and almost uninhabited portions of the earth, situated in the temperate zone.” The nineteenth century 
saw the development of these great colonies into nations enjoying self -government. (Lugard, 1922, 
pp. 5-6).   
Lugard’s statement underscored the primary role of Britain in creating the state of Nigeria 
over disparate indigenous polities. It is in view of the fact that the state of Nigeria was a 
British creation based on European political ideas that the previous chapter was devoted to 
understanding the European state system and political organisation in relation to federalism.  
 The fifth and final point with regard to the impact of the amalgamation is the system 
of rule employed by the colonial administration in governing the colonial state of Nigeria. 
As earlier highlighted, the partition of Nigeria brought together disparaged polities that were 
hitherto independent nationalities, and created a state that “bore little or no relationship to 
the pre-existing polities” (Boahen, 1985). The partition could best be described as former 
Prime Minister of Britain, Lord Salisbury, characterised it: haphazard and disorganised  
(Kwarteng, 2012). As the British gained “effective occupation” of the territories that formed 
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the present state of Nigeria they “overlaid it with colonial administrative grid”  (Betts, 
1985). In his contribution, “Methods and Institutions of European Domination” in the 
General History of Africa VII, Betts (1985) provides a detailed elaboration of the colonial 
system of administration. According to Betts, the point of departure of Europeans’ colonial 
policy in Africa, as opposed to at any other time or in any other place, was the adoption of 
what they referred to as “native policy.” The term meant, in theory and practice, that 
“colonial rule could only be effectively secured through the use of indigenous personnel and 
institutions in some complementary or supportive function”  (Betts, 1985, p. 312). Betts 
argued that what the “colonial masters” conceived as official policy was simply a corpus of 
practices based on administrative expediency.  
 In line with the “native policy,” the “colonial masters” employed a colonial 
administrative approach referred to as “conjunctive administration,” which was termed as 
“indirect rule” (Betts, 1985). Betts defined Indirect Rule as a system of administration 
“which joined African authorities, in traditionally-held or European-imposed political roles, 
to the colonial government, but in an obviously subordinate capacity” (p. 315). Betts listed 
several reasons that informed the choice of this system of rule by the British: 1)  historical 
pattern of the late nineteenth-century colonial acquisition was a formative factor, and size 
added a new dimension to the challenge of colonial rule; 2) internal penetration of Africa 
rapidly outpaced the available number of European personnel to administer the acquisition; 
3) since European penetration extended into many regions that were not reached by 
European cultural contact, direct rule would be abruptly strange and impractical in such 
context; 4) direct rule, which initially was applied in smaller coastal possessions, was 
dropped in favour of indirect rule of interior possessions; 5) the termination of rule by 
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chartered companies precipitated the establishment of national control to strengthen colonial 
grip over extensive territories; 6) the principle of empire “on the cheap” – limiting or 
avoiding direct cost to the metropolitan state; and 7) the belief that by adopting indirect rule 
social dislocation will be minimal and hence the cooperation of natives can be assured (p. 
315). By and large, the “colonial masters” also believed that it was important in order to 
command success and promote the welfare of the people that colonial methods and 
institutions are deeply-rooted in the latter’s traditions and prejudices. Furthermore, as Betts 
noted, the failure of the assimilation project in the nineteenth century due to the cultural 
resistance of the African peoples in places like Lagos, and the attendant conflicts and 
tension it generated, snuffed out the enthusiasm of British “colonial masters” in direct rule. 
Under this scenario, Betts noted, the colonial administrators decided to engage “native 
authorities” as allies or agents through whom they exercised alien rule effectively over their 
colonial subjects. 
 The way the British interpreted the above principles and policies of colonial 
administrative policy in Nigeria before and after the amalgamation has been described as 
consequential (Maier, 2002; Achebe, 2012; Kwarteng, 2012). In spite of the great diversities 
of the polities that formed the British possession that came to be known as Nigeria, the 
British reduced these complexities by dividing the territory into a politico-cultural tripod. 
Kwarteng (2012) describe this phenomenon in the following way:  
In the eyes of the British the country which we would later know as Nigeria was, like Julius Caesar’s 
Gaul, split into three parts. In simple terms the British understood, there was a northern region, 
which was predominantly Muslim, a western region, which was dominated by the Yoruba tribe, and 
an eastern region, where the Igbo were the predominant ethnic group. This was an oversimplified 
view, but it informed British attitudes about Nigeria.  (Kwarteng, 2012, p. 284).                                          
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Tamuno (1980) gave a vivid description of the fallacy of ethnographic congruence relied on 
by the British to divide Nigeria into the three provinces, northern, western and eastern:  
From April 1939, the government split the former Southern Provinces into Eastern and Western 
Provinces. Bernard Bourdillon, the governor at the time, justified this change on three principal 
grounds. He and his staff, he said, had experienced delays consequent on increased work and 
transport difficulties in correspondence between Lagos and Enugu. Though these arguments were 
tenable the other was not. Bourdillon maintained that ethnographical considerations led him to 
believe that the lower Niger provided neat administrative line dividing the people of the former 
Southern Provinces.  Bourdillon refused to split the Northern Provinces at the same time. He argued 
that unlike Enugu, in the Southern Provinces, Kaduna provided a more central capital for the 
Northern Provinces. Besides, he believed that the people of the Northern Provinces were more 
homogenous in culture than those in Southern Provinces. (Tamuno, 1980, p. 395).       
The justification given by Bourdillon was undoubtedly pranky. As Turaki (2010) and 
Mangvwat (2014) have pointed out, Northern Nigeria was heterogeneous, and it was 
inconceivable that Bourdillon could refer to it as culturally homogenous. In addition, the 
Northern Provinces made up more than two thirds of the country’s land mass (Coleman, 
1971), and that should have even justified the need for splitting it.  
 Apart from being a complicated oversimplification, the division of the country into 
three regions created the so-called ethnic tripod (Osaghae, 1991). This so-called ethnic 
tripod refers to the division of the country in reference to the three dominant ethnic groups 
in each of the regions, that is, the Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the 
Igbo in the east (Agbese, 2003). These three ethnic groups by this tripodal conception 
became the well-known majorities, and groups that do not belong to any of these well -
known majorities are called minorities (Aku, 1982 cited in Agbese, 2003, p. 239). Osaghae 
(1991) described this in terms of core-periphery dichotomy: 
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Each region had a ‘core’ comprising the majority group (Yoruba in the West, Igbo in the East and 
Hausa-Fulani in the North) and a ‘periphery’ which comprised the minority groups which were 
territorially located in as follows: Mid-West in the West, Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers provinces in the East 
and middle-belt, Southern Zaria and Borno areas in the north. (Osaghae, 1991, p. 239). 
The delineation of “minorities” by the colonial administrators and scholars who define the 
concept of ethnic minorities as simply numerically inferior linguistic groups or only in 
reference to the three dominant ethnic groups (Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba) has been criticised 
as misrepresentation (Osaghae, 1991; Agbese, 2003). Osaghae has argued that another 
factor that complicates the majority-minority distinction, in the case of the north, was (and 
remains) the Islamic factor: 
Largely because the Hausa-Fulani are predominantly Muslims, the Islamic faith has usually been 
considered one of the characteristics of the majority group. But there were also non -Hausa-Fulani 
Muslims, thanks to the jihad of the early 19th century and official British support for the 
Islamization of the North. Under the circumstances, there were, and continue to be, two distinct, even 
hierarchical, categories of minority groups. The first (higher) category comprised Muslim minorities 
who were in many instances, part of the privileged ‘Northern system’ in terms of benefits and 
identification. The second category was made up of the ‘proper’ minorities who were both non -Hausa 
speaking and non-Muslims. (Osaghae, 1991, pp. 239-240).     
This religious aspect highlighted by Osaghae is examined at length in the next section. A 
third category of minorities delineated in terms of their location are called the “marginal.” 
The term “marginal” was employed by Peter P. Ekeh as a sociological description of the so -
called minorities in Nigeria that by the vagaries of colonial regional boundaries have been 
caught off from a majority ethnic group that they are related with (Ekeh, 1972). 
 Overall, the division of the country into three regions by the British created several 
challenges, some of which have been highlighted above. This division significantly 
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impacted and was impacted by the colonial system of indirect rule. The three regions were 
very different. For example, “The north was dominated by feudal, Islamic lords known as 
emirs” (Kwarteng, 2012, p. 284). The dominant political system of Northern Nigeria was 
organised around the emirates which submit to political and spiritual overlordship of the 
Sultan of Sokoto (Osaghae, 1991). The south-west was dominated by the Yoruba, who were 
prior to the colonial engineered merger organised in several independent polities. “They had 
kings (Obas), supported by chiefs, who control the economy and resources of the 
state...Yoruba Obas had power over life and death, but these powers were subject to control 
through a system of checks and balances...” (Oyeweso, 2014, p. 4). An illustration of how 
this worked was given by Maier: 
The Oyo monarchy ruled through a complex system of checks and balances that involved a council of 
notables, the Oyo Mesi, and the secretive Ogboni society made up of eminent political and religious 
figures. The Oyo Mesi could depose the Alafin, the king, when their prime minister, the Bashorun, 
told him: “The Gods reject you, the people reject you, the earth rejects you.”  (Maier, 2002).   
It can, therefore, be argued that the socio-political systems of the Yoruba societies were 
democratic in nature (Oyeweso, 2014). The Igbo and the other ethnic groups in the south-
eastern region were widely known to be: less feudal (Kwarteng, 2012, p. 284), democratic 
and maintained highly republican political traditions devoid of a centralised authority 
(Maier, 2002, p. 9). Despite the obvious respective internal peculiarities of the three regions 
and the dissimilarities of their political traditions, the colonial administration applied the 
Indirect Rule across the country. It has been noted that this singular act undermined the 
indigenous political cultures and ushered in a new political tradition with grave 
consequences (Asiwaju, 1997; Achebe, 2012).  
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 Afigbo (1980), Asiwaju (1980) and Abubakar (1980b) gave detailed accounts of 
colonial rule in the eastern, western and northern provinces respectively.  The focus here is 
on the infamous system of Indirect Rule and its consequences on the regions. Afigbo (1980) 
asserted that the overriding goal of the British colonial rule in the eastern provinces was to 
maintain a degree of law and order that is necessary to guarantee the most effective 
exploitation of the natural resources in the area. Afigbo noted that, the provinces, divisions 
and districts, which made up the administrative structure through which the central 
government organises and carries out its work, were effectively in the hands of British 
colonial officers. However, at the local government level, as a result of the shortage of 
European staff and the inadequacy of communications and means of transport, which were 
required to administer the vast territory and large population, local rulers were engaged 
(Afigbo, 1980). These two proximate factors and, perhaps, those enumerated by Betts 
(1985), which were highlighted earlier, informed the imposition of Indirect Rule in the 
eastern provinces. For example, Afigbo explained that not only was Indirect Rule 
considered cheaper and germane to ensuring administrative continuity, “but it was believed 
to soften the shock which the introduction of Western ideas was believed to administer to a 
‘primitive’ people” (Afigbo, 1980, p. 416-417). Afigbo further noted that the desire of the 
British to govern the conquered peoples through their indigenous institutions did not 
mitigate the ultimate goal of foisting an alien political system on them.  
 The most bizarre aspect of the Indirect Rule in the eastern region was how those that 
became agents of British rule were chosen. Given the republican nature of the eastern 
communities, it was difficult for the British to determine who were the traditional heads of 
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the villages and village-groups. Afigbo described the confusion that ensued in the following 
way: 
Where the people were consulted they more often than not misunderstood the purpose of the request 
and pushed forward as their chiefs people who had no special status in trad itional society. 
Communities which thought that those they presented would be killed or sold into slavery presented 
slaves or criminals or ne’er-do-wells as their chiefs, while others who thought the whitemen needed 
messengers sent able young men. In many places the administration chose chiefs without reference to 
anybody and made similar mistakes. (Afigbo., 1980, p. 417).   
Afigbo, however, noted that not all those that were chosen as chiefs were nonentities or 
rogues; many of the selected local agents were the traditional heads of their villages. 
Nonetheless, the new power conferred on these chosen rulers was far beyond what any 
political leaders were accorded in pre-colonial period. Afigbo noted that the new crop of 
leaders, both those that were hitherto holding traditional political positions and the 
nonentities that ascended to the new local rulership, were corrupt and oppressive. These 
leaders were issued a certificate called a “Warrant” by the colonial administration and they 
became popularly known as Warrant Chiefs. The Warrant Chiefs had another class of chiefs 
called the minor chiefs or headmen as their representatives at the ward and village levels, 
and the latter had the possibility to succeed the former. In a nutshell, the Warrant Chief 
System has been described as a political disaster for the eastern provinces because it was 
incompatible with the decentralised political system of the Igbo (Asiwaju, 1997, p. 32). This 
is why Achebe referred to the Indirect Rule experiment in the eastern region as “a deeply 
flawed arrangement that effectively confused and corrupted the Igbo democratic spirits” 
(Achebe, 2012, p. 2). A recent work by Oriji (2013), Political Organisation in Nigeria since 
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the Late Stone Age: A History of the Igbo People, gave a similar commentary on the dismal 
effects of the Indirect Rule in Igboland in great detail.      
 British Indirect Rule in Western Provinces was equally problematic. Asiwaju (1980) 
described the region as culturally complex. The Yoruba, who were the predominant group in 
the region, Edo and Itsekiri peoples had commonality of political institution, that is, the 
kingship, and were organised into kingdoms with Oba, Olu or Obi traditional stools; while 
the Urhobo and the Kwale Igbo were more or less organised into clans (Asiwaju, 1980).  
According to Asiwaju, the overriding objective of colonial administration in Yorubaland at 
the initial phase was just to keep the peace required to ensure that  British trade flourishes. 
Asiwaju noted that militarisation and authoritarianism characterised British colonial 
administration in western Nigeria prior to 1914. He argued that, as a consequence of this, 
there “was a drastic and widespread erosion of the Yoruba traditional political authority” 
(Asiwaju, 1980, p. 437). The indigenous rulers that had hitherto wielded power within the 
limit of traditional checks and balances lost status and prestige under the pre-1914 British 
arrangement (Oyeweso, 2014). Rev. Samuel Johnson’s (2010) The History of the Yorubas, a 
posthumous work recompiled by his brother, Dr. Obadiah Johnson, and first published in 
1921, gives an elaborate account of the pre-colonial political organisation of Yorubaland.  
 The year 1914 had dual significance for the western provinces. Firstly, as earlier 
explored, just like the rest of the country, the region was affected by the amalgamation of 
the Southern and Northern Protectorates. Secondly, it was in this epochal year that the first 
administrator of the newly created state of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, extended the 
infamous Indirect Rule to the Southern Provinces (Asiwaju, 1980; Oyeweso, 2014). In 
Yorubaland, the colonial administration took advantage of the kingship or monarchical 
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institutions by superimposing Indirect Rule on the Obaship institution in order to 
consolidate British colonial control of the Yorubaland (Asiwaju, 1980). To some extent, this 
has helped to restore the lost glory of some of the recognized Obas and baales (Oyeweso, 
2014). In the easterly provinces of the western region, particularly in Benin, similar 
phenomenon also occurred, albeit the Indirect Rule encountered problems there due to the 
pre-1914 British coercive erosion of the indigenous political structures of Benin and Delta 
through a direct type of rule, and the complications that arose from the introduction of the 
unpopular Warrant Chief system to the quite politically segmentary Urhobo, Kwale Igbo 
and Itsekiri societies (Asiwaju, 1980). By and large, Asiwaju observed, the existence of a 
kingship system in place ensured the relative success of Indirect Rule in Yorubaland and, to 
a limited extent, in non-Yoruba speaking western provinces.  
  British Indirect Rule achieved even more considerable measure of success in 
Northern Nigeria (Asiwaju, 1980; Maier, 2002; Campbell, 2011). Success here means 
traditional rulers acted in subordination to British administrators and indigenous political 
institutions served the purpose of colonial administration (Asiwaju, 1997). As highlighted 
earlier, before the advent of the twentieth century the place that was known as Northern 
Nigeria, or later called Northern Provinces, was made up of numerous independent entities  
(Abubakar, 1980b). There were empires, states, chiefdoms, chieflets, and various polities of 
varying scales (Abubakar, 1980b; Mangvwat, 2014). Abubakar (1980) noted that prior to the 
British conquest there was no centralized authority wielding political power over the entire 
expansive Northern Provinces, but a huge part of the region was under the Sokoto Islamic 
empire. It can be deduced from a number of sources that the motive of British for the 
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conquest of the northern region and the system of rule they employed to govern the vast 
territory were paradoxical. For example, Campbell (2011) noted that: 
British motives for the conquest of the North were a mix of commercial, strategic, and altruistic 
concerns, including suspicion of the French intentions in that part of the Sahel and the desire to 
suppress the slave trade: by the turn of the twentieth century, the Sultanate of Sokoto was probably 
the largest slaveholding empire remaining in the world [emphasis added]. (Campbell, 2011, p. 2).       
Once the British had conquered Northern Nigeria, they were faced with the challenge of 
establishing colonial administration over such a massive territory. Confronted with the 
inadequacy of staff and materials, which were needed to govern the vast territory of 
Northern Nigeria through a direct type of rule, the British set aside their initial reservations 
about the emirate system, which they had judged as “corrupt, oppressive and grossly 
inefficient,” and decided to use it to establish control over the region  (Abubakar, 1980b, p. 
450). It was, therefore, ironic that, in spite of the unsavoury reputation of the Caliphate as a 
slaveholding empire and the British critique of it, the colonial administrators allied 
themselves with the local rulers: 
The once ‘corrupt and oppressive’ Fulbe were hailed as born rulers whom the British had to maintain 
at all cost; their long established system of government was fit to be utilised by the British. So, the 
emirate system of the Sokoto Caliphate became, for the Brit ish, a good model for local government 
in the Northern Provinces. Consequently, the system was patronised and eventually extended even 
over non-Muslim groups. (Abubakar, 1980b, pp. 450-451).        
Three salient observations can be made about Sa’ad Abubakar’s statement above: the British 
elevated the Fulani or Fulbe as born rulers; the emirate system of the Sokoto Caliphate 
became a model for local government for the entire northern region; and non-Muslim areas 
were subjected to the emirate rule, which was based on Islam. Despite the acclaimed success 
of Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, it created political upheavals in the Middle Belt due to 
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the incompatibility of the emirate system with the political culture of the peoples 
(Abubakar, 1980b). Turaki (2010) and Mangvwat (2014) contended that the ramifications of 
these controversial actions of the British are felt up to the present time.    
 Abubakar (1980b) argued that, contrary to what many studies have maintained, the 
Indirect Rule, which came to be associated with its main architect, Frederick Lugard, and 
known as the “Lugardian system,” had degraded the emirate set up in the region. According 
to him, the emirs were reduced to mere agents of the British. Abubakar opined that the 
conquest weakened the power of the emirs, and the Islamic empire did not wield the kind of 
power it had prior to the nineteenth century. Besides weakening the central authority of the 
Caliph, the British colonial administration proclaimed new policies on slavery, justice and 
taxation that negatively affected the emirate government, which had hitherto relied on the 
[objectionable] “benefits” of keeping slaves (Abubakar, 1980, p. 454). Lugard’s account of 
how the emirate system faired under British rule concurred with Abubakar’s position:  
... for there are very many cases on record in Nigeria, extending from the earliest beginnings of 
British rule in the north up to the present day, where not only the highest officials of the native 
administration have been deprived of their positions and subjected to the rigours of the law for 
misconduct, but even Emirs and principal chiefs have been deposed for misrule.  (Lugard, 1922, p. 
224).      
However, while the Muslim emirs were subordinated to the British colonial administrators 
and had to swear the oath of allegiance in the name of Allah and the Prophet of Islam to the 
British Crown and the representative of the Crown, the High Commissioner (Abubakar, 
1980b, p. 452), it has been argued that, nevertheless, Indirect Rule gave preferential 
treatment to the Muslim rulers at the detriment of non-Muslims in the region (Osaghae, 
1991; Turaki, 2010; Mangvwat, 2014). For example, Maier (2002) and Campbell (2011) 
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observed that it was rather paradoxical that after defeating the Caliphate, the British went 
ahead to sustain it:  
The British administered northern Nigeria through a system called indirect rule that allowed the 
traditional authorities, the sultan and the emirs, to continue running things more or less as they saw 
fit. For the most part, the Islamic legal code, Sharia, was allowed to operate, except for cruel 
punishments such as amputation... It suited the emirs, who were allowed to maintain their power and 
at times even extend it over smaller pagan communities that they had never before controlled.  
(Maier, 2002, p. 11).   
Campbell shared similar perspective on the effect of Indirect Rule on the emirate system in 
the Northern Provinces:  
He [Lugard] looked to preserve, transform, and thereby strengthen the defeated caliphate’s 
“traditional” Islamic authorities... A consequence was that the Sokoto caliphate has continued to 
evolve from establishment by Sultan Dan Fodio in 1804 to the present despite its defeat. Indirect rule 
preserved much that was precolonial and premodern in Northern Nigeria.  (Campbell, 2011, p. 3). 
It can, therefore, be argued based on the arguments of Abubakar (1980b), Maier (2002), 
Turaki (2010), Campbell (2011) and Mangvwat (2014) that the Islamic emirate system 
incurred some losses and gains as a result of the Indirect Rule, but it was clearly in a far 
more advantageous position than the non-Muslim polities and communities in the north, and 
it was imposed as a hegemon on the rest of the Northern region that it had no influence and 
authority over before the advent of British colonialism.                        
 The structure of colonial administration in the Northern Provinces was similar to 
those already enumerated under the Eastern and Western Provinces. In the judicial sphere, 
however, the British maintained the position of Qadis courts, which operated on the basis of 
Maliki law, and established parallel English type of courts operating at three tiers  
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(Abubakar, 1980b). Even with oversight over Qadis courts, the British administrators had a 
daunting task ensuring that judgements passed by Qadis complied with British standards: 
Although in the Qadis courts the Residents and the District Officers played no part, they had access 
to the records of the proceedings and were directed to see that certain canonical punishments – such 
as amputation of limps for theft, stoning to death of fornicators – were not implemented. There were 
serious departures from the sharia’ (sic), which most Qadis found difficult to abide by, hence, some 
used to pass double judgements, one in court abiding by dictate of the Nasara (Europeans) and the 
other at home based on Shari’a. (Abubakar, 1980b, p. 455).  
In general, unlike in the Southern Provinces, Indirect Rule proved successful as far as the 
British had made the attempt to use the pre-existing emirate system in the north and to work 
out compromise that sustained the Islamic and cultural traditions of the ruling class even at 
the detriment of the numerous non-Muslim peoples of the region. It was, thus, the 
instrumentality of the emirate system – being cheap and compatible with the exploitative 
nature of colonialism – that guaranteed the greater success of the Indirect Rule than 
anywhere else.  
3.2.3. Nationalist Movements. Various studies have given account of how the tripartite 
administrative arrangement, which divided the country into West, East and North regions, 
gave rise to the phenomenon of regionalism. Before exploring these studies, it is important 
to first of all interrogate the roots of nationalist currents in modern Nigeria. The purpose of 
doing this is to locate the main factors that had unifying influences on the hitherto disparate 
polities that came to be known as Nigeria. In one of his widely respected works, Milestones 
in Nigerian History, Professor J. F. Ade Ajayi identified four epochal factors that had 
unifying influences in the history of modern Nigeria: Fulani jihad; Christian mission; 
British colonial administration; and nationalist movements (Ajayi, 1962). In line with 
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Ajayi’s position, Olusanya argued that the roots of nationalist ideas in Nigeria are long and 
varied: 
The emergence of Nigerian nationalism pre-dated the establishment of effective British rule over the 
whole country known as Nigeria. This is because the various areas which now constitute modern 
Nigeria were acquired at different times and certain forces and conditions favouring the emergence 
of the nationalist idea were already at work before 1914 when Nigeria became an administrative unit.  
(Olusanya, The Nationalist Movements in Nigeria, 1980a, p. 545)     
 Here, each of the four epochal factors that, according to Ajayi (1962), have had 
integrative influence on modern Nigerian history is discussed. First, the Fulani Islamic jihad 
of 1804-1808, which was led by the Islamic scholar Usman dan Fodio, was instrumental in 
creating an overarching political agglomeration called the Caliphate, which subsumed 
numerous independent polities in the geographical area that later became known as Northern 
Nigeria under British colonial rule. Hence, it has been suggested that: “By bringing together 
such a large area under one single political unit, the jihad paved the way for the  emergence 
of a greater Nigeria” (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 545). It can, thus, be argued that the jihad created 
spatial and territorial identity at two levels. First, the geographical extent of the caliphate 
covered an area that embraced more than half of the present day Nigeria (Olusanya, 1980a, 
p. 545). Second, the jihad reinforced the fusion of Islam and politics, and created a 
synonymity between the entire territory under the influence of the Sokoto Caliphate and 
Islam thereby spatialising and territorialising religious identity. 
 Although Islam was introduced into Nigeria from the eleventh century through the 
state of Kanem (Bornu) via the proselytising work of Arab trans-Saharan slave traders and 
merchants, who doubled as itinerant preachers, and Islamic scholars and clerics (Falk, 1997; 
Hunwick, 2006; Turaki, 2010), it was the nineteenth century Fulani jihad that unified a vast 
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region of the north (Ajayi, 1962; Olusanya, 1980a; Turaki, 2010; Ogbogbo, 2014). It is 
important to note that Arab Trans-Saharan Slave Trade had linkage with European Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade; the former was a major source of slaves not only to the Arab states 
and the Ottoman sultanate, but also to the European slave markets until the Europeans 
discovered new routes to acquire direct access to the human “commodity”  (Falk, 1997; 
Hunwick, 2006). Early contact of West Africa with Islam through North Africans from the 
Maghreb in about mid eighth century did not crystallise in the adoption of the Islamic faith  
by the people, but it was until the eleventh century that Islam started having a foothold in 
West Africa when a number of rulers of states formally accepted the Islamic faith and the 
success of the militant Islamic movement, Almoravids (derived from the Arabic al- 
murābiṭūn – warriors for the faith), which arose among the nomads of the Sanhaja of 
Western Sahara, that paved the way for the spread of Islam in West Africa (see Falk, 1997; 
Hunwick, 2006; Turaki, 2010). The link between the almoravidist movement and the 
coming of Islam into Nigeria is tenuous. In large part, Islam came into Nigeria through 
Muslim merchants and clerics, and the migration and dispersal of Muslims, for example, the 
migration of the Fulani or Fulbe was believed to have played a role in the spread of Islam in 
Northern Nigeria: 
The most significant migration in the region was that of the Fulani or Fulbe from the Futa Toro in the 
Senegal in the nineteenth and fourteenth centuries. They migrated from Western Sudan to places 
beyond Central Sudan and Northern Nigeria. Later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this 
mobile group was responsible for founding Islamic states in many parts of West Africa.  (Turaki, 
2010, p. 39). 
It can, nevertheless, be argued that in the early years of Islam in Northern Nigeria, the 
kingdoms that converted to Islam and their rulers remained autonomous until the Usman dan 
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Fodio led Fulani jihad swept across the region and brought a vast swath of territories under 
the Caliphate, which exerted a unifying influence in the region.            
 The second epochal factor that had unifying influence in modern Nigerian history 
was Christian mission. The introduction of Christianity into Africa south of the Sahara 
occurred in phases associated with three waves of Christianity on the continent: Christianity 
in Mediterranean Africa, Nubia and Ethiopia in ancient times; Portuguese early attempt to 
establish Christianity among coastal areas of Africa, fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries; 
and the modern missionary movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although 
the presence of Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa is often associated with the advent of 
Europeans, its history goes farther back to periods before that. Professor Yusufu Turaki was 
quite categorical in asserting that Christianity even predated Islam in West Africa (Turaki, 
2010, p. 35).  For example, it has been suggested that the early contact of Sub-Saharan 
Africa with North Africa, where Christianity was well established from its beginning before 
the Islamic conquest, might have provided the channel for the spread of the Christian faith 
among black Africans (cf. Falk, 1997; Hunwick, 2006). Dr. Peter Falk, for example, noted 
in his The Growth of the Church in Africa that: “West Africa has had sustained contact with 
the civilization of North Africa since the time of Christ”  (Falk, 1997, p. 69). In her very 
comprehensive work, A History of Christianity in Africa: From Antiquity to the Present , 
Professor Elizabeth Isichei traced the origin of Christianity in Africa to the thriving times of 
the church in North Africa and Nubia, and the important place of the church in Ethiopia in 
the history of African Christianity (Isichei, 1995). Apart from the possible spread of 
Christianity into West Africa through the region’s contact with the churches in Egypt, Nubia 
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and Ethiopia, the Christians of North Africa, who were fleeing from rampaging jihadist 
forces were said to have also brought Christianity into West Africa:     
The Christians of North Africa crossed the Sahara in flight from Islamic jihads and brought 
Christianity to the region. Today’s Tuaregs and Garamantes are said to be descendants of the 
Christian communities in the Sahara, who spoke the Old Libyan Punic language... Christian names 
and relics of Christianity were traceable among the Tuaregs for some centuries.  (Turaki, 2010, p. 35).  
However, it has been noted that the religion of Christianity waned or became obliterated in 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa during the intervening periods of Islamic conquest of North 
Africa (Falk, 1997; Turaki, 2010).   
 The second wave of Christianity in Africa occurred between the fifteenth and 
eighteenth centuries. It followed several expeditions undertaken by Portuguese explorers, 
who were spurred by the invention of the compass, the new knowledge and skills of 
navigation, and the emergence of larger and stronger vessels that enabled people to explore 
the unknown (Falk, 1997). From 1402-1772, the Portuguese expedition provided a platform 
for Roman Catholic missions to the black people of the West African coast.  The motivation 
of the Portuguese missionaries, according to Falk (1997), was: to bring the gospel to the 
people, who had not yet heard about it; and to build a buffer against, or to thwart, the 
expanding power of Muslims by nurturing alliance with African Christian churches that 
were thought to be in existence in the West African coast. With the decline of Portuguese 
influence in the coast of West Africa at the end of the eighteenth century, the Roman 
Catholic missions slowed down.  
 Lastly, the third wave of Christianity, which has been characterised as the modern 
missionary movement or modern missionary Christianity in West Africa, occurred between 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Isichei, 1995; Falk, 1997; Turaki, 2010). Christian 
125 
 
revival in Europe and North America brought about new conceptions of social justice that 
made some Christians to be appalled by the evils of the slave trade and to engage in 
exposing this inhumane act in the public, and this eventually led to the abolition of the 
nefarious slave trade in 1808 in Britain, and officially adopted by other Western powers in 
1833  (Falk, 1997). The anti-slavery campaigns opened the door for Christian missions, as 
liberated ex-slaves, including those from Nova Scotia in Canada, were resettled along the 
coast of West Africa (Isichei, 1995; Falk, 1997). Many slaves were later returned from 
Sierra Leone to western Nigeria, particularly to the Yorubaland (Falk, 1997, p. 124). The 
summary given in the next paragraph is based on the detailed exposés of Isichei (1995) and 
Falk (1997).  
 Most of the liberated African slaves that were returned to the coast of West Africa 
were already Christianised. The first building they constructed was a church, to demonstrate 
their gratitude to God for liberating them (Falk, 1997, p. 105). Some of the ex-slaves had 
already received education and others were even preachers, who played prominent roles in 
proclaiming the gospel to their fellow Africans along the coast and in the interior  (Isichei, 
1995; Falk, 1997). For example, the first African Anglican bishop, Samuel Ajayi Crowther, 
was a liberated Yorubaman who played a prominent role in evangelising among the Yoruba 
of south-western Nigeria. However, these former slaves were by the experience they went 
through uprooted from their African culture, and hence, had difficulty blending with the rest 
of the African populations. However, “gradually, as the latter acquired education and 
accepted the Christian faith, the differences between the two groups diminished; they 
developed into a more homogeneous unit and were called Creoles”  (Falk, 1997, p. 104).   
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 Western Christian agents and the government felt a moral obligation to provide 
humanitarian support and the benefits of Western civilisations, including education, to the 
liberated Africans, who were socially uprooted from their African culture, and to the rest of 
the black Africans. Thus, the modern mission movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries was motivated by this desire, and the mission impulse of nurturing the Christian 
faith of the liberated Africans and bringing the gospel to the rest of the black people from 
the coast to the interior. The movement was dominated by Evangelical Protestants from 
Europe and North America, who established many mission societies for outreach to the 
Africans, albeit the Roman Catholic Orders also continued to establish African missions 
during the period. The liberated slaves, who returned to their own people in western 
Nigeria, started evangelising among their people, and invited the Church Missionary Society 
to fertile mission field that they had just discovered. From the 1840s onwards, Christian 
missions began in western Nigeria and spread through the years to the rest of the southern 
region of the country.  
 The point that is being established here is that Christian mission also acted as a 
unifying factor in Nigeria. Christian missionaries were able to dissolve the rivalry and 
suspicion among liberated African Christians and their fellow African converts  (Falk, 
1997); the missionaries strove to encourage “amongst their converts the idea of the creation 
of a modern state which would take its rightful place in the comity of nations”  (Olusanya, 
1980a, p. 545). Acording to Olusanya, through their activities, which covered the whole 
present day southern Nigeria, the missionaries succeeded in breaking down ethnic 
prejudices and creating an overarching identity that transcended ethnic boundaries.    
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  The third epochal factor that has had a unifying influence in modern Nigerian 
history is British colonial administration. There is no need to go into details about British 
colonialism again here; it has already been explored in the preceding section. Colonial rule 
brought together erstwhile disparate polities and tried to forge a sense of common identity 
among Nigerians. For instance, Olusanya posited that: “The bringing together of the various 
groups by the British themselves within a common administrative unit fostered the spirit of 
oneness and a sense of unity – ‘the unity of common subjection’” (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 545). 
The late Nigerian literary icon, Chinua Achebe characterised the bond of unity among 
Nigerians engineered by the British through the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern 
Protectorates as a delicate and artificial lattice (Achebe, 2012, p. 2). For the purpose of this 
study, it is important to note that the amalgamation of Nigeria by the British had far-
reaching consequence for the state system that was put in place:  
The unification of Nigeria led to the centralization of the army and police, making the centre 
responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the country. The central government has the 
sole responsibility to deploy the military against insurrection and opposition against its policies and 
persecute aggression against the state. The control of the military forces further enhanced the power 
of the government at the centre over those at the regions. (Oyeweso, 2014, p. 6).     
 The fourth and last epochal factor that had a unifying influence in modern Nigerian 
history was nationalist movements. Here, attempt is made to distil from the literature the 
nationalist currents in modern Nigerian history into two: pan-Nigerian nationalism and 
regionalist nationalism. This distinction is necessary in order to capture the context and 
content of nationalist movements in modern Nigerian history. Anti-colonial nationalism is 
used here as a concomitant of colonial rule. Its genesis in Nigeria can be traced to the 
beginning of British invasion. Olusanya (1980), for instance, noted that the various 
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indigenous polities that were brought together under the banner of Brit ish colonial rule had 
had a common strong desire for self-rule and opposed foreign control. Olusanya explained 
how colonialism sowed the seed of its own destruction:  
This desire was strongly expressed in the resistance of the indigenous population to Brit ish conquest 
and domination, a resistance which continued long after the establishment of British control and 
which expressed itself not only in the sporadic outbreak of violence, but in a more subtle, 
psychological form. There was also the fact that British rule carried with it racial intolerance and 
discrimination, limited opportunities for Nigerians in the administrative machinery, and open 
economic exploitation of Nigerians in the administrative enterprise with connivance of the British 
colonial administration. (Olusanya, 1980a, pp. 545-546).      
As Olusanya posited, the common suffering of subjugation, racial discrimination, and 
exploitative treatments that Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic origins, were exposed to 
in the hands of the British colonisers created “the unity of common subjection.” This 
awareness helped Nigerians to see themselves not as separate ethnic nationalities, but as one 
group confronted by a foreign group, the British colonisers. It was against this backdrop that 
Nigerians founded organisations “whose main purpose was to mobilize not only a particular 
class or group, but the entire population of Nigeria against the oppressive British colonial 
rule” (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 546). To be sure, this was the moment that generated what may 
be described as pan-Nigerian nationalism, which in all respect was a widespread expression 
of anti-colonial sentiment.  
 Falola’s (2009) Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria dedicates a chapter to the anti-
colonial nationalism witnessed in Nigeria. Professor Toyin Falola described the different 
faces of the anti-colonial nationalism that characterised the independence struggle by 
Nigerians. The different polities that were brought together by the British to form the 
Nigerian state had individually resisted British conquest and failed. After the amalgamation, 
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the period 1914 to 1939 witnessed a collective, anti-colonial nationalism by Nigerians, led 
by Western-educated elites, in forms of: “Demands for reform, political agitation, and 
complaints about imperial exploitation” (Falola, 2009, p. 132). In general, according to 
Falola, the elites led agitations were peaceful; they articulated their nationalist sentiments 
through writing, and tampered their demands for reform with a willingness to accept 
incremental change. It can, thus, be said that anti-colonial nationalism and reform 
nationalism went hand in hand. The 1940s and 1950s witnessed a more nuanced approach 
by the Western-educated elites, but also some violent protests and cracks in the fold of the 
nationalist (cf. Falola, 2009; Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014). Two strands of anti-colonial 
nationalism emerged during the period of the 1940s to 1950s: “militant criticism of the 
colonial order that demanded independence and messianic nationalism that asserted that a 
Nigerian hero and leader was ready to take over” (Falola, 2009, p. 133). It is important to 
note that the anti-colonial protests were not only carried out by Nigerian Western-educated 
leaders that emerged during the period, but even by less famous people, including market 
women, labour unions and grassroots politicians (Falola, 2009). The anti-colonial discourses 
of this period were intellectually rich, but also sometimes laden with confrontational tones 
(Falola, 2009; Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014). Three snippets of the anti-colonial discourses are 
presented below: 
Osita Agwuna, a member of Zikist Movement, Kano Branch, 1946 had this to say in protest 
to colonial rule:   
We the enslaved peoples, know certainly well that imperialism and African irredentism are two 
irreconcilables. We know also that the redemption of Africa lies in the hands of Africans themselves 
and must be achieved by either violent revolution or by non-violent revolution. (quoted in Falola, 
2009, p. 131).        
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Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1909 – 1987), first Premier of the Western Region (1952 – 1959) 
and opposition leader in the federal parliament (1959 – 1963), made the following assertion 
in his first address as the President of the Action Group, 28
th
 April 1951, to the Conference 
of Party Members at Owo: 
In our view, the rule of one nation by another is unnatural and unjust. It is maintained either by might 
or by complete subordination, through crafty means, of the will and self -respect of the subject people 
to the political self-aggrandizement of the tutelary power. There can be no satisfactory substitute for 
self-rule. (Awolowo, 1951). 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (1904 – 1996), second and last Governor-General of the Federation of 
Nigeria (1960 – 1963), first President of Nigeria (1963 – 1966), former President of the 
Nigerian Senate, former Premier of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, and a foremost 
nationalist, made the declaration below on the National Day of Mourning, 4
th
 July 1950, in 
memory of twenty-one miners who were killed at Enugu on 18
th
 November 1949, at the 
order of a British Police Officer: 
Let there be no mistake about our future; we are determined to be free, and history is on our side. It 
is not whether Nigeria is right or Britain is right; it is what is right for Nigeria. In these days of 
struggle for national survival, let us not be bitter; let us bear no malice; let us be charitable and stand 
firm in the cause of justice and righteousness. God knows we hate none on account of race or colour, 
but we love our country, and we want our country to be free, and we shall be free.  (Azikiwe, 1961, p. 
52). 
The above expressions fall under the category that Coleman (1971) described as “primary 
resistance,” which was a typical opposition of African groups to colonial rule.  
 While anti-colonial nationalism played a role in creating a sense of “common 
destiny” among the various Nigerian groups, like elsewhere in Africa, it was the movements 
to create new political nationalities that actually gave rise to pan-Nigerian nationalism and 
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regionalist nationalism. Coleman’s (1971) Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, considered 
as one of the most solid early works on the development of nationalism and the nationalist 
movements in Nigeria (first published in 1958) delineated the political nationalities that the 
movements sought to identify themselves with as: Nigeria; Western Region; Eastern 
Region; and Northern Region (Coleman, 1971, p. 4). The group that this study refers to as 
pan-Nigerian nationalists were more concerned with “national unity,” that is, broad unity 
among Nigerians, and sought to create a nation-state. Coleman (1971) used the term 
“modern nationalism” as a synonym for the form of nationalism expressed by the pan -
Nigerian nationalists. The concept of modern nationalism, according to Coleman, consists 
of: “sentiments, activities, and organisational developments aimed explicitly at the self-
government and independence of Nigeria as a nation-state existing on a basis of equality in 
an international state system” (Coleman, 1971, pp. 169-170). It is important here to state 
that this desire was inspired by the appeal of European model of the nation-state. Coleman 
identified the distinguishing characteristics of the pan-Nigerian or modern nationalism as 
follows: 
... (a) the explicit goal of Nigerian self-government; (b) the concept of Nigerian unity; (c) the 
predominance of westernized elements in leadership groups; (d) the development of permanent 
political associations to pursue nationalist objectives; and (e) the predominance of modern political 
values and ideals. (Coleman, 1971, p. 170).   
The excerpt below from Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (Zik) in which he affirmed the unity of 
Nigeria in a very personal and unequivocal term reflected vividly the sentiment of pan-
Nigerian nationalism: 
I was born in Northern Nigeria, where the boundaries of the country lie on the verges of the Sahara 
Desert, and where the majority of the inhabitants worship God according to the tenets of Islam, and 
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where the camel caravans still ply to and fro in their various missions across the desert to the Middle 
East. 
 I was educated in Lagos, the capital of Nigeria and a great seaport, where the ships of 
various nations anchor to trade with us. When the Ministerial system of government was introduced 
into Nigeria, I represented Lagos in the Legislature of Western Nigeria, where I still reside, in spite 
of my temporary absence in Eastern Nigeria.  
   My parents are natives of Eastern Nigeria, the arsenal of republicanism in Nigeria. 
Although I am Ibo, yet I speak Yoruba and I have a smattering of Hausa. I am now Premier of 
Eastern Nigeria, the land of my fathers, which lies five hundred miles from Lagos and almost a 
thousand miles from the place of my birth in Zungeru, in Northern Nigeria. Each of our three 
Regions is vastly different in many respects, but each has this in common: that, despite variety of 
languages and customs or difference in climate, all form part of one country which has existed as a 
political and social entity for fifty years. That is why we believe that the political union of Nigeria is 
destined to be perpetual and indestructible [emphasis added]. (Azikiwe, 1961, p. 20). 
As Zik conveyed in the above statement, it can be argued that the sentiments of pan-
Nigerian nationalism were in consonance with what may be categorised as a “civic model” 
of nationalism as opposed to ethnic/cultural nationalism (see Shulman, 2002; Vujakovic, 
2005; Jaskulowski, 2010). The distinction between the two conceptions of nationalism has 
been highlighted in the previous chapter.  
 Although pan-Nigerian nationalism was an integrative force in the political 
development of Nigeria, it was later challenged by another type of nationalism that emerged 
during the late 1940s and the years leading to independence (Coleman, 1971; Fwatshak & 
Ayuba, 2014). Whereas the former had emphasised pan-Nigerian unity, the latter form of 
nationalism put a high premium on regionalism as the focal point of Nigerian nationalist 
development (Coleman, 1971, p. 319). This latter type of nationalism is described in this 
study as regionalist nationalism. It may roughly fit in the category of “ethnic/cultural 
133 
 
model” of nationalism. However, this dichotomy between civic and ethnic/cultural 
nationalism needs to be taken with a caveat (Shulman, 2002; Jaskulowski, 2010). This is 
because the nation is an “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006), and, as Burszta & 
Jaskułowski (2005) argued, nationalism has a metonymic side. The metonymic dimension of 
nationalism is explained as follows:  
Nationalism regardless of its apparent civic or ethnic type refers to magical type of thinking enabling 
mental access to abstract and complex notions such as nation or national territory by means of a 
system of metonymy – concrete and closer to people’s experiences and easier to grasp.  (Jaskulowski, 
2010, p. 301).  
 It is worth noting that a number of factors were responsible for the regionalisation of 
nationalism. One of the drivers of the regionalisation of nationalism was the fear and 
tension created by the amalgamation, which was taking full effect towards the late 1960s. 
The political at the time conveyed the sentiments behind the regionalist nationalism that was 
taking roots in the country. In their article, “Discordant Voices in the House that Lugard 
Roofed: Amalgamation Discourses in Nigeria’s First Centenary,” Fwatshak and Ayuba 
(2014) catalogued the nature of the debates in a chronological framework. They described 
the amalgamation discourses as robust and aggressive:  
Serious discourses among Nigerians on the amalgamation began in the 1940s. The main issue was 
whether or not a united Nigeria was desirable or workable. The parties were the politicians, and the 
masses.” The trends were both intellectual and the use of physical violence.  (Fwatshak & Ayuba, 
2014, p. 5). 
As Fwatshak and Ayuba (2014) described in the above statement, the nationalist currents of 
the 1940s onward differed radically from those from the pre-1939. The pre-1939 
nationalists, who were political parties and leaders chiefly based in Lagos, pursued 
reformist goals and criticised colonialism with guardedness (Falola, 2009, p. 134). In the 
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1940s and 1950s, however, “ethnic nationalism and regional divisions triumphed over the 
forces of unity in Nigerian politics” (Olusanya, 1980a, p. 568). Coleman (1971), Olusanya 
(1980) and Falola (2009) provided detailed analysis of these factors, including the activities 
of political parties and the constitutional developments in the periods leading to 
independence. In a nutshell, the nationalists that were no longer favourably disposed to the 
idea of a united Nigeria embraced sub-state loyalties. A few snippets of the anti-Nigerian 
unity or regionalist nationalist discourses are presented below. 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s characterisation of “Nigeria”: 
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same 
sense as there are “English” “Welsh”, or “French”. The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive 
appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.  
(Awolowo, 1947, pp. 47-48).   
Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1912 – 1966), the only Prime Minister that Nigeria has had 
(1960 – 1966), made the following statement at a Legislative Council debate: 
Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the 
Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs 
and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite ... Nigerian unity is only a 
British intention for the country. (Balewa, 1948, p. 227).   
It is necessary to point out that the nationalists were not simply divided into pan-Nigerian 
and regionalist camps, but some were dangling between the two poles and flip-flopped as 
political exigencies dictated. To be sure, some demonstrated a fervent commitment to pan-
Nigerianism, while at the same time were strong advocates of their regions (cf. Coleman, 
1971).    
 There was no doubt that the creation of the three administrative regions in 1939 and 
the struggle for influence and regional alignments by political parties contributed in 
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generating fierce debate and violence (Coleman, 1971; Nwaubani, 2002; Fwatshak & 
Ayuba, 2014). The Kano riots of 1953 offered an example of how regional nationalism 
reared its ugly head sometimes. In this instance, according to the Reports on the Kano 
Disturbances, for four consecutive days, from May 16 to 19, 1953: “Southerners and 
Northerners in this bustling commercial capital of the Northern Region were attacking each 
other, burning and pillaging each other’s property, mutilating bodies of vic tims and 
committing the most violent atrocities on one another...” (Northern Regional Government, 
1953, p. 10). The next section looks at how federalism came to be employed as a mechanism 
for mediating regional contestations and divergent forms of nationalism, and to hold the 
country together.      
3.3 Long and Bumpy Road to Federalism  
 The year 1954 is often described as “a watershed in Nigeria’s evolution to statehood”  
because it was the date Nigeria became a federation (Gana, 2003, p. 17). Gana argued that 
the current crisis of legitimacy of the Nigerian state cannot be properly grasped and 
resolved without reference to the epoch-making event of that year, where the colonial 
administration and the Nigerian nationalists, mostly of competing political persuasions, 
entered into a “federal bargain” and reached a consensus that federalism was the best option 
for the soon-to-be independent state of Nigeria. However, some believed that the year 1947 
in which the constitution, popularly known as Richards Constitution, came into effect was 
the actual defining moment in Nigeria’s match towards independence and statehood  
(Irukwu, 2005). For example, Irukwu posited that it was a constitution designed to promote 
national unity, but it was believed to have achieved the exact opposite.  
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 Here, an attempt is made to interrogate the socio-political circumstances of Nigeria, 
at the time the decision to federate was taken in 1946 – 1954, and the precursory events 
leading up to 1946. Afigbo (1991) delineated two analytical approaches to this endeavour: 
1) a synchronic approach which focuses on the analysis of the socio-political circumstances 
of Nigeria at the time of the federal bargain; and 2) a diachronic approach that seeks to 
identify the steps leading up to the beginning of the intense debate about the propriety of a 
federal solution. Proponents of the synchronic approach locate the roots of Nigerian 
federalism in what has been described as the “primordial geography or cultural complexity 
of the country’s society,” (Suberu, 2001, p. 20) or “primordial federal features of indigenous 
Nigerian society” (Afigbo, 1991, p. 13). Afigbo (1991) distinguished between three forms of 
pluralities: the plurality of economic and geographic regions, the plurality of ethnic 
nationalities, and the plurality of colonial administrative traditions. This has been illustrated 
here in Figure 2. Afigbo grouped the first two pluralities under the primordial federal 
features of indigenous Nigeria. The third plurality, according to Afigbo, was more or less 
the impact of colonial administrative regionalism. Synchronic analysis places emphasis on 
the primordial federal features of indigenous Nigerian society. Scholars who adopt this 
analytical approach argue that Nigeria’s expansive geographic size and its ecological, 
economic, and cultural complexities and variations were crucial factors that informed the 
adoption of federalism. However, this claim has been challenged on the ground that Nigeria 
has never been a federation of natural, geographical and/or economic regions, and there was 
no evidence that the geographic size and ecological diversity have had any influence on the 
decision to adopt a federal system as opposed to other forms of political arrangements 
(Afigbo, 1991).  
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Figure 2. An illustration of the competing pluralities present at the time the 
decision to adopt the federal option in Nigeria was made. This figure 
illustrates Afigbo's (1991) argument that British sociopolitical engineering 
influenced the decision to adopt federalism in the country. 
 
 In contrast, those who adopt the diachronic analytical approach argue that the 
process of sociopolitical engineering employed by the British colonial administration in 
effect made the federal option inevitable (Afigbo, 1991, Suberu, 2001, and Gana, 2003). 
Proponents of the second approach argue that the legacy of British colonial administration, 
including administrative regionalism or the “colonial divide-and-rule syndrome” were the 
main forces behind the country’s federalism (Suberu, 2001, p. 20). As Suberu noted, the 
scholars in this category argue that the configuration of the three-region federation was not 
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determined by the so-called natural boundaries of the country’s constituent ethnic 
communities, but was an offshoot of British colonial domination and the structures of 
colonial administration. It is in view of this study’s leaning to the diachronic approach that 
already a considerable attention has been given to the British colonial rule and colonial 
socio-political engineering from the beginning of British colonial enterprise in the Niger 
Territory, which we now know as Nigeria. Therefore, only a summary of the key colonial 
wrought forces that played critical part in the decision to endow Nigeria with a federal 
system will be presented here.  
 In his diachronic analysis of the federal features in the Colonial State, Afigbo (1991) 
identified three key factors that played a critical role in the evolution of a federal system in 
Nigeria. First, the haphazard manner in which the British established territorial control over 
Nigeria led to the emergence of a tripartite administrative arrangement wherein each of the 
three separate administrative units evolved its own traditions and identity. As earlier stated, 
the delineation of the three regions was done as a matter of administrative convenience 
rather than borne out of a consideration of the primordial federal features of indigenous 
Nigerian society (Afigbo, 1980; Osaghae, 1991; Asiwaju, 1997; Achebe, 2012; Kwarteng, 
2012). The second factor, according to Afigbo (1991), was the method, patterns and politics 
of amalgamation employed by the colonial administration from 1906 to 1914, which 
reinforced and sustained the incongruity among the administrative units. Through 
amalgamation, the British unified the Nigerian territory and established full dominion over 
it, while at once reinforcing the differences between the administrative units. Again, as 
Afigbo argued, the overriding considerations for the British colonial administration with 
regard to the amalgamation has to do with administrative convenience rather than any 
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sensitivity for the primordial federal features of Nigeria. Policies such as the infamous 
Indirect Rule and schemes of divide-and-rule, which have been explored in great details in 
the preceding section, helped in deepening the differences among the regions. The third 
factor identified by Afigbo was the administrative politics of the post-amalgamation 
colonial Nigeria. He argued that it was not shaped by the primordial federal features of 
indigenous Nigerian society, but rather it leverages the rivalry between the regions and the 
personal animosities among the leading regional actors. It should be noted that Afigbo did 
not dismiss the potency of the primordial federal features completely, but contended that it 
was only after the aforementioned factors had manifested their influence through the 
emergence of the epoch-making Richard’s constitution that the primordial federal features 
began to manifest in form of convergence of geography and ethnicity, and became an 
audible voice on the political scene. Therefore, while British socio-political engineering was 
the crucial factor that influenced the decision to adopt federalism, the primordial federal 
features became a sleeping volcano that erupted later (see Figure 2). It could, therefore, be 
argued that subsequently the Nigerian federalism has been shaped by myriads of factors as 
described by Alli in the following way:  
The character of Nigerian Federalism has however been moulded by several critical factors, namely 
the class character and configuration of class forces of the Nigerian state, and the dominant capitalist 
mode of production and multinational, multiethnic and multi religious nature of the Nigerian society.  
(Alli, 2003, p. 73)    
 A cursory look at the constitutional developments that culminated in the adoption of 
federalism is worthwhile at this point. All the pre-Independence constitutions of Nigeria 
came to be known or associated with the names of British colonial officials, who were at the 
helms of affairs at the time the constitutions came into force. To a large extent, each of the 
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constitutions represented an attempt to address certain sociopolitical, or better “nation-
building” challenges that the “colonial masters” had to grapple with; and to a lesser extent, 
the constitutions also reflected the mindset or principles upheld by their main architects  (cf. 
Coleman, 1971; Alli, 2003).  
 The man who replaced Lord Lugard in 1919 as Governor-General of Nigeria, Sir 
Hugh Clifford, was a controversial figure in the annals of Nigerian constitutional 
development. Clifford was critical of the amalgamation carried out by his predecessor. He 
proposed to the Colonial Office in London to allow him to implement a proper 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates. His idea was to restructure the 
country by abolishing the two lieutenant-governorships and creating a strong central 
administrative organ that would ultimately unite Nigeria, but the Colonial Office turned 
down his first proposal of getting rid of the positions of the two lieutenant-governors and 
only approved the creation of a centralised bureaucracy for the country (Afigbo, 1991¸ Alli, 
2003).  In a dramatic u-turn, Clifford declared that every homogenous community was free 
to aspire to be an autonomous nation (Coleman, 1971; Nwabughuogu, 1996; Alli, 2003). 
Clifford believed that: 1) the idea of a Nigerian nation was inconceivable, and averred that 
the government was opposed to its development; 2) the concept of national self-government 
was only applicable to “self-contained and mutually independent Native States” and not a 
modern state; 3) true patriotism and nationalism were sentiments that only applied to 
“natural” units; and 4) the issue of ultimate control of the superstructure binding these 
independent native states together in a modern political entity was outside the realm of 
permissible discussion (Coleman, 1971, p. 194). The Clifford Constitution, which was 
passed in 1922, introduced elective principle and created the Nigerian Legislative Council, 
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whose jurisdiction was limited to the Southern Provinces, and its local non-official members 
were elected from Lagos and Calabar (Alli, 2003). Under this constitution, the Governor 
continued to serve as the legislative authority for the Northern Provinces (Olusanya, 1980b; 
Aghalino, 2006). It has been noted that the elective principle introduced by the Clifford 
constitution stimulated political activities in Lagos and other parts of the country, and 
consequently paved the way for the emergence of political parties (Olusanya, 1980b; 
Aghalino, 2006).  
 With all its inherent shortcomings, the Clifford constitution was in force for a quarter 
of a century (Ezera, 1959; Olusanya, 1980b). However, the interwar period presented a 
unique challenge for Nigeria for which the search for a new instrument of rule was 
imperative (Olusanya, 1980b). Nigerian nationalists were displeased with the constitution 
because it conferred enormous powers on the Governor and made the national non-official 
members of the Legislative Council as mere “lame ducks.” The agitation for more active 
political representation and self-government by Nigerian nationalists increased as a result of 
the impact of the two world wars (see Coleman, 1972; Olusanya 1980b). Olusanya, for 
example, described the development in the following words:  
The old constitution under which the country had been governed for 25 years came up constantly for 
strong criticisms. Moreover, the British themselves, partly as a result of the spontaneous help offered 
by the colonial peoples and the realization that the war had let loose forces that could not be 
contained without some political concessions...  were convinced that a more radical approach to 
colonial problems was needed. Consequently, they were more prepared to grant political and 
constitutional concessions to the colonial nationalists.  
 In Nigeria itself the political awakening stimulated by the war brought into existence a 
political organisation which was to play a very important role in the history of the country. This was 
the NCNC, formed mainly as a result of the initiative of the King’s College branch of the Nigerian 
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Union of Students, in August 1944. The emergence of this organisation heralded an era of more 
decisive battle with the colonial administration 
 The colonial administration was sensitive to the early indications of the ‘wind of change’ 
and decided to take time by the forelock. (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 524).     
 The Clifford constitution was replaced by the Richards constitution in 1946. Sir 
Arthur Richards was the Governor at the time the constitution was passed, although a great 
deal of its content was prepared by his predecessor Sir Bernard Bourdillon, whom he took 
the Governorship from in 1944 (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003). According to Coleman 
(1971), the Richards constitution was an attempt by the Colonial Office and the Nigerian 
colonial government to devise ways of addressing the unignorable demands of Nigerian 
students abroad and nationalist leaders at home stemming from the wartime influences – 
West African Students Union’s (WASU) agitation for immediate internal self -government 
and Nigerian Youth Movement’s (NYM) clamour for educated Nigerians to be given more 
role in the government – that were getting louder and clearer towards the beginning of the 
postwar period. As pointed out previously, the thrust of the Richards constitution was to 
promote national unity. The first concern of the architects of the constitution was to 
“reconcile the native authority system, as the primary unit of African self-government, with 
a parliamentary system of government at the central territorial level”  (Coleman, 1971, p. 
271). Their second concern was “how to give the centrally-minded nationalists a larger role 
in the government without relinquishing ultimate imperial authority” (Coleman, 1971, p. 
272). These dilemmas presented a number of problems to the British colonial administration 
(Coleman, 1971, pp. 271-273; Olusanya, 1980b, pp.524-525; Alli, 2003, p. 74;): 1) the need 
to promote an amount of unity at the central territorial level of the state that  would not 
compromise or jeopardise the imperial authority; 2) the need to provide within that unity for 
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a level of accommodation of the yearning of the diverse elements that make up the country 
for self-government; and 3) the need to find a political formula that would anticipate the 
ultimate political destiny of Nigeria in view of the obvious reality of the inevitability of 
ultimate self-government, which was already unfolding in some parts of the Common 
Wealth. As Alli (2003) asserted, the first two factors foreshadowed a federal arrangement. It 
can, therefore, be argued that the Richards constitution laid the foundation for federalism.  
 Thus, the Richards constitution changed the units that Governor Bourdillon 
designated as provinces to regions, and established separate Regional Councils and Houses 
of Assembly in each of the three regions, and in addition a House of Chiefs was created for 
the Northern Region (Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b). The regional legislative bodies 
were meant to consider local questions and to appropriately advise the Lieutenant-
Governors (Olusanya, 1980b). It also provided for a new expanded Legislative Council 
whose jurisdiction was to cover the entire country (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003). It has, 
however, been observed that the concept of regionalism was the most distinguishing 
innovation in the Richards constitution (Coleman, 1971). James Coleman posited that this 
outcome was a necessary compromise: 
...the regional plan emerged as a compromise from wartime discussions between regional separatists, 
who envisaged the creation of three separate states, and strong federalists, who want ed to link the 
native authority system with a central parliament but were troubled about the problem of an 
unofficial majority in a large unwieldy council. (Coleman, 1971, p. 276).              
The Richards constitution has also been described by scholars as a landmark in the 
constitutional development or evolution of Nigeria into statehood (Olusanya, 1980b; 
Irukwu, 2005). Although the Southern and Northern Protectorates were amalgamated in 
1914 by Lugard, it was the Richards constitution that finally brought together Southern and 
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Northern Nigeria through the creation of a Legislative Council empowered to deliberate on 
matters concerning the entire country, a step that has been described as paving the way for 
“Nigerian unity” (Olusanya, 1980b). It was remarkable that the concept of regionalism was 
rather a stratagem of “breaking to build” in forging “unity,” as Governor Bourdillon, one of 
the main architects of the constitution, in responding to the accusation that the Richards 
constitution deliberately encouraged separatism through regionalism divulged that:   
But in fact this measure represents, not the division of one unit into three, but the beginning of the 
fusion of innumerable small units into three and from these three into one  [emphasis added]. The 
tripartite grouping of provinces of Nigeria which already exists for purely administrative purposes, 
and which the new budgetary regionalisation follows, has a sound climatic and sociological basis, but 
the unit of political consciousness is still the individual native authority area, or even smaller. The 
Northern Provinces, for all their isolationism, or perhaps because of it, have gone much further on 
the road of “regional thinking” than the Western or Eastern. The annual Emirs’ Conference has 
become a very lively affair, and the Northern Native Authorities have already learned to pool their 
resources for some purposes. The Chiefs’ Conference in the West Provinces is a much later 
institution, and is only just beginning to widen the horizons of its members. The Eastern Provinces 
are not yet beginning to become a unit in the minds of their inhabitants, though a spontaneous desire 
to federate village councils into group councils and group councils into clan councils is beginning to 
emerge. There can be little doubt that the work of the Houses of Assembly will encourage, not only a 
very useful interchange of ideas, but the beginning of that widening of the social, economic and 
political horizon which is essential if the unity of Nigeria is ever to have any real meaning to its 
inhabitants. (Bourdillon, 1946, p. 92).    
It can be seen from the long quotation above that the colonial administration introduced 
regionalism in the Richards constitution as a stratagem of gradual forging of unity, through 
a policy of divide et impera (divide and rule), in a bid to build a nation-state. Olusanya 
explained the Bourdillon’s calculus, as reflected in the Richards constitution, in this way: 
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... since the unit of political consciousness was still the native authority, the establishment of the 
regional councils was to promote a wider consciousness of a regional basis which he [Bourdill on the 
architect of the constitution] envisaged would be the necessary pre-requisite for the growth of 
national consciousness. (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 527).  
It was also glaring from Bourdillon’s revelation that the Eastern Provinces, which were by 
tradition largely republican, had a hard time succumbing to the British stratagem. It is also 
important to note that the Northern Provinces did not feel compatible to be part of the union 
because they had no direct experience with parliamentary processes since the region was 
governed through proclamations, and the northerners were not sufficiently integrated into 
the official English language used in the rest of the country and were afraid of being taken 
advantage of by their more educated southern colleagues (Olusanya, 1980b). Therefore, as 
Bourdillon admitted, the stratagem was meant to give the regions a semblance of autonomy 
while gradually eroding the primary base of political consciousness, which was the native 
authority, and at the same time unobtrusively forging a national consciousness as a 
sociological consequence of a nested politico-territorial interaction engendered by the 
Richards constitution.  
 The Richards constitution suffered from barrage of criticisms from Nigerian 
nationalists for the following reasons: it was considered an imposition because Governor 
Richards went ahead to present it to the British parliament for approval without consulting 
and seeking inputs from Nigerians; it was viewed as a divide and rule legislation; the 
grouping of the country into three regions was perceived to have reinforced the existing 
North and South and East and West divisions, exposing the ethnic division in the country; 
the constitution was seen as defective because it allowed the Northern component unit to be 
twice as big as the two other units, Southern and Eastern regions; it was blamed for creating 
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a minority-majority dichotomy and its corollary subordinate-superordinate relationships 
within regional boundaries; Nigerian nationalists faulted the constitution for paying lip-
service to their demands for responsible and inclusive government by only giving them 
greater participation in the discussion rather than the management of their own affairs; and 
many nationalists claimed that the constitution laid the foundation for regionalism and 
tribalism, in sharp contrast to its supposed objective of promoting the unity of Nigeria 
(Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b; Osaghae, 1991; Afigbo, 1991; Alli, 2003; Irukwu, 2005). 
Despite the attacks the constitution suffered from Nigerian nationalists, it evoked the 
thinking among many of them that perhaps federalism was the only way forward for Nigeria  
(Alli, 2003).  
 Notwithstanding these perceived shortcomings, the Richards constitution has been 
considered a landmark because it foreshadowed what was to come, a federal system. It is, 
however, noteworthy to mention that the federal system was not the only option for the 
country at that point; two, three or more countries would have been formed, but the colonial 
power decided that Nigeria should be kept one. The following statement reflects the 
scenario at the time: 
Obviously at that point in time, there were several directions into which Nigeria could have 
developed. It was possible to have had three countries made up of northern[,] eastern and western 
regions. It was possible also to have had the north form a country, while the south also would have 
formed another. But no doubt for reasons of convenience for the colonial power, it was decided that 
Nigeria should be kept together as one, while the component units were to be granted some degree of 
autonomy within the emerging federal structure. (Alli, 2003, p. 75)        
 In response to the relentless condemnation of the Richards constitution by Nigerian 
nationalists and their supporters, the British government was compelled to initiate a review 
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of the constitution in order to produce a constitution that would be more popular and 
acceptable to the majority of Nigerians (Irukwu, 2005). Sir Arthur Richards’ successor, 
Governor Sir John Stuart MacPherson, who was saddled with the responsibility of working 
out a new constitution, set up a Select Committee of the Legislative Council to carry out 
wide consultations starting from the village level to a General Conference comprising of 
unofficial members of the Legislative Council and representatives of each Regional Council  
(Olusanya, 1980b). The following summary of the extensive process that produced the new 
constitution is based on the works of Olusanya (1980b), Alli (2003) and Irukwu (2005). 
Two questions were laid down before Nigerians, which were to be answered by the Native, 
Provincial and Regional Authorities:  
1) Do we wish to see a fully centralized system with all the legislative and executive power 
concentrated at the centre, or do we wish to develop a federal system under which each different 
region of the country would exercise a measure of internal autonomy?  
2) If we favour a federal system, should we return to the existing Regions with some modifications 
of the existing regional boundaries, or should we form regions on some new basis such as the 
many linguistic groups in Nigeria? (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 530). 
Regional conferences were held in Ibadan, Enugu and Kaduna, the three Regional 
headquarters, and those questions were considered. The Regional Conferences generally 
agreed on a federal system of government, but each had recommended some modifications. 
The Western Region recommended a federal system in which the constituent units, states, 
are formed on the basis of ethnic and/or linguistic delineation. The Western Region 
conceded that the three existing regions are to form the interim member-states of the 
federation, since the delineation of the ethno-linguistic states and boundaries would be a 
time demanding exercise. The Eastern Conference leaned toward a strong central 
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government with Central and Regional Legislatures, wherein the latter would carry out 
legislative functions as may be delegated to it by the former. The East and the West were on 
the same page with regard to the idea of having a Central Legislature comprising of elected 
members and a limited number of officials, and a Central Executive Council of largely 
elected members to be vested with ministerial powers. The Northern Conference agreed 
with the idea of having Central and Regional Legislatures, but opposed the proposal of 
having a Central Executive Council. Instead, the North recommended having an advisory 
central council. The North also differed from the East and West regarding the proposal of  
having Executive Councils and a ministerial system at the regional levels. While the East 
and West preferred that arrangement, the North recommended instead that the Chief 
Commissioner be allowed to continue to exercise executive powers and receive advice from 
the Regional Executive Council, whose function should be merely advisory.  
 Another thorny issue was the question of voting eligibility and electability. The 
Eastern region advocated universal adult suffrage instead of tax-payers’ suffrage, but the 
North wanted to introduce a provision whereby only Northern Nigerian males of 25 years 
and above and resident in the Region for at least three years should be eligible for election 
into the Northern House of Assembly (Olusanya, 1980b). In a minority report, as a 
contribution to the recommendations of the General Conference, representatives of the 
Eastern Region, whose many of its natives were well established in other parts of the 
country, expressed strong opposition to this Northern recommendation whereby southerners 
would be made ineligible to stand for elections into the Northern House of Assembly 
(Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b). This is the position of the minority report submitted by 
representatives from the Eastern Region: 
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 It is in our view invidious that any Nigerian could under a Nigerian constitution be deprived of the 
right of election to the House of Assembly in any region in which he for the time being – or 
permanently – has his abode merely by reason of the accident of birth or ancestry.... In the last 
analysis the unity of Nigeria is the unity of individuals in it. The individuals are bound together by 
political ties of nationality. Identical nationality of any country must surely carry with it identical 
political rights... (cited in Coleman, 1971, p. 339).    
Coleman noted that this discriminatory provision proposed by Northern representatives was 
unanimously supported by representatives of the Western Region, which means the pan-
Nigerian vision was “a more emphatic objective of the Ibo and others from the Eastern 
Region because the growth and the institutionalisation of regional separatism might well 
have affected the careers and future opportunities of large numbers of easterners resident 
abroad [in other parts of the country]” (Coleman, 1971, p. 339). The discriminatory 
provision proposed by the Northern representatives and supported by Western 
representatives was an early example of what has been plaguing Nigeria to the present t ime, 
the so-called Indigene-Settler phenomenon.  
 The status of Lagos was also a bond of contention. The Western Region insisted on 
having Lagos as part of it against the recommendation that it should be designated as a 
Federal Capital Territory (Alli, 2003). Olusanya posited that the different regional positions 
on many issues revealed once again the gap between the regions; and he attributed that to 
“uneven constitutional development” (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 530).                                    
   A Constitution Drafting Committee received the recommendations of the Regional 
Conferences, and in turn prepared and presented a consolidated series of recommendations 
to an All-Nigeria Constitutional Conference, which was convened in Ibadan in January 
1950. The Conference considered the recommendations and made the following 
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constitutional proposals: 1) a federal system with the three existing Regions should be 
established; Lagos should be conferred with the status of an independent municipality; 2) 
the Regions should be transformed from mere administrative regions to political regions 
with the powers to legislate within their respective boundaries; 3) regional legislation may 
not require the approval of the central legislature, but a caveat be put in place wherein the 
regional legislation might be debated on the floor of the central legislature, House of 
Representatives, and where majority of members of the House of Representatives oppose 
the proposed regional legislation then it should not take effect. A Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council considered the proposals of the Conference and the contentious issues, 
and came up with its own recommendations, which were submitted to the Secretary of 
Colonies for the approval of the British Government.   
 During the constitutional debate between 1948 and 1951, several sociocultural 
organisations and political parties sprang up. These organisations have been described as 
“ethnic socio-political organisations wearing the garb of cultural associations” (Alli, 2003, 
p. 75). Three major political parties, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons 
(NCNC), the Action Group (AG) and the Northern People’s Congress  (NPC) were 
prominent. The parties became aligned along regional interests, the NPC was a northern 
party, the AG was a western party, and the NCNC ended up being an eastern based party. It 
was, therefore, observed that: “Instead of Nigerian nationalism, what prevailed was ethnic 
or tribal nationalism as represented by the three dominant political parties”  (Irukwu, 2005, 
p. 8). However, one point needs to be stressed here: 
...despite the intensity of the debate over the nature of political and administrative structure, and 
despite the passion for the promotion of ethnic identity and goals, none of the groups considered at 
that point to opt out of the emerging Nigerian nation. Rather, the major political associations, 
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including the NCNC, saw the future of their communities in a federal arrangement that allows for 
active participation of all component communities. (Alli, 2003, p. 76). 
In line with Afigbo’s (1991) position that British socio-political engineering walked 
Nigerian into federalism by default rather than by design, one can further argue here that the 
consensus among Nigerian nationalists and the various socio-political organisations to 
remain in one Nigeria was a programmed decision in which political discourse was 
following the direction charted by the colonial administration.    
 After the long deliberative process the Macpherson constitution was finally passed at 
the end of 1951; and it was by and large well received by Nigerian politicians and 
nationalists. As described above, the process of consultation that produced the constitution 
was unprecedented – involving deliberations by the whole people of Nigeria from the 
village, district, divisional, provincial, regional and national levels. The Macpherson 
constitution provided for the establishment of a House of Representatives as the Central 
Legislature with 148 members, out of which 136 were to be elected by the Regional 
Legislative Houses, and 13 members to be nominated. The North was granted 68 seats, 
while the West and the East received 34 seats each. The constitution established a Council 
of Ministers to be headed by the Governor. The constitution also gave the Governor 
reserved powers to circumvent legislative process and pass any bill into law that he deemed 
in the interest of public order and good government, if the House of Representatives is 
reluctant to pass such bill. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was endowed with the 
discretionary power to even nullify any law passed by the House of Representatives and 
assented to by the Governor. The constitution provided for the conversion of the regional 
councils into Regional Houses of Assembly with legislative powers. Thus, the Regions were 
transformed into political entities, and each Region was endowed with “the powers to make 
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laws for the peace, order and good government of its area of jurisdiction”  (Olusanya, 1980b, 
p. 532). In addition to the Houses of Assembly, the North and West got Houses of Chiefs. 
Olusanya noted that a House of Chiefs was not set up in the Eastern Region because the 
Chieftaincy system did not take roots there as in the North and West. As earlier highlighted, 
the Eastern communities, especially the Igbo, were traditionally more republican in their 
political organisation.  
 A significant feature of the constitution is the devolution of authority from the 
Centre to the Regions, which was meant to be a step towards developing a federal system.  
The Macpherson constitution, despite being a homemade product and well received by 
Nigerians, fell short of satisfying Nigerian political leaders (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003; 
Irukwu, 2005). The constitution was blamed for institutionalising primordial (or identity) 
politics because the members of the Central Executive Council were basically to be elected 
from the three regional parties, the NPC (North), the AG (West), and the NCNC (East), as a 
consequence, each representative invariably maintained primary allegiance to his region and 
the party (Irukwu, 2005). This is why Olusanya (1980b, p. 533) argued that the Macpherson 
constitution “ushered in an era of ethnic nationalism and regional divisions.” Olusanya 
explained the implication of this for the unity of the country:  
Under the 1951 [constitutional] arrangement it was difficult to establish a principle of collective 
responsibility or promote the spirit of national unity because the Ministers considered themselves 
representatives of the respective Regions and placed the interests of their Regions over and above 
national interests in their approach to problems. (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 537).  
 Another criticism levelled against the 1951 constitution was that it created imbalance “by 
having three unequal regions knit together by a central legislature”  (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 
533).  
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 The crack that the constitution created in the ranks of Nigerian political leaders and 
the seeming irreconcilable differences between the Regions, especially the North, on one 
hand, and the East and West, on the other, about many issues led to tension and riots, which 
claimed lives (Alli, 2003). The “litmus test” for the Macpherson constitution was the 
elections into the regional Houses of Assembly and Chiefs in December 1951, and the 
elections into the House of Representatives in July 1952. For instance, Dr. Azikiwe (Zik), 
an Igbo pan-Nigerian nationalist leader, contested the election in his place of residence, 
Lagos, which had five seats in the Western House of Assembly because of its status as a 
federal capital. Zik and his NCNC party knew that the Action Group dominated Western 
Regional House would be unlikely to elect him into the House of Representatives , as a 
direct consequence of the politics of ethnicity and regionalism that was becoming 
entrenched in Nigeria (Olusanya, 1980b). Zik’s fear was confirmed, the Action Group 
displayed ethnic chauvinism and he was defeated in his bid to go to the House of 
Representatives. In view of the circumstances of his defeat, Zik was not magnanimous and 
he took the result as a strong message reminding him of where he came from rather than his 
vision of a united Nigeria.             
Consequently, there was a backlash from the Eastern Region as its representatives 
threatened to boycott the House of Representatives in protest to the exclusion of their 
leader, but eventually accepted to remain there and be part of the next constitutional review 
(Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003).  
 Coleman’s (1971) analysis of the development and its implications for Nigerian 
politics was very thorough and revealing. He observed that the strategy that gave the Action 
Group advantage over Zik’s NCNC was inventing and popularising a theory that “under the 
154 
 
circumstances then prevailing in Nigeria the only certain avenue to power was a regional 
political party” (p. 350). For that reason, according to Coleman, the Action Group ran a 
campaign that was largely anti-Zik and anti-Igbo domination in a possible unitary system. 
The NCNC reacted by using tribalism to court the support of the Western minority and non-
Yoruba ethnic groups in the Western Region against the Action Group. This development 
has been described as a negative turning point for Nigerian politics:  
The victory of the Action Group over the NCNC by a sizeable margin in the 1951 e lections in the 
Western Region was the triumph of regional nationalism.  
 These, then, were the steps in the evolution of subgroup nationalism from a vague awareness 
of differentiation to a sentiment employed as a conscious instrument in politics. Certain b asic 
underlying differences in history, culture, temperament, and levels of development and acculturation 
provided the classical setting for intergroup friction. The net effect of British policy was to aggravate 
these differences. (Coleman, 1971, p. 351).    
Coleman’s characterisation located the problem of regional nationalism or identity politics 
in Nigeria largely in certain primordial factors and only slightly apportions blame on British 
socio-political engineering. Coleman failed to appreciate that British colonialism created 
Nigeria and colonial policies instigated the kind of group dynamics at play at the time. This 
does not, however, entirely vindicate Nigerian nationalists of their missteps. For example, 
Azikiwe and his supporters blamed his electoral misfortune on the Macpherson constitution 
for its failure to allow Lagos direct and unfettered representation in the Central Legislature 
instead of granting it seats through the Western Region (Coleman 1971). Coleman himself 
acknowledged this when he asserted that: “There can be little doubt that the implementation 
of the Constitution of 1951 accelerated the drift toward subgroup nationalism and tribalism”  
(Coleman, 1971, p. 352). 
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 It is important to emphasize that this uneasy relationship between the Yoruba and 
Igbo was mainly a consequence of the regional nationalism institutionalised in the 
Macpherson constitution and to a certain extent an outcome of the “cold war” of 1948, 
where the pan-Igbo (Igbo Federal Union) and pan-Yoruba (Egbe Omo Oduduwa) became 
politicised, and began to act as rival ethnic movements in the country  (Coleman, 1971). 
Again, the tension following the elections brought to the fore the question of Indigene-
Settler divide and the integration challenge before the soon-to-be independent country.  
 Besides the East-West tense relationship, there was also a larger problem between 
the North and the South. It is important to reiterate that besides its huge size, being twice 
the combined sizes of the East and West, and the integrative effects of Islam and the Fulani 
Islamic Empire, the North is geodemographically more complex than the other Regions. 
Coleman (1971, p. 354) classified Northern Nigeria into three areas, namely: 1) the 
predominant Muslim areas (Muslim North), which is inhabited mainly by the Hausa, Fulani 
and Kanuri ethnic groups; 2) parts of the Middle Belt inhabited by peoples who were 
subjects in the Fulani Islamic Empire and “who have been, or are being, assimilated to the 
culture of the Muslims North;” and 3) parts of the non-Muslim Middle Belt which did not 
fall to the Fulani conquest, and have been significantly influenced by Christian missionaries 
and Western education, and are not fully integrated into the dominant northern culture.  On 
the basis of this classification, when the North is mentioned it generally invokes the identity 
and position of the Muslim North. The part of the Middle Belt that has been assimilated into 
the Muslim culture of the Muslim North is often likely to go with the position of the 
Northern Region; whereas the non-Muslim part of the Middle Belt would seldom share the 
156 
 
political views of the Muslim North. As earlier pointed out, this point has been well 
underscored by Osaghae’s (1991) “Ethnic Minorities and Federalism in Nigeria.” 
 One characteristics of the North, from the time of the amalgamation in 1914 to the 
period before the Macpherson constitution came into force in 1951, was its determination to 
maintain isolationism or separatism (Bourdillon, 1946; Olusanya, 1980b). In fact, as 
highlighted previously the British colonial administration did attempt to sustain the North’s 
isolationism for the purpose of administrative convenience. However, as Bourdillon 
revealed, the British strategy was to adopt the principle of gradualism in unifying the whole 
territory of Nigeria, overcoming the North’s isolationism through regionalism and 
interaction. Thus, the creation of a Central Legislature vested with the powers to legislate 
for the whole country by the Macpherson constitution made the North to entertain the fear 
of the threat of southern domination, since the North was lagging behind in education and 
parliamentary experience (Coleman, 1971). Coleman noted that this fear brought about 
northern awakening, which was characterised by anti-southern sentiment and a great sense 
of urgency for reform. The North began to realize that in the new political arrangement, it 
can no longer fit in with a go slow approach, whereas the other Regions felt frustrated that 
they are slowed down by the North. This view was expressed by the Northern Elements’ 
Progressive Union (NEPU), which emerged with a dissenting voice challenging the “Family 
Compact rule of the so-called [Northern] Native Administration in their present autocratic 
form” (Coleman, 1971, pp. 364-365). However, the conservative elements held sway and 
this made the North and South to move at different paces: “The southern political leaders 
were impatient for further progress, while the Northern leaders felt that too much progress 
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had already been made and that time had come to rest and be thankful”  (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 
534).  
 For example, a big blow against the Macpherson constitution occurred in March 
1953 when Mr. Anthony Enahoro (later Chief), a member of Action Group in the House of 
Representatives, moved a motion that the House should devote itself primarily to the 
attainment of self-government by 1956 (Olusanya, 1980b; Alli, 2003). Northern politicians 
were irked by the motion, and they mounted a strong opposition to it, having being 
convinced that the Northern Region was not ready for independence since that would mean 
the domination of the country by Southerners (Olusanya, 1980b). Sir Ahmadu Bello, the 
Sardauna of Sokoto, who was also the leader of the NPC, moved a motion for amendment in 
which the “1956” would be replaced by “as soon as practicable,” because he believed there 
was lack of national unity in the country and that it was suicidal for the North to support the 
call for independence now, when clearly the country would become dominated by the South  
(Olusanya, 1980b, p. 535). As a result of this disagreement, there was a sharp division in the 
House of Representatives between the North and the South, which led to a walk-out by 
members representing Western and Eastern Regions, and four AG members resigned from 
the Cabinet (Olusanya, 1980b). According to Olusanya, Northern politicians felt in turn 
frustrated with the attitude and behaviour of their Southern counterparts; and the southern 
press did not help matters by carrying out a vituperative campaign against the Northerners, 
calling them names. In reaction to this development, the Northern House of chiefs and the 
Northern House of Assembly passed an Eight Point resolution demanding for the dissolution 
of the Federal Government and the adoption of a confederal system (Alli, 2003). This move 
by the North has been described as a secession attempt (Olusanya, 1980b).  
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 To make matters worse, the Action Group took an unwise decision to undertake what 
it termed as an “educational tour” of the North, starting with Kano, to enlighten Northerners 
on the issue of self-government, but that turned into a bloody riot, where 50 people were 
killed and more than 200 were injured. At this point it became very clear to the colonial 
uuthorities that all was not well with the Macpherson constitution. The Colonial Secretary, 
Mr. Oliver Lyttleton reported to the British House of Commons on May 20, 1953 that recent 
events in Nigeria had proved that “it was impossible for the three Regions of Nigeria to 
work effectively in a federation so closely knit as the existing one”  (Olusanya, 1980b, p. 
536). Hence, the British government convened a Constitutional Conference in London from 
July to August, 1953, where Nigerian political leaders and representatives of the British 
government met to address the grievances of the Regions, the defects of the Macpherson 
constitution and the question of self-government (Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b).  
 The gap between the three Regions was once gain brought to the fore during the 
negotiations. The North, represented by its main political party, the NPC, was “still unhappy 
with the effects and uncomplimentary remarks of many of the southern politicians about its 
ideas, and was prepared to accept only a loose federation” (Alli, 2003, p. 77). The South, 
jointly represented by Action Group and the NCNC, who were the leading parties of the 
West and East respectively, was “prepared to demand the creation of a federation of east 
and west” (Alli, 2003, p. 77). The London Conference, however, was able to adopt a federal 
system for Nigeria. On October 1, 1954 the new constitution popularly known as the 
Lyttleton constitution came into force (Coleman, 1971). In essence, Nigeria finally became 
established as a three-region federation in 1954, that is, four decades after its formal 
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amalgamation under British colonial rule in 1914 (Suberu, 2001). Figure 3 shows the first 
component units of the Nigerian federation.   
 
Figure 3. First component units of the Nigerian federation (1954). The 
Nigerian federation was at the beginning comprised of three regional 
federating units. 
 
According to Suberu, under the Macpherson constitution, Nigeria existed as a quasi-federal 
entity. However, the 1954 constitution granted “the country’s three large but unequal 
regions substantial powers over internal policy and administration, while leaving external 
160 
 
affairs and interregional issues largely to the centre” (Suberu, 2001, p. 19). The constitution 
provided for the allocation of specified subjects to the federal government, specified list of 
concurrent subjects to the federal and regional governments jointly, and residual powers to 
the regional governments (Coleman, 1971). Other features of the constitution, according to 
Coleman, included: position of three regional premiers; position of Governor-General of the 
Federation; regional public services, judiciaries and marketing boards; Lagos was excised 
from Western Region and given the status of a federal capital territory; full internal self-
government in 1956 for regions that wish to have, and independence for all Nigeria 
undecided; and a review conference for the new constitution was scheduled for August 
1956.  
 It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the choice of a federal system in 
Nigeria was a compromise between competing internal geopolitical interests, which  
implicated and were implicated by British colonial socio-political engineering. It can also be 
gleaned from the review of the process through which Nigerian federalism evolved that 
there was no covenantal dimension to the federal bargain. It was simply and squarely a 
political compromise or agreement by rival regional actors to accept a structural 
arrangement that allows them to co-exist as competing rivals within the Nigerian state. 
Consequently, even with the 1954 constitution the drift to regionalism festered and political 
parties continued as regional loyalists (Coleman, 1971). The minority question was also a 
thorny issue – the fear of minority ethnic groups about the dominance of the three regional-
based ethnic majority groups, the Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo (the so-called WAZOBIA 
elements) – that prompted the appointment of a commission, the Sir Henry Willink’s 
Commission, to enquire into the fears of minorities in the federal system (see Ezera, 1959; 
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Coleman, 1971; Olusanya, 1980b; Irukwu, 2005). Subsequent constitutional conferences 
dwelt on the so-called unresolved issues including the minority question and the most 
important issue of self-government.  
3.4 Overview of Nigerian Federalism after Independence 
 This section takes a brief look at the Nigerian federalism after the country was 
granted independence by the British. Nigeria became an independent state on 1
st
 October 
1960 with the three regions as the federating units and a bicameral legislature comprising of 
House of Representatives and the Senate (upper chamber), and operated a Westminster 
model of parliamentary democracy (Elaigwu, 2005). At independence, the division between 
the federal government and the three regions guaranteed the autonomy of the regions, but 
latter constitutional development brought about by the 1960 and 1963 Constitution altered 
that arrangement by providing for three legislative lists: exclusive list (powers allocated to 
the federal government), concurrent list (powers allocated to both federal and regional 
governments), and residual list (powers allocated to the regions)” (Elaigwu, 2005, p. 54).  
This substantive allocation of subject matters or competence between the regions and the 
federal government, as Elaigwu observed, deepened the rivalry between the three regions as 
they strove at once to guard their autonomy and to compete for control of the federal 
government. It has been argued that this allocation of competence between the federal and 
regional governments made the centre economically and politically more attractive to the 
regions, and, hence, the regions developed strong desire to control the centre (Falola, 1988, 
cited in Alli, 2003). Rotimi Suberu has succinctly explained this development and its 
implication for federation: 
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Federalism in the First Republic was dominated by two contradictory trends: the growing economic 
and political ascendency of the federal government and the vitiation of this c entripetal current by the 
strengthening of the centrifugal pressures inherent in the federation’s unwieldy structure and 
regionalized party system. (Suberu, 2001, pp. 26-27).     
 Another constitutional development which took place was the creation of the 
Midwest Region from the minority Mid-West area in 1963, which transformed Nigeria into 
a four-component federal structure (Alli, 2003) as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. The Regions of Nigeria 1963-1967. 
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The creation of the Midwest Region did not significantly improve what has been described 
as an “imperfect federal arrangement” (Alli, 2003, p. 79). The history of Nigerian 
federalism from 1960-1965 can be summarised as characterised by a concentration of 
economic and political power at the federal centre, struggle and rivalry by the regions to 
control the lucrative centre, increasing economic dependence of the regions on the centre, 
ethnoregional politics, minority rebellion, prolonged crisis in the West, and a federal 
government beginning to overreach itself (Suberu, 2001; Alli, 2003; Elaigwu, 2005).     
 On 15 January 1966, the First Republic was toppled in a bloody coup by a group of 
military officers of relatively junior ranks, who were predominantly Igbo (Suberu, 2001). 
Adewale Ademoyega, one of the three masterminds of the coup, gave a detailed account of 
the first military intervention in his Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup 
(Ademoyega, 1981). One of the coup leaders, Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, gave a 
speech in which he described their grievances: 
Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek 
bribes and demand ten per cent; those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they 
can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tr ibalists, the nepotists, those that make the 
country look big for nothing before international circles; those that have corrupted our society and 
put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds.  (cited in Ademoyega, 1981, p. 
125).    
The first coup triggered reaction in the North because majority of the key people killed, 
including the Prime Minister, were from the North. The feeling that the North had lost its 
power at the centre grew and, few months after the coup, riots broke out wherein 
southerners were attacked and the North was threatening to secede (Madiebo, 1980). 
Subsequently, a bloody countercoup was staged by officers from the North in July 1966 
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(Suberu, 2001). By 1967, the crisis of the newly independent state had reached calamitous 
magnitude and, at the centre of it, the integrity of the Nigerian federalism was being tested. 
The Eastern Region, under the leadership of Col. Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, in reaction to 
the killing of Igbo in the North and the return of many Igbo to the East due to the attacks in 
the North and frustration with the federal government, attempted to secede by declaring 
Biafra Republic and the Federal Government, led by the Head of State General Yakubu 
Gowon, opposed the move (Madiebo, 1980; Harnischfeger, 2008). The newly independent 
country fell into a sad civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970. Madiebo (1980) gave a 
firsthand account of the war in detail. At the end of the war, the military government 
dissolved the Regions and created twelve states in order to avert a repeat of regional 
secession. Figure 5 shows the 12 states that replaced the four regions. Presently, Nigeria is a 
federation of 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory.      
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Figure 5. The 12 States 1967-76. At the end of the civil war, regional 
structure was abandoned and these states became the federating units.  
3.5. Theoretical Framework 
 The purpose of this study was to understand why Nigeria has remained a deeply 
divided state and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place a federal system, 
which was specifically instituted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and peaceful 
coexistence. The key themes and concepts of the study have been explored through an 
extensive review of relevant scholarly works. The concepts of state, nation, nationalism and 
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federalism have been examined from numerous perspectives from the literature. In addition, 
key historical developments that highlight the evolution of the Nigerian federal state have 
been also delved into from a wide range of scholarly perspectives in the literature. Such in-
depth explorations have helped to generate a broad understanding and appreciation of the 
phenomenon under investigation. At this point, therefore, a theoretical framework needs to 
be adopted to guide the empirical aspect of the inquiry. 
 Before explaining what a theoretical framework means, it is important to define the 
term theory. The definition of theory is quite varied among scholars. For instance, Fred L. 
Kerlinger defined a theory as “a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions and 
propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations 
among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting phenomena” (Kerlinger, 
1986, p. 9). In this sense, therefore, a theory consists of three properties: 1) it is a set of 
propositions; 2) provides a systematic view of the interrelations among constructs 
(variables); and 3) by explaining the way constructs (variables) are related in a phenomenon 
allows predictions to be made about the behaviour of certain variables from the 
understanding of others (Thomas, 2006, p. 64). Such conception of theory is essentially 
positivistic in that it views theory as embodying “key assumptions about the way in which 
the social world can best be analysed (into variables) and how social events are to be 
explained (by causal analyses of interrelationships among variables)” (Thomas, 2006, p. 
66). Thus, a social phenomenon is conceived as an event which is covered by law. However, 
the social scientist Herbert Blumer, challenged the positivist scheme, which seeks to reduce 
human group life or social phenomenon to variables and their relations. Blumer argued that 
“the crucial limit to the successful application of variable analysis to human group life is set 
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by the process of interpretation or definition that goes on in human groups ... [which] give a 
character to human group life that seem to be at variance with the logical premise of 
variable analysis”. (Blumer, 1956, p. 685). Blumer did not reject variable analysis, but 
acknowledged that they are applicable in “those areas of social life and formation that are 
not mediated by an interpretative process” (p. 689). According to Blumer, there is also 
complementarity between variable analysis and the interpretative approach because “in the 
area of interpretative life variable can be an effective means of unearthing stabilized 
patterns of interpretation which are not likely to be detected through the direct study of the 
experience of people” (pp. 689-690). Leaning towards Blumer’s position, Paula F. Silver 
asserted that any attempt to come up with a formal definition of theory robs it of its true 
beauty, emotional significance, and its importance to everyday life (Silver, 1983). 
Nevertheless, Silver went ahead to define theory as a unique way of perceiving reality, 
expressing someone’s profound insight into some aspects of nature, and a new and different 
understanding of some aspect of the world. 
 Abend (2008) has distinguished seven different usages of the word theory. He 
classified the multiple meanings of theory into: theory1; theory2; theory3; theory4; theory5; 
theory6; and theory7. By theory1 meaning a theory is a general proposition or logically 
connected system of proposition that establishes a relationship between two or more 
variables. In the sense of theory2, a theory means an explanation offered about a particular 
social phenomenon. Theory2 offers explanation about something. Such explanation should 
“identify a number of ‘factors,’ and ‘conditions,’ which individually should pass some sort 
of counterfactual test for causal relevance, and whose interaction effects should be somehow 
taken into account” (p. 178). Theory3 also says something about an empirical phenomenon 
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in the social world, but it does not seek to answer the question what x causes y? Instead, 
given a certain phenomenon of P (certain fact, relation, process, and trend) what does it 
mean? Here theory3 seeks to make sense of or shed light on the development or outcome P. 
Abend posited that: 
 ...what theories3 offer is an original ‘interpretation,’ ‘reading,’ or ‘way of making sense’ of a certain 
slice of the empirical world. They may shed light on an empirical problem, help one understand some 
social process, or reveal what ‘really’ went on in a certain conjuncture. Unlike theory1, theory3 does 
not view P as the value of a variable y, which in turn is related to other variables in such a way that 
can be described by a function y = F(x1, x2...., xn). Unlike theory2, theory3 may or may not causally 
explain P. (Abend, 2008, p. 178).  
Theory4 refers to the study of the celebrated works of great philosophers by way of 
‘interpretations,’ ‘analyses,’ ‘critiques,’ ‘hermeneutical reconstructions’ or ‘exegeses.’ This 
involves the study of the real meaning of what a philosopher has written, that is, what s/he 
wanted to say in a particular text. Typically, the great philosophers write complex 
arguments using a style that is equally complex. Theory4 seeks to identify the logic behind 
the complex ideas put forward by such great authors as well as the relevance, significance, 
usefulness and applicability of the text. Theory5, according to Abend, is a Weltanschauung, 
that is, a general perspective from which one sees and interprets the world. Therefore, 
unlike the first four types of usage, which are about the social world, theory5 is simply about 
how to look at, grasp and represent the social world. This consists of our positionality, the 
lexicon and syntax by which we talk about the social world, the nature of our conceptual 
scheme, the categories into which we group things, and the logical relations between the 
concepts we use. The word ‘theory’ etymologically came from the late Latin noun ‘theoria,’ 
and the Greek noun and verb ‘theōria’ and ‘theōrein’ respectively, which mean “to look at,” 
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“to observe,” “to see,” or “to contemplate” (Abend, 2008, p. 180). Abend argued that these 
connotations imply detachment, spectatorship, contemplation, and vision.  However, where 
in addition to these connotations the usage of the word ‘theory’ also includes a fundamental 
normative component, it falls under what Abend classified as theory6. Critical theory, 
feminist theory and postcolonial theory are examples of such theories with explicit 
normative components. Lastly, theory7 refers to discussions about the social construction of 
reality. Theory7 includes an element of theory4, that is, the reconstruction of what the great 
philosophers said or would have said about a problem under consideration. Theory7 and 
theory5 also have some similarity, but the former does not include a general 
Weltanschauung, that is a way of looking at or representing the social world.  
 Having clarified the different meanings of ‘theory,’ it is helpful to attempt to also 
define the meaning and usage of a theoretical framework in this study. Theoretical 
frameworks are more popular in quantitative research, but they are nowadays becoming 
increasingly used in qualitative research as well (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). In a quantitative 
research, a theory is used deductively, while in a qualitative research a theory is used 
inductively (Creswell, 2014). In this mixed methods study, theories have been used as 
‘theoretical lenses.’ Therefore, the theoretical framework served as a set of ‘lenses’ that 
allowed the inquirer to “see” and understand certain aspects of the phenomenon under 
investigation (Anfara & Mertz, 2006, p. xxviii). There is a caveat here to be noted: 
“theoretical framework alone cannot provide a comprehensive explanation on the issue 
being studied” (Tavallaei & Talib, 2010, p. 573). Nevertheless, Tavallaei & Talib avowed 
that “the high diversity and richness of theoretical frameworks give researcher a valuable 
opportunity to see what could seem familiar through a new and distinct perspective” 
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(Tavallaei & Talib, 2010, p. 573). In their book, Political Geography, Martin Glassner and 
Chuck Fahrer underscored the importance of using multiple theoretical lenses when they 
asserted that: 
No responsible scholar would suggest that any theory describes exactly the real world of territ orial 
political behaviour. Neither do any combination of them nor all of them together provide answers to 
our innumerable questions about the state and state behaviour. They are, after all, more like 
impressionist paintings than photographs... Nevertheless, they all provide compact descriptions, clues 
to explanations, and tools for more and better work. They should inspire us to challenge them, extract 
their valid and useful elements, apply them to real and important problems... (Glassner & Fahrer, 
2004, p. 54). 
 This study drew from the meaning of ‘theory’ connoted by theory3 and theory6. By 
the implication of theory3 meaning, the study sought to understand why the Nigerian state 
has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite the adoption of 
federalism as a device for fostering unity in diversity. As Abend posited, in a theory3 sense, 
the ultimate goal is not to establish causal relevance, but to offer an original ‘interpretation,’ 
‘reading’ or ‘way of making sense’ of a certain slice of the phenomenon under investigation. 
Adopting a theory6 usage, the study also approached the phenomenon under investigation 
from a certain perspective. Here the perspective serves as a way of looking at or 
representing the phenomenon being studied. It fits into Abend’s theory6 because of the 
normative component of the study. Finally, the adoption of theory7 meaning has allowed the 
inquirer to use an approach that renders the social construction of reality by the research 
participants intelligible. Hence, the study uses an interpretive framework, which allows the 
inquirer to gain understanding of the phenomenon from the meaning and experience of the 
people.  In what follows these various usages of theory that form the theoretical framework 
of the study are presented. 
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 This study, first and foremost, draws from the Hartshorne functional model. Richard 
Hartshorne, one of the outstanding geographers of the twentieth century, in his presidential 
address delivered before the Association of American Geographers on April 7, 1950 at 
Worcester, Massachusetts, proposed that the functioning of the state was the primary 
preoccupation of political geography. He appealed to political geographers to view the state 
and other political entities in terms of structure and function. Although Hartshorne 
developed this model more than sixty years ago, it is still applicable to contemporary 
political geographical processes and situations (Reményi, 2012). This is why Glassner and 
Fahrer suggested that Hartshorne’s ideas “still warrant a careful reading today” (Glassner & 
Fahrer, 2004, p. 56). Recent publications point to a continuous interest in the Hartshorne 
model and its contemporary relevance (see Kumar, 2011; Reményi, 2012; Berg, 2013; 
Mileski, 2013). Reményi supported the contemporary application of the Hartshorne model 
by arguing that it was “a well constructed and long standing theory on its own” (Reményi, 
2012, p. 130). Reményi also considered the theory to be relevant because, despite processes 
of globalization, the growing importance of territorial entities can be observed at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. Hence, the importance of territoriality remains 
prominent in political geographical processes. Reményi summed up his support of the 
relevance of the functional, territorial integration model with this compelling practical 
argument:  
Ordinary people live their lives within the framework of states and subnational territorial entities. 
These are the systems of reference of everyday life; the framework of socialization, so they are the 
territorial features to which the strongest identity is linked. This phenomenon seems to be g rowing 
today; when the belief in the exclusivity of positive effects of globalization is increasingly labile, and 
the role of the states in the socio-economic processes of the world is becoming more important. In 
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the light of the factors stated above, it is argued that the functionalist model of the effective state – of 
course with the use of a critical approach – may be suitable to analyse the performance of territorial -
political formations even at the beginning of the 21
st
 century. (Reményi, 2012, p. 130). 
Similarly, Kumar (2011) argued that the functional approach is still promising in the 
politico-geographical studies of contemporary phenomena because it “still holds its 
objective relevance in the analysis of the ‘internal’, political geography of States, which are 
badly shaken by dissension, secessionism, and centrifugalize (sic), causing concern to their 
viability and political stability” (p. 138).  
 This study subscribes to the relevance of the Hartshorne model to contemporary 
political geographical studies. Territorial integration, Hartshorne argued, is the fundamental 
function of any state: “The fundamental function of any state, as an organisation of a section 
of land and a section of people... is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse 
regions of the state-area, into a single organised unit” (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 104). According 
to Hartshorne, the state is able to succeed in this primary function when it overcomes the 
centrifugal forces that tend to break it apart with the binding (or cohesive) effect of the 
centripetal forces present in the state. Therefore, as Reményi (2012) put it simply, the forces 
keeping the state together are what Hartshorne referred to as centripetal forces, while those 
pulling it apart are called centrifugal forces.  
 Hartshorne considered the centripetal forces as a necessary ingredient for the 
existence of a state. He argued categorically that:  
The fact that a country has a name and a government, that an international treaty recognizes its 
existence as a state and defines its territorial limits – all that does not produce a state. To accomplish 
that, it is necessary to establish centripetal forces that will bind together the regions of t hat state, in 
spite of centrifugal forces that are always present.  (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 110). 
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For Hartshorne, the basic centripetal force that must be present if a state is to “truly” exist is 
some concept or idea justifying the existence of the state and its incorporation of the various 
regions that make it up. Hartshorne further insisted that a state must have a raison d’être, 
that is, reason for being or reason for existing. Although Hartshorne rejected Friedrich 
Ratzel view of the state as an organism, he nonetheless borrowed the concept of a “state-
idea” from Ratzel, who conceptualized state “as a section of land and a section of humanity 
organised as a single unit in terms of a particular, distinctive idea”  (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 
110). Drawing discretely from this Ratzelian conception, Hartshorne posited that once the 
original idea behind the establishment of a state has lost its validity a new state-idea will be 
required to keep the state functioning. He maintained that although a particular state, whose 
original raison d’être has withered may not quickly succumb to disintegration due to “forces 
of inertia, vested interests, and fear of the consequences of change,” its chance of u ltimately 
surviving is contingent on evolving a new state-idea (p. 111).                
 How is the Hartshorne model employed in this study? First, Hartshorne posited that 
territorial integration is the primary function of a state. Hartshorne asserted that the primary 
function of a state “is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse regions of the state -
area, into a single organised unit” (p. 104). The notion of territorial integration, which 
Hartshorne referred to as uniting the diverse territorial parts and regions of the state into a 
single polity, is in this study construed in an integrationist sense. Unlike the assimilation 
model, which seeks to cause differences to disappear, the integrationist perspective 
considers “the recognition of diversity as a defining characteristic of the polity”  (Simeon, 
2008, p. 58). Second, Hartshorne explained that political geographers need to pay attention 
to the forces that keep a state together, the centripetal forces. He argued that for a state to 
174 
 
survive or function effectively the centripetal forces must prevail over the centrifugal forces 
that tend to pull it apart. In this study, therefore, Nigerian federalism is viewed as a 
centripetal force, put in place to hold the ethnically and religiously diverse peoples and 
geographical regions of Nigeria together. “Generally, federalism is interpreted as the most 
practical of Hartshorne’s centripetal forces in that it has to be consciously designed to fit a 
particular situation of diversity” (Flint & Taylor, 2007, p. 132). In his Federal Theory, Max 
Frenkel elaborated the functional aspects of federalism. Frenkel viewed federalism as 
having the potential to reduce social tension and to promote integration in a state as a model 
of accommodating unity and diversity (Frenkel, 1986). In recent years, there has been a 
growing discussion about the peace-promoting function of federalism (Iff, 2013). While this 
study shares the assumption that federalism could serve as a mechanism for promoting unity 
in diversity and peace, it approaches it with a caveat. The mere fact of having a federal 
institutional design is not enough. For example, Daniel Thürer explained this when he 
argued that: “Characterizing federalism as an essentially technical approach to managing 
diversity overestimates the potential of legal and political engineering in areas of public life 
that are deeply rooted in history, human beliefs and even geography” (Thürer, 2008, pp. 1-
2). Therefore, in employing this functional approach the study has to decide on what is to be 
its focus of analysis in evaluating the peace-promoting function of federalism. 
 Hartshorne’s concepts of raison d’être and state idea are considered relevant in 
evaluating the peace-promoting function of the Nigerian federalism. Hartshorne asked a key 
question regarding the reason for the existence of the state: “Under what concept , for what 
purposes, are these particular regions to be bound together into one political unit, absolutely 
separate from every other political territory?” This question is considered germane to an 
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attempt to interrogate the peace-promoting function of Nigerian federalism. In what follows, 
the epistemological and ontological considerations of the study with regard to this 
theoretical framework are elaborated.                        
 More than fifty years ago, Professor K. W. Robinson described a federation as “the 
most geographically expressive of all political systems” (Robinson, 1961, p. 2). It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the federal idea has become increasingly important in the 
contemporary world (Blindenbacher & Watts, 2003; Watts R. L., 2008; Hueglin & Fenna, 
2010), and no wonder federalism has attracted a lot of political geography research (Flint & 
Taylor, 2007; Caminal & Requejo, 2012). Despite the corpus of literature on federalism, 
researchers still have to face the question put forward by Rocher and Fafard (2013): what is 
the optimal way to study federalism? To this end, Raoul Blindenbacher and Ronald L. Watts 
proposed a conceptual framework for federalism research. They delineated two major 
dimensions of the study of federalism: analysis of structural characteristics and analysis of 
elements relating to political culture. Most studies in the past tended to focus on analysing 
federalism’s political and institutional dimensions (Rocher, 2009; Rocher & Fafard, 2013; 
Máiz, 2013). For example, the general tendency among scholars in the past was to 
concentrate chiefly on the legal frameworks of federalism (Blindenbacher & Watts, 2003). 
Institutional biased studies may also focus on analysing “how federal institutions work in 
the light of division of powers, the degree of intergovernmental collaboration or 
competition, and, ultimately, the ability of multiple governments to govern effectively” 
(Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43). Such analytical focus that dwells on the institutional 
dimension reduces federalism to a mere mode of organisation and a formula for sharing of 
jurisdiction (Rocher, 2009).  
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 However, there is a growing awareness that a merely legal and institutional study of 
federalism cannot sufficiently explain political patterns within a federation, and, therefore, 
scholars writing about federalism have become more conscious of the social forces 
underlying a federal system (Blindenbacher & Watts, 2003). More than fifty five years ago 
William S. Livingston advocated that attention be given to the sociological aspects of 
federalism. He argued that:  
The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional 
terminology but in the forces – economic, social, political, cultural – that have made the outward 
forms of federalism necessary... The essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or 
institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal 
qualities of society are articulated and protected. (Livingston, 1956, pp. 1-2).      
Several scholars have added their voice to Livingston’s by calling for a greater attention to 
the sociocultural aspects of federalism. For example, Máiz (2013) noted that it is important 
to look beyond the institutional design of federalism or the interactive set of actors and 
institutions by taking into account the interpretation or a federal vision of politics. Máiz 
pleaded with scholars to give a fresh attention to this “somewhat neglected interpretative 
dimension of federalism” (Máiz, 2013, p. 83). Similarly, Rocher and Fafard (2013) 
emphasised the relevance of the cultural and additional factors that shape federalism. They 
showed the importance of taking into consideration the existence, strength and implications 
of federal political culture. It is, however, to be noted that call for a greater attention to be 
paid to the social forces underlying federalism does not presuppose that the institutions or 
formal framework of a federal system are to be downplayed in a study (Douglas-Scott, 
2002). Douglas-Scott stressed the need to be cognisant of the complex relationship between 
institutions and societal behaviours, which is commutative in nature. He posited that: 
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“Common feelings may not only produce federal societies but may themselves in turn be 
fostered by the institutions and superstructures themselves” (p. 195). On this ground, 
Douglas-Scott hypothesised that most successful federations are likely to exhibit the strong 
social forces and carefully crafted political institutions that work symbiotically together.  
 This study sought to understand why the Nigerian state has remained deeply divided, 
despite having in place a federal system specifically adopted to promote unity in diversity, 
and as Gana and Egwu (2003a) noted, to mitigate intergroup conflict. Instead of evaluating 
the institutional dimension, that is, the structural characteristics of Nigerian federalism, the 
inquirer decided to explore the phenomenon under investigation by focusing on its 
normative political dimension, that is, the political culture of federalism in Nigeria. The 
theoretical implications of this approach are variegated. First, the approach is based on the 
adoption of a normative political theory. “Traditionally, the scientific study of politics has 
been associated with a value-neutral approach to politics” (Gerring & Yesnowitz, 2006, p. 
102). This value-neutral approach, also referred to as a “positive” science, seeks to uncover 
what is, not what ought to be in the political realm (Gerring & Yesnowitz, 2006; Gregory et 
al., 2009). Positive theorists are concerned with identifying the characteristics of polities in 
terms of causes and effects, without going into moral judgement of what is good or bad and 
right or wrong. Therefore, a positive theory strives to make descriptive and explanatory 
inferences on the bases of empirical information about reality (Porta & Keating, 2008). In 
contrast, normative theory involves an evaluative or moral appraisal – dealing with the 
questions of how things should be or ought to be, what is good or bad, and what is right or 
wrong. From its very beginning in Ancient Greece, normative theorists have preoccupied 
themselves with the question “about the common good realized through political 
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community, the legitimacy of political authority, the rights and freedoms of those living 
under such authority and the nature and binding force of political obligations” (Bauböck, 
2008, p. 41). In a nutshell, on the surface, positive theory is about facts, while normative 
theorising (that is, political theory) is about values (Gerring & Yesnowitz, 2006). 
 However, the fact/value dichotomy that has bifurcated political theory into positive 
and normative theory, and kept asunder those who self-identify as positivists and 
interpretivists is no longer an irreconcilable problem between political philosophy and 
political science or within the broad field of social science. For example,  David Held argued 
that a consideration of social institutions and political arrangements, without taking into 
account the proper principles of their ordering, might yield an understanding of their 
functioning, but it will not enable us to arrive at a judgement as to their adequacy, 
appropriateness and desirability (see Held, 1989, p. 5). David Harvey was even more 
categorical in rejecting what he called the artificial separation of empirical and normative 
approach. He described the dualism that arose from this separation in the following words:  
From this separation flows a tendency to regard facts as separate from values, objects as independent 
of subjects, “things” as possessing an identity independent of human perception and action, and the 
“private” process of discovery as separate from the “public” process of communicating the results.  
(Harvey, 2009, pp. 11-12).     
The mixed methods approach of this study underscores the increasing appreciation of the 
complementarities and interdependence between positive (deductive) and normative 
(inductive) approaches. As Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006) have noted: “Normative 
theorising must deal in facts just as empirical work must deal in values, they do not inhabit 
different worlds” (p. 108). Gerring and Yesnowitz argued that the trad itional segregation of 
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positive and normative theory is crippling because it is untenable since both approaches rest 
on an implicit understanding of the other’s territory.  
 The application of a normative approach in this study served the purpose of choosing 
what aspects of federalism to be analysed in an attempt to understand the integrative and 
conflict management function of Nigerian federalism and its constraints. By adopting a 
normative approach, the study’s focus of analysis was on the political culture of federalism 
instead of the operation of federal institutions and processes. The underlying premise of this 
approach is that: 
... in order for federations to operate in a manner that results in policies and programmes that are 
considered fair and just by both citizens and the federal partners, they must be evaluated and 
understood in the light of the values they promote and their ultimate purpose: balancing self -rule and 
shared rule. (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43).        
For this reason, therefore, Rocher and Fafard posited that beyond the analysis of 
institutional organisation and processes, the strength or weakness of the political culture – 
that is, the values, norms and views underpinning citizens’ views of federalism – equally 
deserves consideration in evaluating the success of federalism in any particular context 
(Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 43). Daniel Elazar, for example, has this to say about the 
cultural dimension of federalism: 
True federal systems manifest their federalism in cultural as well as constitutional and structural 
ways. That is, the idea that society is made up of a series of interrelated covenants and compacts, 
which allow parties to them to unite for common purposes while retaining their respective integrities, 
is deeply embedded in the national cultures of authentic federal systems. (Elazar, 1987, p. 78).    
The above assertion by Elazar has an ontological implication. It means federalism exists 
insofar as a federal culture also exists. The underlying proposition here is that federal 
institutions are created by people, but “they only exist when there is a shared belief in them”  
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(Máiz, 2013, p. 86). Therefore, an analysis of the integrative and peace-promoting function 
of Nigerian federalism cannot be limited to analysis of structural characteristics, but must 
also be linked to an analysis of citizens’ understanding of federalism (cf. Rocher & Fafard, 
2013). This means the study recognises that “it is not just institutional arrangements which 
are indicative of federalism” (Douglas-Scott, 2002, p. 194). After all, the separation of the 
concepts of structure and culture are only for analytical purpose because the two are, in 
reality, inherently interdependent (Rocher & Fafard, 2013). This is why Máiz argued that, 
“normative elaboration should always take place in a close contact with empirical and 
comparative political science research and the positive political economy theory of 
federalism” (Máiz, 2013, p. 100).  
 This also implies that the study subscribes to the normative idea that the best 
institutional arrangement and legal framework will not guarantee the success of a federal 
system in the absence of a federative political culture (political culture of federalism). 
Hence, the study views federalism as something more than just a set of institutions and 
actors, but also “a set of beliefs, values, attitudes, and civic dispositions” (Máiz, 2013, p. 
85). Daniel Elazar has aptly described what federalism means in this sense: “In this respect, 
federalism implies a posture and attitude toward social as well as political relationships, 
which leads to human interactions that emphasize coordinated rather than superior-
subordinate relationships, negotiated cooperation, and sharing among parties”  (Elazar, 1987, 
p. 78). Elazar even took a step further by postulating that “the viability of federal systems is 
directly related to the degree to which federalism has been internalized culturally within a 
particular civil society” (p. 78). This view was recently echoed by Máiz when he asserted 
that: “Just as a democracy cannot exist without democrats – citizens infused with civic 
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culture – federalism cannot develop without a solid federative culture  [emphasis added]” 
(Máiz, 2013, p. 86).   
 The definition and usage of the concept of ‘federal culture,’ ‘federative political 
culture,’ or ‘political culture of federalism’ in this study draws from the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), Rocher and Fafard (2013) and Máiz (2013). The 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines political culture as:  
... the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a political process and 
which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system. It 
encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity. Political culture is thus the 
manifestation in aggregate form of the psychological and subjective dimensions of politics. A 
political culture is the product of both the collective history of a political syste m and the life histories 
of the members of that system, and thus it is rooted equally in public events and private experiences.  
(International Enclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, p. 218).  
 For Rocher and Fafard, political culture of federalism refers to the modes of representation 
of federalism and its ideational dimensions. They define culture as “a set of ways of 
thinking and of grasping reality and is constituted by norms, values, and codes which 
contribute to guiding actions as well as developing judgements regarding different social 
objects” (Rocher & Fafard, 2013, p. 45). According to Rocher and Fafard, culture plays a 
role in building solidarity within a group, and shapes the expectations, wishes, and needs of 
people. By doing so, Rocher and Fafard posited, it allows a “meaning” in terms of the 
preferences and behaviours that ought to be shared; it is this spirit, therefore, that gives 
expression to the notion of ‘political culture.’ The elaboration of federal political culture by 
Máiz (2013) has also guided this study. Máiz identified the attitudinal dimension of federal 
political culture to include “specific emotional aspects of empathy and solidarity, habits and 
capacity for tolerance, mutual respect, and reciprocity,” and the cognitive aspects, which 
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include distinct beliefs and values (shared and self-government, unity in diversity, equality, 
negotiation, and pacts)...” (Máiz, 2013, p. 100).       
 The overarching approach of this study is the employment of a geographical 
perspective. Braden and Shelley (2014) defined geography as simply “the systematic study 
of location and place” (p. 5). They explained that the question of where and why various 
phenomena are located and distributed is the preoccupation of professional geographers. 
Hence, geographers pay considerable attention to the study of place, both individual place 
and regions. “A region can be defined as a set of places with common attributes. The 
common attributes characteristics of regions in the world today can include culture, 
economy, political system, language, religion and many others” (p. 6).  As a consequence, 
this study pays attention to the subnational characteristics reflected in the political culture of 
federalism in Nigeria. Since Nigeria is divided into six semi-official geopolitical regions, 
namely, North-East, North-West, North-Central, South-West, South-East and South-South, 
regional variations with regard to federal culture are examined. By using a mixed methods 
approach, regional variations and patterns have been explored both qualitatively and 
quantitatively.  
 The study is situated within the political geography subdivision of human geography. 
In a broad sense, political geography is concerned with “the relationships between politics 
and geography at spatial scales ranging from local to international”  (Braden & Shelley, 
2014, p. 7). “Political geographers are interested in how power relations build spaces and 
places and how, in turn, spaces and places mediate politics and conflict” (Flint & Taylor, 
2007, p. 4). Therefore, in this attempt to understand how the prevailing political culture of 
federalism harnesses or hinders the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism 
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against the backdrop of entrenched ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, and 
pernicious cycles of sectarian violence, the study recognizes this interrelationship between 
spatial and locational contexts and politics and conflict.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
 The purpose of this case study was to understand why the Nigerian state has 
remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious contestations and conflicts despite 
having in place a federal system, which was specifically adopted as a mechanism of 
fostering unity in diversity and plurinational coexistence and peace. The study sought to 
contribute to unravelling this puzzle by interrogating how the prevailing political  culture of 
federalism in the country harnesses or hinders the supposed peace-promoting and integrative 
function of federalism. The researcher believed that a better understanding of this 
phenomenon would allow policy makers and practitioners to appreciate the relationship 
between the institutional and normative dimension of federalism, and to strive at closing the 
gap between designed aspirations of federalism and political culture of federalism among 
citizens. In seeking to understand how the political culture of federalism among the 
Nigerian population harnesses or hinders the peace-promoting and integrative function of 
federalism, the study addressed five research questions: (1) How have the values, attitudes, 
actions and perceptions of the Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously 
contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-promoting and integrative function of 
federalism since the country’s return to democratic rule in 1999? (2) What understandings 
of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation to 
the contentious issues? (3) What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing 
culture of federalism among the people? (4) Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular 
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among Nigerians nowadays? (5) What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard 
to the future of their country?  
 This chapter provides a description of the study’s research methodology and includes 
discussions around the following methodological areas: (1) rationale for research approach; 
(2) sampling strategy; (3) summary of information needed; (4) overview of research design; 
(5) methods of data collection; (6) data analysis; ethical considerations; and (7) delimitation 
of the study.   
4.2. Rationale for Mixed Methods Research Design  
  This study employed a mixed methods research design. A mixed methods research 
combines the dominant research traditions, quantitative and qualitative methods, in one 
study. Mixed methods emerged as a formal field of research in the 1980s (Guest, 2012). 
Mixed methods research has gained increasing popularity among researchers in recent years 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Cameron, 2011), and has 
been variously described as: “the third methodological movement” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2008; Cameron R. , 2009); “a research paradigm whose time has come” (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004); and “an intellectual and practical synthesis” (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, 
& Turner, 2007). Mixed methods research has been defined “as the class of research where 
the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, 
approaches, concepts or language into a single study” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 
17). Cresswell and Plano Clark gave a more comprehensive definition of mixed methods 
research:  
Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of 
inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the 
collection and analysis and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases in 
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the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative 
and qualitative data in a single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a better understand ing of research 
problems than either approach alone. (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p. 5).  
John, Onwuegbuzie and Turner (2007, p. 123) have come up with a composite definition of 
mixed methods research after synthesising 19 different definitions by leaders in the field:   
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers 
combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of qualitative and 
quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference techniques) for the purpose of breadth 
and depth of understanding and collaboration. (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p. 123).  
 Every study’s choice of a methodological approach implies a certain philosophical 
grounding. This is why Cameron asserted: “Methodological choice does not exist within a 
philosophical void” (Cameron R. , 2011). Julia Brannen, for example, argued that a 
researcher’s choice of methods is essentially driven by philosophical assumptions, which 
have both ontological and epistemological implications, and frame the research or serve as 
the researcher’s frame of reference (Brannen, 2005).  
 The difference between quantitative and qualitative research approaches stems from 
the philosophical positions each of them is grounded in. As a result, the advocates of the 
two approaches have engaged in an “ardent dispute” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14) 
or what some have termed as “paradigm wars” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14; 
Cameron, 2011, p. 78). This so-called “paradigm wars” has produced two sets of purists, 
who are poles apart. On one hand, quantitative purists (also called positivists) insist that 
social science should be objective, researchers must eliminate their biases and be 
emotionally detached and uninvolved with the objects of their study, and research is a 
process that involves testing of hypothesis and arriving at empirically verifiable conclusions 
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(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). On the other end of the spectrum, qualitative purists (also 
referred to as constructivists and interpretivists) reject positivism and embrace 
“constructivism, idealism, relativism, humanism, hermeneutics, and, sometimes, 
postmodernism” (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14). The position of qualitative purists 
is that  
... multiple-constructed realities abound, that time- and context-free generalizations are neither 
desirable nor possible, that research is value-bound, that it is impossible to differentiate fully causes 
and effects, that logic flows from specific to general (e.g., explanations are generated inductively 
from the data), and that knower and known cannot be separated because the subjective knower is the 
only source of reality. (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 14). 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie drew the above summary from the work of Egon G. Guba’s, 
“The Alternative Paradigm Dialog” (Guba, 1990). Guba provided explicit elaboration of the 
debate between positivists and constructivists or interpretivists.  Cresswell and Plano Clark 
(2011) noted the implications of the two positions as follows:  
One might argue that quantitative research is weak in understanding the context or setting in which 
people talk. Also, the voices of participants are not directly heard in quantitat ive research. Further, 
quantitative researchers are in the background, and their own personal biases and interpretations are 
seldom discussed. Qualitative research makes up for these weaknesses. On the other hand, qualitative 
research is seen as deficient because of the personal interpretations made by the researcher, the 
ensuring bias created by this, and the difficulty in generalizing findings to a large group because of 
the limited number of participants studied. (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 12).  
 The emergence of mixed methods research, as a third research paradigm (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004), has not put to rest the disagreement between quantitative and 
qualitative research paradigms. Instead, it recognizes that both paradigms are important and 
useful (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Hence, mixed methods research enables a 
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researcher to reap simultaneously the benefits of quantitative and qualitative approaches in a 
single study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). In stressing the benefits of mixed methods 
research, Cresswell and Plano Clark noted that: 
Mixed methods research encourages the use of multiple worldviews, or paradigms (i.e. , beliefs and 
values), rather than the typical association of certain paradigms with quantitative research and others 
for qualitative research. It also encourages us to think about a paradigm that might encompass all of 
quantitative and qualitative research, such as pragmatism...  
 Mixed methods research is “practical” in the sense that the researcher is free to use all 
methods possible to address a research problem. It is also “practical” because individuals tend to 
solve problems using both numbers and words, combine inductive and deductive thinking, and 
employ skills in observing people as well as recording behaviour. It is natural, then, for individuals 
to employ mixed methods research as a preferred mode for understanding the world [emphasis 
added]. (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 13).    
 In this study, I opted for a mixed methods approach with a qualitative priority. The 
overall leaning of the study, therefore, was towards qualitative research, while the 
quantitative strand was used in a complementary or auxiliary role. It was my contention that 
qualitative methods were more likely to elicit the rich data necessary to offer insights into 
the research questions and the normative nature of the issues under investigation. In my 
view, the fact that qualitative research is grounded in constructivist philosophy makes it 
suitable as the priority or major strand of this mixed methods research. The constructivist 
philosophy allows the researcher to understand a research problem from the perspectives of 
the local population and, hence, offers the advantage of generating culturally specific and 
contextually rich data (Mack, Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & Namey, 2005, p. vi). 
Further, the choice of qualitative methods to drive this mixed methods study was predicated 
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on its suitability to the issues under investigation. Mack et al. (2005) underscored this 
suitability when they asserted that: 
The strength of qualitative research is its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how 
people experience a given research issue. It provides information about the “human” side of an issue 
– that is, the often contradictory behaviours, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of 
individuals. Qualitative methods are also effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social 
norms, socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue 
may not be readily apparent. (Mack et al., 2005, p. 1-2).  
 The use of quantitative methods in a secondary role in this study allowed the 
researcher to use descriptive statistics to bring out the basic features of the data. Descriptive 
statistics differs from inferential statistics. The former simply describes what the data is or 
shows, while the latter is used for the purpose of reaching conclusions that would allow 
generalization beyond a given sample. The study was also designed as a concurrent mixed 
model design wherein the qualitative and quantitative strands were carried out at the same 
time.  
4.3. Rationale for Case Study Methodology   
 Within the framework of a mixed methods approach, the study was most suited for a 
case study. A case study, as a methodology, is an intensive study of a spatially bounded 
phenomenon over a delimited period of time (Gerring, 2004). For example, Orum, Feagin, 
& Sjoberg, (1991, p. 8) noted that: “Since the case study seeks to capture people as they 
experience their natural, everyday circumstances, it can offer a researcher empirical and 
theoretical gains in understanding larger social complexes of actors, actions, and motives.” 
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4.4. The Research Sample   
 A purposeful sampling procedure was employed to select the sample for this study. 
Purposeful sampling has been well acknowledged as a suitable sampling strategy for a case 
study type of methodology. For example, Patton (1990) pointed out that: “The logic and 
power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth” (p. 
169). Purposeful sampling, according to Patton, is identifying and working with 
information-rich cases, which gives the researcher great deal of lessons about issues of 
central importance to the purpose of the research. The reason for using purposeful sampling 
is, therefore, “to select information-rich cases whose study will illuminate the questions 
under study” (Patton, 1990, p. 169). The researcher also utilised snowballing sampling to 
locate individuals that are able and willing to discuss the research issues in various states 
across the country. Snowballing here refers to a process whereby respondents are asked to 
refer the researcher to other individuals whom they knew to be quite conversant with the 
issue under study and may be willing to share their opinions (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). 
Purposeful sampling enabled the researcher to draw samples from across various locations 
all over Nigeria. The criteria for selecting respondents were as follows: 
 All respondents were Nigerians and resident in the country. 
 All respondents were 16 years and above. 
 Respondents for the questionnaire were all literate, that is, able to read and write in 
English. 
 Three distinct samples were collected for the different methods of data collection 
used. A sample of 354 respondents was used for a questionnaire survey, a sample of 40 
respondents was used for interviews expert and key informant interviews, and a sample of 
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43 participants took part in the focus groups. The total number of sample for the study was, 
therefore, 437. The use of purposeful sampling allowed for representation based on certain 
criteria such as region, religion, gender and professional background.   
4.5. Research Procedure 
 The following steps were followed in carrying out the research:  
4.5.1. Literature Review. A continuous review of relevant literature was conducted to 
inform the study. Due to the nature of the research problem, the literature review was 
extensive and elaborate. The literature review was divided into two parts and carried out 
successively. The first part delved into the foundations of political organisation, historicity 
of the state system and, then, dwelt extensively on exploring federalism, which is the key 
concept of the study. The second part of the literature focused on colonialism, the evolution 
of the Nigerian state and the evolution of the Nigerian federalism. The focus of the second 
part of the literature review was to gain a better understanding of the background of 
federalism and the historical developments that shaped the political culture of federalism in 
Nigeria.  
4.5.2. Methods of Data Collection. Multiple methods of data collection were employed in 
this study in order to obtain in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
This triangulation of data collection methods added depth, richness and rigour to the study. 
The study also triangulated the types used. Primary data were obtained from survey, 
interviews, focus group, and observation, while secondary data were gathered through 
document analysis. Data triangulation refers to “the use of multiple data sources in the same 
study for validation purposes” (Hussein, 2009, p. 3). As Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) noted, 
triangulation helps the researcher to be more confident of their results.  Yeasmin & Rahman, 
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(2012, p. 159) pointed out that triangulation is useful because it “provides richer and more 
comprehensive information because humans share more candidly with an independent third 
party than they do with someone they know or they think they know. Using several methods 
together also helps to rule out rival explanations.”   
1. Survey 
 Nigeria is made up of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The country is 
divided into 6 so-called geo-political zones (GPZs). For the purpose of the survey, three 
states were selected from each GPZ. In the case of the North-Central GPZ to which the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, belongs, two states, Plateau and Nassarawa, were 
selected and added to the FCT to make up three survey sites in the zone. For the North-West 
GPZ, Kano, Zamfara and Kaduna States were chosen. In the North-East GPZ, Borno, 
Bauchi and Adamawa States were selected. In the South-South GPZ, Rivers, Akwa Ibom 
and Edo were picked. For South-East, Enugu, Ebonyi and Abia were selected. Lastly, for 
the South-West, the states picked were Lagos, Oyo and Ondo. The 18 survey sites were 
allocated 20 questionnaires each, which made the total number of questionnaires allocated 
for the whole study to be 360. However, only 354 questionnaires were administered, filled 
and returned. Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the demographic characteristics of the 
survey respondents. The questionnaire was designed with both close-ended and open-ended 
questions in keeping with the mixed methods orientation of the study.  
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Figure 6. Composition of respondents by educational qualification.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Composition of respondents by sex. 
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Figure 8. Composition of respondents by age. 
Due to the nature of the research topic, majority of respondents that filled the questionnaires 
had at least a bachelor degree. It was discovered during the test run of the survey that 
having respondents fill the questionnaire themselves was a safeguard against interference by 
survey assistants, who might have strong feelings about some of the questions, and to allow 
respondents to be heard in their own voice. Although efforts were made to ensure equal 
gender representation, this target could not be achieved in several sites. The age 
composition of the respondents was more inclusive, although there were no respondents 
above 65 years of age. However, the triangulation of data has allowed some of these 
shortfalls to be compensated. There were people older than 65 years old, who took part in 
the interviews and focus groups  
 I had to engage survey assistants in each of the 18 sites due to the vastness of the 
survey sites and the long distances separating them. I recruited 12 survey assistants to cover 
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7 sites. I was able to get 5 people to administer questionnaires in 5 sites pro bono (on 
voluntary basis), and I covered one state myself. All the survey assistants had a minimum 
qualification of a bachelor degree. The survey assistants and volunteers were introduced to 
the criteria and the ground rules of the survey to ensure uniformity in the process and to 
safeguard the integrity of the data. The whole survey was meant to complement other 
methods of data collection because of the qualitative priority of the study.  
2. Interviews 
 The interview was the primary method of data collection because of the qualitative 
research leaning of the study wherein the generation of thick and rich description was 
essential. The interviews allowed me to gain the perspectives of different respondents about 
the phenomenon under study. In conducting the interviews, I was guided by 
phenomenological philosophy. Phenomenological philosophy enabled me to capture the 
lived experiences of the respondents and to unearth their different perceptions. The study, 
therefore, followed the phenomenological doctrine of Verstehen, which is based on the 
premise that “human beings can and must be understood in a manner different from other 
objects of study because humans have purposes and emotions; they make plans, construct 
cultures, and hold values that affect behaviour” (Patton, 2002, p. 52).  
 I conducted the interviews over a period of two and half years during several field 
trips to Nigeria from 2011 to 2014. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the people that were 
interviewed by category.  
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Table 1Composition of Interviewees. 
Attributes of interviewees Number 
Christian leaders  10 
Muslim leaders 13 
Traditional rulers 1 
Youths 4 
Academics 5 
Other professionals 7 
TOTAL 40 
 
There were heads of major mainline churches and leaders of Christian umbrella 
organisations among the Christian leaders. The Muslim leaders comprised Imams and 
leaders of Muslim umbrella organisations. The traditional ruler interviewed was among the 
most prominent traditional leaders in the country. Two of the four youths were leaders of 
Muslim and Christian groups respectively, and the other two were students. All the 5 
academics that I interviewed were professors; one among them was a former head (Vice 
Chancellor) of one of the first generation universities in the country. The other professionals 
I interviewed included 3 legal practitioners and 4 journalists. Two types of interviews were 
conducted, semi-structured and open-ended interviews. It was easier to conduct in-depth, 
open-ended interviews with top leaders than to use a semi-structured format. Hence, I 
started such interviews with open-ended questions that would allow the respondents to 
speak freely in the course of the interview. For such elite interviews, I discovered that 
flexibility in terms of format and timing was essential.       
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3. Focus Group 
 Six focus groups, with a total of 43 participants, were held in the course of the 
research fieldwork. The focus group allowed the researcher to use elements of interview and 
participant observation. The groups that participated in focus group discussions included 
Muslim youths, Christian youths, Christian women, Muslim women, grassroots Christian 
leaders and grassroots Muslim leaders. The focus group discussions allowed the researcher 
to understand group’s perspectives about the phenomenon under study, and gave 
participants the space to engage in joint reflections.      
4. Observation 
 I employed two types of observations in carrying out this study. I used direct 
observation in some instances where I observed events and happenings that were relevant to 
the study as an onlooker or bystander. In this case, I did not participate in the happenings 
that I observed. I undertook direct observation by unobtrusively listening to people 
conversing about issues related to the phenomenon under investigation. I also made direct 
observation of behaviours and events that occurred at different times in the course of my 
field work. The second type of observation I employed was participant observation. As a 
Nigerian, I had the opportunity to take part in many interactions and discussions with 
individuals and groups, either on the basis of acquaintance, affiliation and instantaneous 
encounter in several locations across the country. My extensive network and itinerant life 
during the fieldwork exposed me to occasions where I had the opportunity to participate in 
discussions and activities that allowed me to gather considerable lessons about the 
phenomenon under study. Apart learning from the discourses of those I observed, both types 
of observation allowed me to capture nonverbal communication and body language of 
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people, such as emotion, expression of discomfort or gesticulation that might have meaning 
within the a given cultural context.    
5. Document Analysis                        
 Over a period of three years, I undertook the collection and analysis of Nigerian 
newspapers, both print and electronic versions. I selected the newspapers based on contents 
relevant to the phenomenon under study. The newspapers collected provided me the 
opportunity to learn about the perspectives of opinion leaders, political leaders, religious 
and ethnic associations, militias, and other major players in the country. The newspapers 
also gave me access to third party interviews (mainly interviews conducted by journalists), 
which enabled me to learn from the opinion of leaders I could not interview them myself. 
Through a large network of informants, using communication technology, I was 
continuously able to follow developments in the country that were relevant to the study, 
including the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and political issues, to complement other 
sources that I had. The newspapers also allowed me to understand patterns of public 
discourse, media narratives and the perspectives and behaviour of government officials, 
although I was mindful of their positionality. 
4.5.3. Methods of Data Analysis. The data gathered from the survey was codified and 
saved in a retrievable Excel database created by the researcher. First, I gave each of the 
returned 354 questionnaires a serial identification number (ID). On the database, I created 
headings for all the close-ended questions on the questionnaire. I also added new fields such 
as geo-political zone (GPZ) in order to assign each questionnaire to its respective GPZ. The 
coding allowed me to assign numbers to each possible answer for the close-ended questions. 
After the entry of all data in the database, the data was statistically analysed using SPSS 
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software (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences). Univariate and bivariate analyses 
were conducted on the data. The qualitative data from the questionnaire was processed 
manually. It was combined with qualitative data from other data collection methods. I 
manually transcribed the qualitative data from interviews and focus groups. Due to the 
length of time of the interviews and time constraints I was able to transcribe only the most 
relevant half of the total number with the assistance of a volunteer. I devised a modified 
content analysis to process the information from newspapers. I use the word “modified” 
because I simply identified relevant issues and took excerpts from the papers, and put them 
under the themes and categories that they fit to collaborate the primary data. 
4.5.4. Ethical Considerations. Given that this research is a mixed methods case study with 
a qualitative priority, the researcher was aware, as Patton (2002) pointed out, that in 
qualitative research the researcher is the instrument. This is because the researcher as a 
human instrument possesses the capacity, which no other investigative instrument has, to 
understand the meaning of the interaction that takes place in the course of carrying out a 
research in a natural setting. As a consequence, this places a great responsibility on the 
researcher with respect to the validity and credibility of the investigation. Patton  identified 
three essential ingredients that can help the researcher, namely: Skill, competence, and rigor 
of the person doing fieldwork (Patton 2002, p. 14). The researcher was aware of the 
sensitivity of the phenomenon under study and, therefore, tried to protect the identity of 
respondents. To this end, I have tried to follow the internationally well recognised American 
Psychological Association’s (APA) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 
Conduct, Including 2010 Amendments, as much as possible.  
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 Being a Nigerian gave the researcher the advantage to demonstrate empathy, which 
was necessary in order to comprehend the motives and feelings of the people in  a socio-
cultural context (Patton, 2002, p. 52). At the same time, the researcher was conscious of the 
tendency that bias, value and judgement may affect the study negatively, if scholarly and 
ethical protocols of research are not adhered to. As a safeguard, the researcher was guided 
by the principles of ‘phenomenological epoché’ and ‘empathic neutrality.’ Edmund Husserl 
introduced the term ‘phenomenological epoché’ to mean that the researcher will bracket 
himself and suspend his judgement to examine the phenomenon as it occurs (Moran, 2005). 
This ‘phenomenological attitude’, according to Finlay (2008), implies that the researcher 
will at once retain a wonder and openness to the world and reflexively retain pre-
understandings. This means the researcher must simultaneously bracket pre-understandings 
and exploit them as a source of insights (Finlay, 2008).  
 The second principle is ‘empathic neutrality’. Patton (2002 , p. 51) coined it as a 
pragmatic solution to the debates about subjectivity versus objectivity. For Patton, the 
language of qualitative research has shifted from subjectivity versus objectivity to 
‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’. Empathic neutrality can be achieved through a 
commitment to understanding the phenomenon in its natural setting, accepting complexities 
and diverse perspectives as they emerge, and reporting both confirmatory and disconfirming 
evidences with regard to any hypothesis. The researcher in this case maintains neutrality by 
not starting out to prove a particular perspective or manipulate the data to arrive at an 
inclined truth. However, neutrality does not presuppose detachment. The researcher learned 
about the phenomenon through empathy, that is, by interaction with the people. I had cause 
to shed tears during some of the interactions I had with victims of Boko Haram insurgency. 
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I was also moved by compassionate stories that I heard from respondents. For example, I 
wept when a respondent told me how her brother came out to save someone that was going 
to be killed during one of the crises in the country. The brother told his friends, who wanted 
to kill a person from another religion in their neighbourhood, that life would cease to mean 
anything to him if they go ahead to kill the person they were attacking. For his 
compassionate stance, the person apprehended was spared and allowed to go. I am also not a 
dispassionate observer because I have experienced personal losses and pain as a result of the 
effect of the phenomenon under study. I have lost loved ones and I know people still living 
with the scars of ethno-religious conflicts. It was my interest to see that peace prevails in 
Nigeria that motivated me to undertake this academic endeavour.  
4.5.5. Delimitations of the Study. This study has certain limitations, which are worth 
pointing out. Being a mixed methods case study driven by a qualitative priority 
automatically exposed the study to specific weaknesses of qualitative research methodology. 
Although the study contains a quantitative strand, it was only used in a complementary way.  
4.5.6. Problems Encountered. In carrying out this project, I encountered numerous 
challenges. I would highlight few of them here. Doing a study that covered an entire country 
presented a challenge to me because Nigeria is a very large and diverse country. The task of 
travelling within the country from one location to the other was time consuming, expensive 
and risky due to long distances, poor public transport systems and security risks on the 
roads. The financial support of the University of Tübingen via our Research Group, “Human 
Geography and Development Studies,” subsidised some of my travel costs. Another 
challenge that I encountered during this research was sensitivity of the issues that were 
relevant to the study. It was difficult to get people to talk about issues for which they were 
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bitter about or they considered too sensitive. In spite of these challenges, I have learned a 
lot from this endeavour, and it is hoped that readers would find the report worthwhile .       
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IS THERE A PEACE-ENABLING POLITICAL CULTURE OF 
FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA?  
5.1. Introduction 
 This mixed methods case study sought to understand why the Nigerian state has 
remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite having in place a 
federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and 
peaceful coexistence among its regionally, ethnically and religiously diverse population. 
This puzzle, therefore, has put the widely acclaimed integrative and peace-promoting 
function of federalism on trial, at least in this particular case. This study was an attempt to 
understand and shed some light on a phenomenon that has had debilitating consequences on 
the Nigerian state and its people, and left some gaps in our knowledge of the circumstances 
that harness or hinder the integrative and peace-generating function of federalism in 
Nigeria. 
 Chapters two and three of this report have been dedicated extensively to 
understanding the concepts that are central to this study and to the background of the 
Nigerian federalism respectively from previous scholarly works. The empirical part of the 
study narrowed the scope of investigation to interrogating how the prevailing political 
culture of federalism harnesses or hinders the integrative and peace-promoting function of 
federalism in Nigeria. Specifically, the empirical study sought to find answers to the 
research questions: (1) How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of Nigerian 
population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the 
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peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country’s return to 
democratic rule in 1999? (2) What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, 
actions and perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues? (3) What 
historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of federalism among the 
people? (4) Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular among Nigerians nowadays? (5) 
What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their country?  
The data obtained through the various research instruments have been analysed and 
presented in this chapter as the findings of the empirical part of the study. Qualitative data 
in form of thick descriptions and direct quotations are complemented with quantitative data 
where appropriate, being a mixed methods study driven by the qualitative strand. The 
findings are discussed under themes and categories that deal with the research questions.   
5.2. Ethno-Religious Contestations and Conflicts 
A federal system is expected to foster unity in diversity by promoting harmonious 
coexistence among the diverse inhabitants of a state and mitigating potentially damaging 
conflicts. However, for Nigeria, this supposed integrative and peace-promoting function of 
federalism has been called to question as a result of persistent ethno-religious contestations 
and conflicts, which have become manifestations of disunity in the country in recent times. 
The study sought to understand why in this instance federalism has not been able to fully 
fulfil its acclaimed integrative and peace-promoting function by interrogating the prevailing 
political culture of federalism among the Nigerian population. Therefore, to be able to tell 
whether there is a federative culture, and if there is, whether it is weak or strong, the study 
has enumerated the so-called centrifugal forces (divisive issues), which have generated or 
are bringing about ethno-religious contestations or conflicts in some parts or whole of the 
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country from 1999 to 2013, and the positions and perceptions of the public on them. The 
presentation and analysis of the data under each divisive issue helps to bring to the fore the 
attitudes, values, actions and ideas that make up the kind of political culture prevailing 
among the Nigerian population. The presentation and analysis of the data have been done in 
a way that the research questions are addressed simultaneously. 
5.2.1. Indigene-Settler Divide. One issue that has been observed to become a serious 
source of contention in Nigeria is the so-called indigene-settler divide, which has been 
blamed for several ethno-religious violent confrontations in different parts of the country. 
The study observes that the ethno-religious dimension of the indigene-settler divide poses a 
great challenge to the principles of federalism and appears incompatible with the provisions 
of the federal constitution of Nigeria. For example, the Nigerian Constitution clearly 
demonstrates, in the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, that: 
Accordingly, national integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds 
of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited . 
For the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the State to – 
(a) provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services 
throughout the Federation; 
(b) secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation;  
(c) encourage inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, 
ethnic or linguistic associations or ties; and  
(d) promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious or 
other barriers. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Chapter II, Section 15(2-
3)). 
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The study tried to know if these laudable principles and objectives resonate with the people, 
that is, if the constitutional ambition for national integration enjoys a corresponding 
sentiment among the population.  
 The study found that there are no official definitions of “indigene” and “settler ,” 
although the term “indigene” has been mentioned in the constitution. The federal character 
provision of the constitution requires “compliance with the principles of proportional 
sharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels” (Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Third Schedule, C). The idea of the federal 
character was intended “to promote national unity, and also to command loyalty, thereby 
ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few 
ethnic or sectional groups” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Section 
14(3)) in the government or any of its agencies. The constitution explicitly requires equal 
proportion of indigenes of the states of the federation in all government appointments and 
public service, including the armed forces and the police. The study found that the 
interpretation of the federal character idea by the citizens has resulted in an indigene-settler 
phenomenon, by which Nigerians tend to divide residents of a state of the federation into 
us/them dichotomy, with a practice of territoriality that gives rise to a socio-spatial 
differentiation of insiders and outsiders, and inclusion and exclusion with regards to 
citizenship rights. 
 To find out what the constitution and federal character principles mean to the 
population, the study asked a focus group to describe why the constitutional desire for 
national unity does not seem to find expression in the current state of affairs. One 
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respondent, a human rights lawyer, suggested that the constitution is not popular among the 
people because they feel it was handed down to them by the military: 
One of the biggest conceptual flaws with it [the constitution] is the concept of ‘we the people.’ In 
actuality it was not so much the people that put the constitution together, it was the military. It 
should actually read, ‘we the military.’ 
 The comment made by this respondent was shared by the rest of the participants of the 
focus group. The study observed that it has become common to hear, from time to time in 
private conversations and public discourse, people disowning the constitution. For example, 
Law Mefor, an author, forensic psychologist and national coordinator of Transform Nigeria 
Movement stated that: “Many informed Nigerians have therefore contended that the 1999 
Constitution is purely a military legacy and contains many flaws that have made it far more 
unitary than federal” (Mefor, 2013, para. 5). The Deputy President of the Senate, who is 
also a lawyer and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Review, 
affirmed that Nigeria needs a more people-oriented constitution (Ekweremadu, 2012). A 
newspaper columnist, for example, commenting on the request by the Senate Committee for 
the public to submit memoranda on the proposed amendment of the current constitution, 
stated that:  
However, many Nigerians, including this columnist, are not swayed by the whole noise about 
constitutional amendment. This is because the truth of the matter is that what Nigeria really needs 
now is not constitutional review but a people’s constitution  [emphasis added] – the one that will 
emanate from the Nigerian people. (Odepeju, 2012, para. 2).              
A group called Pro National Conference Organisation (PRONACO) also averred a similar 
view when its spokesperson was reported by Channels Television saying that : 
...though the National Assembly, by the provisions of section 8 and 9 of the 1999 constitution, can 
amend the constitution and also make laws thereof, unfortunately, what Nigerians want at this point 
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is a brand new constitution that can be initiated, owned and defeated by them [emphasis added]. 
(Okunniyi, 2012, para. 1). 
A foremost constitutional lawyer and Igbo leader, Professor Ben Nwabueze, who has been 
canvassing for a people’s constitution affirmed, in an interview with journalists, that “We 
need the people’s constitution whose source of authority derives directly from the people” 
(Vanguard, 2013, August 30). He argued that while the contents of the constitution are 
important, they are not as important as the source of the authority the constitution.  
 Despite the perception that the 1999 constitution is not truly reflective of the 
people’s wishes and the feeling that it is not a “people’ constitution,” the study observed 
even those who described it as “flawed” conceded that no constitution is perfect. One 
respondent,a lawyer and human rights activist, argued that:  
As imperfect as the constitution is, it provides a good framework for national unity , national 
integration, religious freedom, etc, but these concepts appear not to be entrenched in the mentality or 
psyche of the people. The constitution is an aspirational document, it encapsulates our aspira tion.  
A professor of social ethics expressed a similar view during an interview by asserting that: 
“We don’t have the moral and the ethical understanding to implement the constitution. The 
constitution states the ideals, but they are only on paper.”  
 The ongoing constitutional review has triggered a public debate on the issue of 
indigene-settler divide. There are two options before Nigerians: “state of origin” or “state of 
residence.” The former is what is practiced presently where those who live outside their 
“state of origin” are considered settlers in their state of residence. Since this has been 
generating conflicts, a proposal was put forward that “state of origin” which confers 
indigeneity to individuals or groups be replaced with “state of residence,” where every 
Nigerian citizen would be entitled to equal rights wherever she or he resides in the country.  
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The special adviser (media) to the Deputy Senate President announced through the media 
that the Senate Committee on Constitutional Review has created an online poll, where the 
public was asked: “Should state of origin be replaced with state of residence in the 
constitution?” (Anichukwu, 2013, January 6). The people were asked to vote “Yes” or “No” 
to the short code 20052 or visiting a stipulated Web site to answer the question. It was 
observed that during the public debate triggered by the poll, people began to circulate text 
messages (SMS) vigorously campaigning against the proposal. The researcher received 
several of such messages via SMS from several people. The people that circulated these 
messages cut across the different ethnic groups, religions, regions and social classes. The 
poll was later discontinued.  
 This study followed up on this question by asking respondents to indicate their 
preference between “state of origin” and “state of residence” and to justify their choice on 
the questionnaire. The data obtained indicates a stronger support for “state of residence” 
(61.3%) than for “state of origin” (38.7%) among the 323 respondents who answered the 
question (see Figure 9).  
210 
 
 
Figure 9. Respodents' choice between "state of residence" and "state of 
origin." 
The responses were grouped into the six so-called geopolitical zones (GPZs) of the country, 
namely, South-South (SS), South-East (SE), South-West (SW), North-East (NE), North-
West (NW), and North-Central (NC) as shown in Figure 10. The respondents were assigned 
to a particular GPZ, where their indicated state of origin belongs to, without prejudice to 
whether the respondent was considered an “indigene” or “settler” in that state.  
38.7% 
61.3% 
State of Origin 
State of Residence 
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Figure 10. Geo-Political Zones of Nigeria. 
 
The support for “state of residence” across the GPZs is as follows: SS (53.1%); SE (56.9%); 
SW (71.9%); NE (77.2%), NW (50.8%); and NC (61.8%). While the support for “state of 
origin” across the GPZ are these: SS (46.9%); SE (43.1%); SW (28.1%); NE (22.8%), NW 
(49.2%); and NC (38.2%). Figure 11 shows the differences in the preference for “state of 
residence” and “state of origin” across GPZs.  
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Figure 11. Choice between "state of origin" and "state of residence." This 
figure illustrates the regional breakdown of support for the choices. 
 
In general, there is no much difference in the amount of support for both “state of 
residence” and “state of origin” between the north (NE, NW and NC) and the south (SS, SE 
and SW). However, there are big disparities between the individual GPZs. The highest 
support for “state of residency” was obtained in the NE (77.2%) followed by the SW (71.9), 
while the highest support for “state of origin” was found in the NW (49.2%) followed by the 
SS (46.9%).       
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 The justifications of respondents for their choice of either “state of origin” or “state 
of residence” were elicited through an open-ended question on the questionnaire. A 
collection of selected responses are given below in the respondents’ own words: 
Reasons given by respondents in favour of “state of origin” in their own words: 
 The seed of tribalism is already deeply rooted in the Nigerian mentality that it is almost imp ossible 
to force the populace to forget what tribe they come from. The only feasible solution I think is to 
embrace our individuality, respect it and learn to respect the individuality of other tribes like the 
South Africans are doing. 
 Indicating state of origin will go a long way to determine your root and your identity. 
 Northerners do not enjoy socio-political and economic freedom in southern Nigeria compared to 
what the southerners enjoy in the north. Imbalance exists in terms of accommodation, with 
northerners disadvantaged. 
 Every individual citizen of the federation must know his forefather’s background and this will show 
his or her identity.  
 In my opinion, citizenship should stick to state of origin respecting each other’s religious and 
traditional values.  
 The state of origin matters a lot to be able to identify where one comes from. So every individual in 
the country is supposed to have an origin as long as he or she is a citizen of the country.  
 State of origin gives one a full right in his state and any attempt to grant the same right to residents 
will bring imbalance in the polity.  
 You are born into a family, in that family you are from one ethnic group, in that ethnic group you 
are from a state before you are a Nigerian. The problem of Nigeria is not the state of origin, but the 
state of corruption, state of disunity, state of wickedness.  
 It is easy to address the issue of federal character and other minority issues.  
 I favour state of origin because there will be no fairness in administering state of residence. 
 Nigeria is a nation of minorities with an overly large 3 majority ethnic groups. Minorities must be 
protected as seen in all the work and treaties of the UN. To remove the issue of state of origin would 
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be to sound the death knell of ethnic minorities in the exercise of their rights to govern themselves. 
If this happens in a matter of eight years all states’ executives and legislatures in all states of the 
federation will be taken over by Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa people; while minorities will not be able to 
make significant inroads into elective positions. The issue of state of origin and its removal is not an 
issue of economics as Nigerians are living and conducting their business in states other than their 
states of origin, it is an issue of political power and the quest to dominate minorities and take over 
the country by a group of people in majority ethnic groups who are not contented with 
intermarriages that have reduced numbers of minority groups, killed local languages where 
insensitive men and women marry into larger ethnic groups and do not teach their children minority 
language nor give them names.  
 To protect minorities, state of origin should remain the basis of identity within a country and 
citizens must know why it got there in the first place, and why representatives of minority groups 
insisted on it. People need to be able to counter the useless arguments that use America as an 
example. America is a classical example of why state of origin must remain given the fact that 
original owners of America, the Indians, are in reserves and nowhere to be seen in the socio -
economic and political life of America. 
 State of residence will introduce complications. An individual may be resident in more than one 
state; which shall he be known with? 
 Those living in the same state of origin though practising different religions share the same culture 
and tribe. It’s highly probable they will stay together peacefully. But state of residence means 
different cultures, different tribes, different norms, etc.  These could lead to conflict and no peace.   
 When you open the constitution for state of residence to prevail, the major tribes would outrightly 
suppress the minority for example in the north, where religion seeks to eliminate the state borders.    
 
Reasons given by respondents in favour of “state of residence”  in their own words: 
 The “state of origin” issue is one of those strategies of the Nigerian system to keep foreigners out of 
the “scarce” political-cum-economic largess of the country. “Fence them off and the resources will 
be for us only syndrome.” 
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 Every Nigerian should be allowed to lay claim to indigeneship status wherever he or she resides in 
the country and their children accorded the same. Political and economic power should also not be 
denied to non indigenes wherever they reside in the country.  
 State of origin is the main root of Nigeria’s problem; it gives room for selfishness, domination and 
corruption. 
 If we really want unity we need to stop using state of origin to identify ourselves. It di vides us. 
People who have lived in a place for a specified period of time should be given citizenship of that 
state. 
 Unless we start seeing ourselves as one people in this country regardless of where one comes from 
(state of origin), the unity that we advocate for will remain far from us.  
 I opted for state of residence because I know it will promote citizenship rights in a federal structure 
like Nigeria where citizens seem to lack any benefits as people are treated on the basis of 
indigeneship status, which is inherently discriminatory to non-indigene who might have resided in a 
particular state for long and have contributed to its development. I believe that state of residence 
will strengthen our federalism by fostering the much desired unity in diversity as well as strengthen 
our democracy. 
 Citizens are productive, pay taxes and contribute to the development of their state of residence and 
should have all the rights and privileges. That is the spirit of true federalism in most parts of the 
world. 
 The use of state of origin as the pedestal upon which a person’s citizenship stand makes bogus the 
constitutional provisions for free association, freedom of residency and freedom of mobility. And it 
is also anti-integration and a source of disunity.  
 A man [and woman] must be accorded all the rights and privileges he [or she] deserves from his [or 
her] place of residence because by the single fact of residence, because he [or she] contributes to the 
economic, social, infrastructural and political development of his  [or her] place of residence and not 
his [or her] place of origin. 
 I have lived in Borno State for over 25 years and all my children were born there, yet they cannot 
benefit from Borno State scholarship neither can they get meaningful employment there.  
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 A citizen of Nigeria can live in any part of Nigeria, and it is expected that the place has become his 
or her legal place of abode. So any where a Nigerian finds himself or herself must be 
accommodated. That keeps us united and we should see ourselves as one people. 
 State of residence will overshadow the ills of state of origin, which include favouritism, 
sectionalism, tribalism, etc.  
 Your state of residence is where you pay your tax and exercise other duties as a citizen of the 
country. It is also where you enjoy most of the services of government. Therefore, it is only normal 
that you should be entitled to all rights given to you under the constitution in the same place you 
exercise your duty.  
 State of residence would eradicate inter-ethnic conflict and reduce religious bigotry. 
 I am an indigene of Anambra living in Enugu. If I apply for a job or an appointment in my state of 
residence, I will be less favoured than an indigene of that state. I believe as a Nigerian living in any 
state I should have equal rights as the indigene of that state.       
 Despite the stronger support for “state of residence” as the statistics indicate, the 
study observed several instances where the application of “state of origin” generated 
controversy and conflict. For, example, one issue that has recently brought the indigene-
settler divide to the front banner was the so-called “deportation” of Nigerians within 
Nigeria. In July 2013, the Lagos State Government undertook the clearing of street of 
beggars and destitute, and “deported” 67 persons to the Upper Iweka Bridge, Onitsha in 
Amambra State (Adekunle, 2013, August 8). This incident generated controversy and public 
debate about the constitutionality and moral basis of the action of the Lagos State 
Government. Although the Lagos State Government explained that the action did not 
amount to a deportation because its intention was to help reunite the alleged destitute with 
their family and community, the pan-Igbo cultural organisation, Ohanaeze Ndigbo, 
described the action as deportation carried out without even a human face. The Ohanaeze 
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Ndigbo’s position was divulged by its national publicity secretary, Tony Oganah in an 
interview: 
 In the case of what happened in Lagos, the people were not even given the luxury of the provision of 
the 1999 Constitution that if you are accused of wrongdoing, you must be given a fair trial. We even 
have information that all the people were not Igbo people, even the Igbo among them were not even 
from Anambra State. They were not given a chance to say goodbye to their loved ones, they were not 
given a chance to carry their bags; they were not given a chance to explain themselves. They were 
summarily arrested and deported in the same country. Everybody carries Nigerian passport and up till 
now, there is no law that says any Nigerian cannot live and work in any part of Nigeria. The Igbo are 
known for being adventurous and entrepreneurial; anywhere we settle down is our second home. We 
invest anywhere; we build houses anywhere. For this to happen is shocking.  Something tells us that 
there is a political undertone to all of this. (Oganah, 2013, August 4, para. 1).                   
There is presently a suit at the Federal High Court in Lagos challenging the deportation of 
Igbos, which was on 20 October 2014 adjourned to 10 February 2015 (Vanguard, 2014, 
October 20). The Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Fashola, has, despite insisting that the 
action of the state government was misunderstood, gone ahead to apologize to the Ndigbo 
and the Anambra State Government (Akoni, Olowoopejo, & Egole, 2013, September 26). It 
is worth noting that Governor Fashola had appointed “non-indigenes,” including Igbos, into 
key positions in his government. One commissioner in his cabinet was even from Anambra 
State. One commentator, Tony Iredia, even argued that Governor Fashola was far ahead of 
all the other governors in terms of broadmindedness because he has many different tribes in 
his cabinet, government departments, and judiciary. Tony Iredia asked: “why is everyone 
angry with the Lagos State Government for doing what we all do?” (Iredia, 2013, August 
18, para. 3).  
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 The “deportation” of Nigerians from their state of residence to their state of origin 
had also been carried out by other State Governments. A renowned human rights lawyer and 
Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Femi Falana, listed many instances where deportations 
of Nigerians within Nigeria occurred (Falana, 2013, August 12). Anambra State, which was 
irked by the Lagos’ “deportation” of its own indigenes, was reported to have “deported 29 
beggars to their states of origin, Akwa Ibom and Ebonyi States. Lagos had previously 
deported 129 beggars of Oyo origin, who were from the same Yoruba ethnic group as 
indigenes of Lagos, and left them at Molete in Ibadan, the Oyo State capital. In 2012, the 
Abia State Government was reported to have purged its civil service of “non-indigenes,” 
and many of the victims were fellow Igbos from other SE states. The Federal Capital 
Territory had also been reported to have deported 129 beggars to their respective states of 
origin in 2011, and in 2013 it carried out a further street clearing of beggars where it 
expelled hundreds from Abuja. In 2013 also, the Rivers State Government deported 113 
Nigerians from the streets of Port Harcourt to their states of origin. Femi Falana (SAN) 
observed that internal deportation appears to becoming a trend, and asserted that such 
forceful deportation of people, regardless of their socioeconomic status in society is illegal, 
unconstitutional and violates the fundamental rights of such citizens as enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. Further, Falana argued 
that, the deportation runs counter to the provisions of section 15 of the constitution, which 
has imposed duty on the state to promote national integration and to “secure full residence 
rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation” (Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999, Chapter II, Section 15(3b)).  
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 The disengagement of the services of “non-indigenes in the civil service by state 
governments, as pointed out above, has generated row between the states implementing the 
policy and the state, whose citizens were affected. For example, the Abia and Imo State 
Governments were embroiled in a feud over their disengagement of each other’s indigenes 
in their civil service. The Imo State Government, speaking through its Commissioner of 
Information and Strategy, Dr. Obinna Duruji, described the Abia State Government’s policy 
of “sacking of non-indigenes on its payroll” as “anachronistic and patently obsolete in 
Nigeria’s present realities... [and] completely reprehensible” (Vanguard, 2011, October 4, 
para 3). Dr. Duruji stated that “the irrational act would compel us to retaliate, so as to 
accommodate our citizens forced out of the Abia civil and public service” (para. 4). The 
Abia State Government responded through its own Commissioner for Information and 
Strategy, Chief Don Ubani, by questioning the moral basis of the Imo State Government’s 
lamentation on the Abia State Government’s “policy of transfer of non-indigenes in her 
public service when the Imo State Government had carried out a policy decision that “led to 
the summarily, unnotified unceremonious and most cruel dismissal of all Abia indigenes 
who were her public servants in 2000” (Ubani, n.d., para. 7). Both State Governments 
decried the action of each other as injurious to the unity of the Igbo ethnic group, Ndi Igbo, 
to which indigenes of both states belong to.  
 A final example of the indigene-settler divide that the study looked into was the 
Plateau situation. This particular case has been responsible for several violent clashes 
between the so-called indigenes, who are predominantly Christians, and the so-called 
settlers that are mainly Muslims, since 2001. The former belong to smaller ethnic groups 
that are considered natives of Plateau State, while the latter belong to the larger Hausa and 
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Fulani ethnic groups, which as a result of their intertwined history and culture are 
collectively referred to as the Hausa-Fulani. In order to understand whether the attitudes and 
perceptions of the two sides are compatible or against the principles of federalism, the study 
conducted interviews and focus group discussions among purposefully sampled respondents 
from the two groups in Jos. It was outside the scope of this study to establish the veracity of 
the claims of each side. What the study presents here are opinions and perceptions of the 
respondents, which the study considers indicative of the attitudes,  values and norms of the 
parties that constitute what may be termed a strong or weak federative culture.    
 In a focus group discussion, one leader of the Hausa-Fulani community in Jos 
described the indigene-settler crisis in the state as a product of religious misunderstanding 
that has to do with patronage. The community leader decried that the “Plateau State 
Government does not seem to be sympathetic to Muslims.” In agreement with the focus 
group, the community leader stated that the populations of Muslims and Christians in the 
state are 40% and 60% respectively. However, the group suggested that the population of 
Muslims in Jos North Local Government is 800,000, that is, 80%, while Christians make up 
the remaining 200,000, which is 20%. The group maintained that there are three Local 
Government Areas (LGAs) out of the seventy in the state in which Muslims are the 
majority, namely, Jos North, Wase and Kanam, and in five other LGAs there are large 
numbers of Muslims. The participants averred that presently and for a very long time, 
Muslims are grossly underrepresented in political appointments in the state. They decried 
that there are presently two Muslim commissioners out of twenty three in the State 
Executive Council. One participant, an elderly community leader, pointed out to the inquirer 
that:  
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It would surprise you to hear that the Governor is a Christian, Deputy Governor is a Christian, SSG 
[Secretary to the State Government] is a Christian, Speaker [of House of Assembly] is a Christian, 
and the Chief Judge is a Christian. Leaders of the top organs of government are all Christians. 
Therefore, the Speaker is a Christian, the Chief Whip is a Christian, the Majority leader is a 
Christian, and only the Minority Leader is a Muslim on the basis of party affil iation.  
The participants expressed the opinion that the lopsidedness in appointments makes the 
Muslim community unhappy. They claimed that in other places that have similar 
proportions of Muslims and Christians, the Governor and the Deputy Governor usually are 
from different religions. The group decried that as a result of this lopsidedness, the Muslim 
community has been disenfranchised and denied participation in decision-making, and that 
the government does not even consider that there are Muslims in the state, “who deserve to 
have their own share,” as one participant put it. This scenario, one participant argued, is 
responsible for why “Jos is regarded as the headquarters of Christians in the north, even 
though there are more Christians in Benue more than what we have here.” The participant 
pointed out that it can be observed that major decisions and meetings of Christians take 
place in Jos and not in Benue. The group suggested that this is so because the behaviour of 
Christians in Benue is different from that of Christians in Plateau State, and that this is why 
the misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims is more on the Plateau than anywhere 
else in northern Nigeria or even Nigeria as a whole.  
 One of the leaders of the Hausa-Fulani, who participated in the focus group, 
described the ethno-religious dimension of the indigene-settler divide by narrating a story 
about a Hausa man, who supposedly did not suffer the same discrimination because he is a 
Christian. The community leader gave the story as follows: 
Hausas or Hausa-Fulani are regarded as 100% Muslims, but there was a Hausa man, who was getting 
his appointment with the name of Plateau State, although he is from Kazaure or Daura. But because 
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he is a Christian, Plateau State has been sponsoring him for outstanding appointments at the federal 
level. The man became Upper Area Court judge in Plateau here. And when he finished from the 
public service here, he was appointed chairman of the Public Complaints Commission. He took over 
from Maitama Sule, who was the first to be appointed by Murtala. When the man finished that 
service he was given the Chairmanship of the Code of Conduct Bureau. The thing is that he is a 
Hausa man, but because he was Christian nobody went against that appointment. The government, 
which is Christian in outlook, recommended him. But if you go round, you would hear here on the 
Plateau if you are a Muslim no matter how qualified you are you will not get appointment under the 
state government.  
The participants shared the view, as one of them decried, that: “What brings problem all 
over the country is wrong patronage. Muslims contribute towards the development of 
Plateau State, but when it comes to patronage they would not get their own share .” There 
was also a suspicion among the Hausa-Fulani Muslim community that because the Plateau 
State Government is purportedly dominated by Christians, churches are being financially 
empowered. One participant, who is also a spokesperson of a Muslim association in the 
state, stated this suspicion like this: 
All the organs of government are occupied by the Christians; that is why the Muslims have the 
feeling that most of the churches and the vehicles owned by the Christians are usually financed by 
the government secretly, but personally we Muslims have nothing against Christians. Muslims and 
Christians live in peace; there are even families where you can find Christians and Muslims. Instead 
of the State Government to show people how to interact, how to be friends, it is the same government 
that creates misunderstanding between Christians and Muslims.             
  The Hausa-Fulani Muslim community in Jos divulged that they suffer discriminatory 
treatment in terms of access to social services. For example, in an interview, a Hausa-Fulani 
politician, who was a member of the Plateau State House of Assembly, claimed that 
Muslims in Plateau State: pay higher charges than Christians in government hospitals; have 
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less educational opportunities; and have less government projects sited in their community. 
This is how the respondent described the situation: 
The issue is becoming a complex situation in the sense that we Muslims we are paying different 
charges in government hospitals. If you go there your charges Christians and Muslims receive vary. 
Two, admission into the government school, be it at the secondary or tertiary level, is also a complex 
situation, where you don’t have a free opportunity or privilege as that of a Christian brother. Even if 
you are opportune to be admitted into, for instance, state poly[technic], you are paying different 
charges from a Christian. Today also if you [as a Muslim] are not coming from Kanam, Quanpam or 
Wase, you have no access to Plateau scholarship. You cannot even have access to their form. Simply 
for you to have that your name must follow a kind of traditional name in combination with your 
Muslim name before you receive that form. In essence, the segregation is going deeper and deeper, 
which adds a lot of mistrust, misunderstanding and creates conflict. In a situation wher e one pays a 
different charge in the hospital, a different charge at the school, you cannot even think of govt to site 
a project in your community. Right from 1999 when we have democracy or when we started electing 
our leaders up to today most of the Muslim communities or areas you hardly see any development 
project. You go to Jos North, we are more than 80% in population, out of the 1226 workers at the 
Local Government Council (LGC) there are no up to 30 Muslims working in there. These are some of 
the issues that I feel you should know. The government of the day is working very hard to see that 
the segregation is getting bigger, and unless the government decides to carry everybody alone then 
there will not be peace. Because there is a correlation between justice and peace; so also there is a 
correlation between injustice and violence.    
 The views and perceptions of the Christian community in Jos on the indigene-settler 
divide were also elicited through interviews and focus group discussions. A Christian 
respondent described the indigene-settler divide as simply an “expansionist tendency” by 
the Hausa-Fulani Muslims. The views of the respondent are as follows: 
Unfortunately, the settlers in majority are Muslims. When I talk of Muslims I want to make an 
exception. You mix freely with Yoruba Muslims settlers, but the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are the issue. 
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During crisis houses are set ablaze and property looted. So people started running. As people ran 
away the Hausa-Fulani were occupying their houses. You know when they started the Christians 
didn’t fight back because of the teaching that if someone slaps you turn you the other cheek. Is that 
not expansionism? And then when people were tired of running they said they have only two cheeks, 
so they had to fight for self-defence. Up to now those who have their houses along Bauchi Road, 
Nassarawa, and Anguwan Rogo cannot go there. I don’t even go there because silent killing is still 
taking place. (A leader of a women Christian group). 
A similar view was expressed by another respondent, a Christian youth leader, in an 
interview when he asserted that: 
The Muslim community came and settled among us. We even gave them the land. They don’t have 
titles of the land. But we notice they are trying to use crisis to expand and take over. What if we 
wake up one day without a single Christian on the land? So we sometimes react the way we do 
because we no longer trust these people. People that we accommodated for a long time, those people 
that we even gave opportunity to work, and they want to take everything. I want to just say that lack 
of trust and suspicion are causing this problem, because we don’t want to see other people taking 
over everything.  
 In a focus group discussion with Christian leaders, the participants also gave thei r 
breakdown of the populations of Jos and Plateau State. According to the group, Muslims 
make up 25% and Christians are 75% of the population of Jos North. They put the 
population of Muslims in the state at 10%, while that of Christians at 90%. The question 
ownership of Jos was considered central to the issue of indigene-settler divide by majority 
of Christian respondents. For example, in another focus group, a participant argued that “Jos 
was never conquered by the jihadists, so how come the Hausa-Fulani are claiming it as their 
own?” The Christian community claimed that the Hausa-Fulani Muslims are demanding 
rights in Plateau state that are not accorded to settlers in Hausa states. One participant , a 
community leader, articulated this argument in the following way:  
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If your state is my state then my state can be yours. But when yours is yours and mine is yours that is 
the problem. They want to have their own and they want to have our own. No matter how weak you 
are, you cannot sit down and allow someone to take away your land. Land is a heritage. And they 
know where they come from. From Katsina, from Kano, from Bauchi, from Jigawa; they know where 
they actually come from. And they would bring in mercenaries and they would settle here. If you 
look so many people from Chad are here, so many people from Niger, and they have better claims to 
Jos than me the indigene.    
Respondents from the Christian community in Jos claimed that the indigene-settler divide is 
peculiar to the Hausa-Fulani because people from other parts of the country, like the people 
from the South-South, who purportedly settled in Jos before the Hausa-Fulani, have never 
laid claim to Jos. For example, a respondent, who hails originally from the South-South, put 
forward the following claim: 
I believe everybody has a right to worship whatever. Apart from Christians and Muslims there are 
other people. They also have rights. Yoruba Muslims are more tolerating. In the North they don’t to 
see any other person apart from their own religion. In the south we live and mix freely. But Hausa-
Fulani everywhere they go they want to rule. They want to carry everything. That is not right. You 
should allow other people to also exercise their right. The South-South people were the first to come 
to Plateau, but they are not laying claims to the place. We all know where we come from. I have been 
here for 36 years; most of my children were born here. I never claim this place. The Hausa came 
after the South-South, and they are claiming everything. We know where we come from and we have 
lineage. We go to our states of origin for Christmas, but is not so with the Hausa people.  
Another respondent, a pastor living in Jos, gave his personal feeling about the Christian 
claim of domination in the following words: 
You see for me, I am pastor, and I am still praying to be able to trust a Hausa man, especially Hausa 
Muslim. Because where they settle they want to dominate. They have that spirit of domination. I am 
from Adamawa; the Muslims are not the majority there. They are only in large number in Yola, but 
they don’t want non-Muslim to be a governor. They came from other places, but they want to 
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dominate. They want to rule the whole of the nation. That is why they always settle along the major 
highways, the major entrance of the town. 
Participants of a focus group were posed the questions: Why is the indigeneship issue so 
divisive, after all, in other parts of the world you can move to a new state and, with time, 
even aspire to become the governor? What does it add to you that you are holding to it so 
tightly? The participants pointed out that if the right the Hausa-Fulani are claiming is not 
universal it would not work. One of them argued that: “They [Hausa-Fulani] say their own 
is their own and my own is still their own. Shouldn’t that right be universal? You lay claim 
to your own and yet my own is your own? Impossible [chorused the group]!” 
 The study found that both sides were aware of the usual examples of what is obtained 
in different states cited by the other to justify their claim. The respondents cited the example 
of what happens in other states to justify their stance on the indigene-settler issue. For 
example, a Christian respondent claimed that the Hausa-Fulani’s (of Anguwan Rogo in Jos 
North) pointing of Kano as a Hausa state where non-indigenes are allowed to participate in 
politics and enjoy equal rights with the indigenes is tenuous. According to the respondent, it 
is true that people, who are not Kanawa [indigenes of Kano], who have settled there 
recently, are allowed to hold important political posts in the state, but it is a game of 
religion. The respondent, a priest, cited one case as an example to buttress this claim: 
A Plateau man held a position of commissioner or something [in Kano]. So the Muslims in Anguwan 
Rogo in Jos North have been using that to claim the same rights here. And now I started enquiring, 
and I discovered they were right. The man came from Plateau and settled in Kano not in a very 
distant past and integrated in the political system, but I discovered that this is a matter of religion 
than anything else. There are Kano indigenes that are Christians and would not be given key 
positions, nothing at all. It was an anathema for them to be given anything.              
227 
 
The Christian respondents also point at what they claimed as discriminatory practices 
against even Christian indigenes of Hausa-Fulani, Muslim-majority states to justify the 
opposition to the rights that Hausa-Fulani “settlers” are claiming in Plateau State. A 
respondent, a Christian leader from Plateau State, gave a story to illustrate the claim of 
discriminatory practices against Christian indigenes in Hausa-Fulani Muslim-majority 
states:  
There is an area in Kano that we have a church branch, and 100% of the members are Hausa. The 
state government would not even build a primary school there. So it is our church that is taking care 
of education needs of the people. Some of their children have become professionals in different 
fields, but because they are Christians they don’t get anything.  So our church decided that if they are 
baptizing their children, they would no more insist on changing their names to Christian names 
because their native names are Hausa names, such as Mohammed, Isa, etc, so the church now has 
accepted those children should be baptised with their local names so that they would be accepted in 
the society based on their names. Their Christian names attract the discrimination. Once they don’t 
have a Muslim name no matter their education, they can’t have opportunity. They can ’t get anything 
from the state. So see a Bamaguje Christian, whose origin is Kano cannot get anything there because 
of his name, Albert. The name Albert is not a Kano name. So which situation is better, the Plateau or 
Kano? You people [Hausa-Fulani Muslims] are even discriminating against yourselves.         
Other Christian respondents claimed that Christians in Hausa-Fulani, Muslim-majority 
states are: denied land and Certificate of Occupancy (C of O) to build churches; not given a 
fair access to the media; discriminated when it comes to admission and employment; and 
not allowed to enjoy full political participation. A top Muslim leader, who was interviewed, 
shared a personal story about the issue of church building permits as a commissioner in one 
of the states in the North-West, 
When the Certificate of Occupancy of one church was just about to expire, the church people came to 
me about three months before it was to expire. I was in my state then the Commissioner for Works, 
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Land and Housing. Before they came a group of business people came to me that they are happy the 
Certificate of Occupancy of the church is expiring, so ‘Honourable Commissioner, we want you to 
help us allocate this land. You see that land is a juicy area now. So help us.’ So I said okay, and they 
went out. When the pastor and his members came they were very jittery because they have already 
given up. I looked at it and I now asked myself a question: If this is mosque what can I do? I slept 
over the issue. I checked the file records, which dated back to the colonial time. I now recommended 
the renewal of the Certificate of Occupancy of the church. When the approval was out, I called the 
Permanent Secretary and asked him to convey the approval, and was shocked. He asked me, ‘How 
can you do that?’ I told him the Chief Executive [Governor] has already approved it. So later, when 
the church got a letter that their renewal has been approved, the pastor and their senior members 
came to my office. I asked them what is your purpose of coming since your application was 
approved? They said they got the letter of approval, but they don’t know what to say. Do you know 
the pastor and those who came along with him were shedding tears? That already they had given up, 
and even the local business people were coming around to which part of the land was affected. They 
[church] got their certificate from that period for 99 years.         
 When a group of Christians in a focus group were told that Muslims in Plateau State 
complained that they are deprived employment in the civil service and grossly 
underrepresented in political appointments, the group claimed that what the Muslims enjoy 
in Plateau State is more than what should have been their fair share. One participant , a 
youth leader, asserted that:  
If they say they are not employed, they are not telling the truth. I think they should be grateful 
because presently the SEMA [State Emergency Management Agency] Secretary is a Muslim, and that 
is the Plateau State Emergency Management Agency, and a Muslim for that matter. They have a 
commissioner. They have a member at the House of Assembly, and even a member at the House of 
Representatives. They should be grateful. This is not the first time. Some people are saying that they 
are getting a lot compared to some of the Christians that are in other Muslim states.    
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On the other hand, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim respondents argued that there is no basis for 
comparing other Hausa-Fulani, Muslim-majority states with Plateau state becomes 
demographic differences. A Muslim leader illustrated this position with this personal story: 
Some boys came to me and said Alhaji, we understand that Muslims are not happy because they are 
not getting what they are supposed to get in Plateau, but a Christian doesn’t feel happy in Kano, why 
should a Muslim be happy on the Plateau?  I gave them an example, that these two things are not 
comparable. I asked them what is the population of Kano? They say over 10 million. What is the 
population of Plateau? Is about 3.2 million people. Then I told them of these 10m people you would 
hardly get 1000 pure Kano men who are Christians, but here on the Plateau every Local government 
among the 17 Local Governments there are Muslims.   
 The issue of indigene-settler has been acknowledged by experts as a key driver of 
conflicts in Nigeria. The positions of the experts and elites that were interviewed on this 
indigene-settler phenomenon were equally varied. For example, a professor, who has 
published extensively on the history of Christian-Muslim relations in Nigeria, was 
interviewed and his perspective was that unlike the Native Authority system, which 
recognized where one is born, the Local Government reform and state creation created the 
indigene-settler divide. According this expert, The Local Government reform and state 
creation ushered in a practice whereby an individual is identified as belonging to a certain 
ethnic group, who belongs to a certain Local Government within a particular state. Another 
expert observed that a Nigerian has been defined right from the colonial time not as an 
individual, but as an ethnic, who belongs to a territory, and, therefore, to solve this problem 
requires changing that across the federation. A respected journalist and Civil Society 
activist, who has attended the prestigious National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies 
and holds revered title of MNI (Member National Institute), who was interviewed described 
the indigene-settler divide as the most important driver of conflicts in the country. The 
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expert argued that it is unfair that people that have lived for a long period of time in a place 
are called settlers. The expert gave this perspective on the matter: 
People lived for three hundred years in a place and you call them settlers. So when do you become an 
indigene? The issue is we all came from somewhere. The whole history of humanity is about 
migration, settlement and mobility. Imagine you lived for three hundred years in a place and you are 
called a settler. It is injustice, discrimination and stereotyping. By the time I l ive in a place for three 
hundred years, I don’t know where my original home is. I don’t know anywhere else except that 
place, but you say I am a settler. Where do I go? This is a violation of the Constitution of Nigeria 
that says I have a right to settle anywhere. So once you violate this grand norm of justice, equity, 
non-discrimination and accommodation, you have problem. You are bound to have ethnic conflicts 
and crisis. When the settler also belongs to another religion and those who call themselves indi gene 
belong to another religion then people add the religious angle to it so that they can make mileage.  
According to the above expert, once religion is brought into it by people saying “Look at 
what Christians or Muslims are doing to us,” then other people are dragged into the 
indigene-settler struggle. Consequently, this transforms the indigene-settler divide into a 
wider conflict, drawing in more parties. The indigene-settler divide is not confined to people 
who are from different religions. For example, a professor and a pastor, who hails originally 
from one of the North-Central states, described a personal experience of the intra-religious 
dimension of the indigene-settler divide in the South-East, a predominantly Christian 
region:  
I lived in the East for six years, yet majority of the Igbos could not accept me as a Christian because 
they say, ‘You are Hausa.’ And I always tell them that your culture and language are closer to me 
than the Hausa and Fulani. They don’t different iate.   
Similarly, a Muslim interviewee shared a personal experience of this intra-faith dimension 
of the indigene-settler divide by stating that being a Muslim from the south living in a 
Muslim community in the north does not spare one from being seen as an outsider.  
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5.2.2. Majority-Minority Relations. The study looked into how the issue of majority-
minority relations reflects the kind of culture of federalism that is obtained in Nigeria. As a 
result of how ethnicity and religion crosscut each other in Nigeria, majority-minority 
relations have been seen to have an ethno-religious dimension. For example, when asked 
whether majority-minority struggle is one of the drivers of ethno-religious conflicts in the 
country, majority of respondents (60.2%), as indicated in Table 2, either strongly or simply 
agreed that the contestations between the so-called majority and minority groups is one of 
the drivers of ethno-religious conflicts in the country. The views across religious affiliations 
also shows that majority of the adherents of the two major religions in the country, 
Christians (61.8%) and Muslims (57.3%), share the opinion that majority-minority struggle 
is one of the drivers of ethno-religious conflicts in the country.  
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Table 2 Nigerians’ View on Whether Majority-Minority Struggle (MMS) is a 
Driver of Ethno-Religious Conflicts (ERC)  
 
Religion 
Total Christian Muslim 
Non-Religious/ 
Religiously 
unaffiliated Other 
MMS 
drives  
ERC? 
Strongly agree Count 55 18 1 0 74 
% within 
Religion 
23.6% 16.4% 25.0% 0.0% 21.2% 
Agree Count 89 45 1 1 136 
% within 
Religion 
38.2% 40.9% 25.0% 50.0% 39.0% 
Undecided Count 50 23 2 1 76 
% within 
Religion 
21.5% 20.9% 50.0% 50.0% 21.8% 
Disagree Count 31 17 0 0 48 
% within 
Religion 
13.3% 15.5% 0.0% 0.0% 13.8% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 8 7 0 0 15 
% within 
Religion 
3.4% 6.4% 0.0% 0.0% 4.3% 
Total Count 233 110 4 2 349 
% within 
Religion 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Percentage breakdown of respondents’ views according to religious affiliations on 
whether majority-minority struggle is a driver of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. 
 
 The data obtained from participant observation, interviews and focus group 
discussions provide insights into the majority-minority struggles. The study observed that 
when Nigerians talk about majority and minority they are referring to two kinds of group 
delineations in relation to ethnicity. At the federal level, three ethnic groups, Hausa, Yoruba 
and Igbo, are considered the majority, while all other ethnic groups are collectively referred 
to as minorities. The Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups are nowadays referred collectively as 
one large group called Hausa-Fulani, and they are considered jointly as one of the three 
majorities at federal level. The second kind of majority-minority delineation is employed to 
classify ethnic groups as majorities and minorities at the subnational levels, state and local 
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government levels. The classification of ethnic groups into majority and minority is based 
on comparison of the relative compositions of the ethnic groups in the population of a 
particular political administrative area. In some instance, the study found that members of a 
national majority ethnic group, that is a majority at the federal level, may become minority 
at a certain subnational level, where their population is smaller than other local groups. This 
phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 12. The study also observes that in certain instances 
majority-minority delineation has a religious dimension to it because members of a majority 
ethnic group may belong predominantly to one religion and the minority to another.   
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Figure 12. Majority-Minority Configurations in different contexts. This 
illustrates the different scenarios that are obtainable in Nigeria.  
 Over the years, successive Nigerian governments have created states and Local 
Governments. For example, the Deputy Senate President, Ike Ekweremadu, in a speech 
entitled “Constitution Amendment, and State Creation” observed that Nigeria started as a 
federation with three regions as federating units in 1954, but “From then on, Nigeria has 
been on a roller coaster of steady splinter into the 36 federal units” (Ekweremadu, 2012) the 
country operates today. There are presently 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory (FCT), 
and 768 Local Government Areas and 6 Area Councils of the FCT (Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The driving force behind the creation of many states 
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over the years, according to several experts interviewed, was the agitations from sections of 
the country that felt marginalized. The Deputy Senate President, Senator Ike Ekweremadu, 
who is also the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitution Review, gave credence 
to the experts’ explanation in the above mentioned speech. The Senator confirmed that 
during the 6
th
 National Assembly (2007-2011) alone 45 memoranda of requests for state 
creation were submitted by several state creation movements from various parts of the 
country (Ekweremadu, 2012). One expert observed that the creation of new administrative 
units has simply produced new minorities.  
    In order to understand how the majority-minority struggle acts as a source of 
disunity and one of the driving forces behind ethno-religious conflicts in the country,  the 
study looked into the relationship between Hausa-Fulani and northern Christian minorities. 
The northern Christian minorities, especially those located in the North-Central, tend to 
identify themselves as Middle Belters rather than Northerners. Figure 13 shows the 
geographically indeterminate area referred to as the Middle Belt.  Through participant 
observation for three years as a member of one of the Middle Belt movements, which is 
both a physical and an online community, the inquirer learned about the perceptions and 
views of the northern Christian minorities about their Hausa-Fulani neighbours. Although 
the Middle Belt is characterised by diversities of culture and religion, vast majority of those 
who call themselves Middle Belters also identify themselves as Christians. As a result, the 
Middle Belt region is considered the home of the northern Christian minorities. The Middle 
Belt movement observed by this study comprises of hundreds of academics, technocrats, 
business men and women, politicians, journalists, civil servants, and other professionals, 
who self-identify as Middle Belters wherever their locations are in the world. A person 
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becomes a member of the group by enlisting to the group’s listserv, usually through the 
recommendation of an active member. The group has a secretariat in one of the country’s 
main cities, and maintains a web site. In the past, the group had undertaken some relief 
work to assist victims of ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle Belt. The group is currently 
involved in media advocacy to champion the cause of the Middle Belt.                 
 
Figure 13. The Middle Belt area of Nigeria. The Middle Belt is a 
geographically indeterminate socio-cultural area inhabited by diverse minority 
ethno-linguistic groups, forming a separation between the core Islamic North 
and the majority Christian South. 
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The general feeling among the group members is that the Middle Belt is a home to northern 
ethnic minorities, who as a result of being non-Muslims have suffered domination in the 
hands of the ethnic majority Hausa-Fulani. At the initial stage of the group’s formation, the 
conversation was to deconstruct the concepts of “Northern Nigeria” and “One North.” 
According to the Middle Belt movements, Northern Nigeria was created by the “colonial 
masters” to unite the disparate nationalities and cultural groups under the domination of the 
Hausa-Fulani for administrative convenience. The group claimed that the idea of “One 
North” was a device used by the Hausa-Fulani majority to achieve political dominance at 
the federal level by claiming that the north, which makes up about twice the size of 
Southern Nigeria, are one people, speaking with one voice. The group claimed that while 
the idea of Arewa (One North) was used to mobilize all groups in the northern territory, 
when it comes to sharing the benefits, only those who belong to the core Muslim North are 
counted as the real Yan Arewa (Northerners). This view of the Middle Belt movements was 
articulated in a newspaper report like this: 
The non-Muslims, non-Hausa/Fulani of the 19 northern states, who choose to be identified as Middle 
Belters, have risen to insist that they are in the majority in the enclave that once boasted as “one 
monolithic, indivisible North”.  
 The Middle Belt people say they have been unfairly treated by the Hausa/Fulani, used and 
dumped as second rate citizens when it comes to matters of national security, welfare, politics, 
economics even in social relationships such as marriages. (Binniyat, 2013, August 18, para. 2 -3). 
 Hence, the Middle Belt movements promote the idea that Middle Belters are not part 
of Arewa, and, as the National Youth Leader of the Middle Belt Forum, Jonathan Asake, a 
former member of the House of Representatives asserted in an interview, Middle Belters  
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insist that collectively they are the majority in the north (Binniyat, 2013, August 18). For 
example, in an interview with reporters, former Plateau State Military Governor, Major-
General Lawrence Onoja, a Middle Belt, had this to say about the Middle Belt and the idea 
of One North: 
There is a misconception. The North of the sixties when Sarduana was alive is no longer the same 
North today. Let me correct that misconception. I am from the Middle Belt, which is a geographical 
reality today. I am an active member of the Congress for Equality and Change, which is a non -
political association. I am also a member of the Middle Belt Forum. So, if you say I am from the 
North, and you are referring to the old North yes, I am from the North. But now, the Middle Belt is a 
geographical reality and I am a member of the Biddle Belt. I am not from the core North. (The 
Nation, 2013, August 20, para. 5).   
In recent years, the movements have also made efforts to create a Middle Belt identity. 
Hausa language is the lingua franca in most parts of northern Nigeria, and is widely spoken 
across the Middle Belt. It serves as the bridge language among the various ethno-linguistic 
groups of the region due to the varying degree of mutual intelligibility between the 
numerous Middle Belt languages. The Middle Belt movements now encourage Middle 
Belters to teach their children their native language. In some instances, where the parents 
are not able to teach the children their native language, they resort to speaking only English 
to their children at home, since it is the language of instruction at schools and the main 
official language of the country. Middle Belters have also tried to develop a dress code. 
Despite the push for the adoption of a single dress code for the Middle belt, there has not 
been one yet in place. However, the general practice is to either wear variants of the Hausa 
kaftan, making it shorter and sometimes with short sleeves, or to use Western-style clothes. 
Plateau State is viewed by Middle Belters as a rallying point for the Middle Belt movement. 
For instance, one respondent, an active member of the group asserted, during an interview, 
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that: “Plateau State has been a bastion of Christianity. And we consider it the capital of 
Middle Belt. There is no doubt about it.”   
 A common theme in the interviews conducted with Middle Belters was the claim of 
Hausa-Fulani domination. The following statement by a respondent reflects the perception 
of Middle Belters: 
We were colonized by Britain, and our documents of independence were prepared in Sokoto. Some 
of us have read and we know where they are coming from, particularly the Hausa-Fulani. They are 
claiming that Nigeria was handed over to them by the Britons. And that no Christian would ever rule 
Nigeria because it was handed to them. I don’t know what the British can do now to correct that. 
That act alone that they went to Sokoto and they did the ceremony for independence before coming 
out to do the real thing, they handed over Nigeria to Sokoto. Why did they [British] do that? That is 
what they [Hausa-Fulani] are holding to. We thought that we were being set free from the colonial 
masters. We didn’t know that they were handing us over to a black colonial rule in the name of 
Islam. This is very unfortunate. 
It was outside the scope of this study to establish the veracity of the above claim. However, 
it is taken here as a perception that is shared by majority of Middle Belters.  Also the study 
observed that the Middle Belt movements claim to be resistance movements. A majority of 
respondents claimed that they are now doing what they can to resist the Hausa-Fulani 
“hegemony.” Middle Belters view what they refer to as “Hausa-Fulani hegemony” as the 
imposition of Islamic dominance over the territory. This is how one respondent, a 
community leader, put it: 
They manipulated the government and took over all Christian missionary schools, but government 
didn’t take over a single Islamic school. They saw Christianity as going hand in hand with 
conversion. We are liberal and you can come to our school and retain your identity. Thank God the 
government is planning to return schools. They did this because they wanted to catch up. One thing 
in their favour is that they have vision. What they would do in 50 years they have already pencilled 
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down and they would follow it. And unfortunately because the Christian is too trusting and anything 
you do he would think is good, God takes care of everything. We thank God, God has not 
disappointed us. God takes care of everything even when we just resign. And they take undue 
advantage of that trust. And that oneness that we felt we are one to their advantage. Now people are 
enlightened and you cannot come today and cheat me. We now know our right. This is why people 
are resisting.  
The Hausa-Fulani have a different account of the colonial legacy on their relationship with 
non-Muslim minorities, especially Christians in the north. According to many respondents, 
they are not trying to dominate the non-Muslim minorities, but are simply trying to protect 
their culture and their religion, which is a complete way of life from the incursion of 
Western influence and Christianity. For example, one respondent, a Muslim leader, 
described this view as follows: 
One problem is historical marriage from colonial rule. There were some historical inconveniences. 
The Muslims had their religion and had their various levels of education, culture and good 
leadership. And their way of life was Islam and Arabic was the language they used. It was so 
beautiful that [when the] colonial people came they had to borrow the leadership. And what they 
used is what is called indirect rule. They could not have any means to cancel or distort it, so they had 
to use it for easy control. But then at the other level, there were new Christians and there was some 
kind of allergic-ness by both parties. The colonial missionaries while trying to remove the Muslims 
were speaking against their historical belief. And then our ulamas [Islamic scholars], because they 
were scared of the Christians, they felt the incursion of this new religion into their place or the issue 
of Western school around that time may end up giving their children to the missionaries. The 
missionaries arrived first before the colonial invasion. Their initial intention was to convert 
everybody to Christianity. This was resisted by our parents and ancestors because they thought 
anything foreign is going to change their life forever. This kind of problem was the beginning of fear 
among the Muslims.                   
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Another Muslim leader explained that “new generation” churches that are springing up 
everywhere in the north and engaging in “radical evangelism” have become a source of 
concern to the Muslim majority in the north: 
These denominations that are springing up in terms of radical evangelism and what have you, they 
would set the target by saying that by 2015 Northern Nigeria must be delivered for Christ. The kind 
of banners that you see everywhere; they send palpable fears in the minds of Muslims. So it is 
difficult for Muslim leaders all over the country to manage this. I would tell you an instance, in 
Borno-Yobe axis that we are having problem of insurgency and what have you, there was a day we 
went for conference, and one of our elders in the Muslim community said, ‘Look I am coming into 
this place and I know this is a predominantly Muslim place, but on the entrance to the city a very 
large banner was there, almost three of them, saying Christian kaza [this and that].’ The elder said 
that, ‘I know Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people and in the Christian dominated areas nobody 
can do that.’ Go to Muslim areas, go to Sokoto, and that would prove to you that indeed Muslims are 
tolerant of other’s views.        
The study observed that all over the country, including in the core Muslim areas with the 
exception of places overran by the Boko Haram insurgents, one could see conspicuous 
display of bill boards and banners advertising churches, pastors and spiritual events . In the 
course of the fieldwork, the study observed that even in the core Hausa-Fulani states, there 
were many churches, especially in the predominantly Christian, “settlers’ quarter” called 
Sabon Gari (New Settlement) in major Hausa-Fulani cities like Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, 
Gusau, Birnin Kebbi and Dutse. However, the study also observed that the visibility of 
Christian programmes in the core Muslim north has reduced since the Boko Haram 
insurgents began targeting churches.  
 As depicted in Figure 12, the majority-minority struggle has different configurations. 
The study found that the majority-minority dichotomy also exists among national ethnic 
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minorities, who even predominantly belong to the same faith. For example, the Tiv and the 
Idoma ethnic groups are both classified as national minority ethnic groups and both are 
predominantly Christians. In Benue State, the Tiv are the majority, while the Idoma are the 
minority. The Idoma complain of being marginalized by the Tiv. One Idoma respondent 
illustrated this by claiming that:  
And the Tiv have ensured systematically that, even though the Idomas went to school way ahead  of 
them, that the Idomas do not occupy certain positions. A Tiv would rather go and hire someone from 
another state than give it to an Idoma, who is an indigene in that state.  
This is a scenario where the majority and the minority belong to the same religion. As one 
expert observed, the majority-minority dynamics are abounding at all geographical scales.          
5.2.3. Farmers and Herders’ Conflict. Farmers and herders’ conflicts have become one of 
the sources of ethno-religious tension and violence in Nigeria. The incidence of conflicts 
between farming and pastoralist communities has become more widespread and frequent in 
the past three years, and has occurred in all geographical zones of the country (Shuaib, 
2012, September 8). However, the study observed that the North-Central zone has been 
witnessing more frequent and more violent episodes of such conflicts than other parts of the 
country.  
 The farmers and herders’ conflict easily assumes an ethnic and, sometimes, religious 
dimension, because the herders are predominantly Fulanis and Muslims. When the clash 
occurs between the Fulanis and a community that is predominantly non-Muslim or Christian 
then it tends to assume a religious colouration. Two categories of Fulani pastoralists have 
been observed by the study: settled Fulani herders, who confine the wandering of their 
livestock within one location; and nomadic Fulani that engage in seasonal migration 
(transhumance) based on the dictates of climatic conditions. Not all Fulanis are nomadic 
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pastoralists. The Fulani (Fula or Fulbe) are a transnational ethnic group found across Africa, 
predominantly in West African countries. According to the Fulani umbrella organisation, 
Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, the Fulanis are found in the following 
countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Niger, Togo, the 
Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and in eastern part of Sudan (Miyetti Allah 
[Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria] Web site). The Miyetti Allah Web site gave the 
estimate of the population of Fulani in Nigeria as 18% and the Hausa and Fulani together 
make up 29% of the Nigerian population. It is worth noting that Nigeria has census data on 
ethnicity and religion. 
 The conflict between farmers and herders revolves around the issue of grazing land. 
The farmers often complain that their farm crops are destroyed by stray cattle. Most farms 
are not fenced. For example, the chairman of Jos North Branch of Farmers Association of 
Nigeria (AFAN), Mr. Sako Danboyi, in an interview with reporters of Sunday Trust 
newspaper, described the farmers’ concern as follows: 
Even when they [cattle breeders] don’t go out to make their cows damage crops, they can be quite 
careless. They, at times just watch their cows do whatever they wish, including chopping off crops.  
 Sometimes, they allow their small children to lead the cows and small children are usually 
not careful enough; they even lack the capacity to lead cows and stop them from doing harm to crops.  
 So, I believe that a considerable way to avoid clashes between cattle breeders and crop 
farmers would be for cattle breeders to watch their grazing cows in the hands of their children who  
are too young to effectively lead the cows. (Danboyi, 2013, June 9, p. 10).      
The cattle breeders also have their concerns and explanation for the conflict. For instance,  in 
an interview with a reporter of Sunday Trust, a cattle breeder, Malam Idris Musa, explained 
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that the cattle breeders do not intentionally let their cattle into a farm to destroy crops. This 
is how the cattle breeder explained the standard practice:  
As a matter of rule of practice, a cattle breeder would not willingly let his cattle d estroy crops. But in 
situations where a Fulani man’s cattle destroys a farmland, we have our own internal arrangement of 
handling it. When such happens, we immediately report to the ‘Wakili’ even before taking the case to 
Ardo, and all our people here that move with cattle know about the guidelines and rules and we 
usually remind our people about it.  
 Whoever gets into a farmland and destroy people’s crops is punished. Apart from paying for 
what he destroys, we hand him to security agents for prosecution and for negligence. In accidental 
situations, we have our own way of handling the matter in order to prevent clashes with our 
neighbours. 
 But here in our area now, some of our neighbours are handling the matter. By the power of 
guns, they either kill the cattle or the owner, paving way for cattle stealing. Back to the question of 
wilful destruction of crops, anyone with the fear of Allah will not go into any farmland and destroy 
people’s crops. Whoever does that has no fear of God. (Musa, 2013, June 9, p. 11)      
Concerning the complaint of cattle breeders that some farmers take the law into their hands 
when their crops are destroyed, farmers said that the normal practice is for a farmer, whose 
crops have been destroyed by cattle, to report the matter to the police. According to the 
chairman of AFAN, Jos North:  
You don’t take the law into your hands, whatever your grievance may be. Stealing or killing cows 
that stray into your farm is a criminal offence. You may seek justice from the law and fail but taking  
the law into your hands could very easily become your own undoing.  (Danboyi, 2013, June 9, p. 10).     
 There are other issues that relating to the farmers and herders’ conflict that have 
come up recently. Middle Belters view the clash between Fulani catt le breeders and their 
kins, who are farmers, as part of a grand scheme by the Fulanis to expand into the 
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predominantly Christian Middle Belt area. For example, one Middle Belter explained during 
a focus group discussion that: 
The stage for this misunderstanding and crisis we have was set by our historical antecedents, as far 
back as 1804 when Usman dan Fodio launched his jihad. That to my understanding laid the 
foundation and vision. That mission is a global vision of Islamisation.           
This kind of perception has increased among Middle Belters since the clashes between 
farmers and herders took a more deadly dimension in the past two to three years.  The 
natives of the Middle Belt claim that the Fulanis are seeking to dispossess them of their land 
(Nigerian Tribune, 2014, October 27). A Middle Belter claimed during an interview that the 
Fulani strategy is to conquer, establish and dominate.  
 On the other hand, the Fulanis claimed, according to Malam Idris Musa, a cattle 
breeder, that the conflicts are a result of blockage of cattle routes and grazing areas, and 
sources of water (Musa, 2013, June 9). Musa also blamed the crisis on discrimination 
against the Fulanis by the government; that also Fulanis are deprived of privileges that other 
groups in the Middle Belt enjoy from the state. Apart from that, Musa maintained that some 
of the ethnic groups in the Middle Belt are saying the Fulanis must leave and stop grazing, 
and “some disgruntled elements” among them are rustling their cows, and sometimes shoot 
Fulani boys or the cattle or take them away. In an interview with the Leadership Weekend 
newspaper, Saleh Bayari, the protem national secretary of the Miyetti Allah asserted that: 
“The Fulani man has been at the receiving end of insecurity in this country. To say that the 
Fulani are marginalised is an understatement” (Bayari, 2012, September 8, p. 5). Bayari 
explained that Fulani cattle breeders have no representatives in government, who would 
address their plight because they have no children as councillors at the lowest tier of 
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government; they do not have Local Government Chairmen or representatives in the State 
House of Assembly, who are from their nomadic community.  
 The study observed that the majority of clashes between farmers and cattle breeders 
in the North-Central zone are taking place in areas that already have ongoing or not fully 
resolved ethno-religious conflicts. Besides the clashes in the North-Central zone, there are 
several other locations across the country, including the southern parts of the country where 
violent conflicts occurred between farmers and Fulani cattle breeders in recent time.  
 According to environmental experts the conflict between farmers and herders is 
environmentally-induced, that is, a consequence of environmental degradation and possibly 
climate change. For example, the Building Nigeria’s Response to Climate Change 
(BNRCC)/Nigerian Environmental Study Team (NEST), observed that Nigeria is vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. The experts observed that: 
“Climate change will significantly affect vulnerable groups because of a variety of factors, 
including low adaptive capacity, limited resources, and poverty. In general, climate change 
tends to exacerbate differences among various groups” (Building Nigeria’s Response to 
Climate Change [BNRCC] Project, 2011, p. iv). The national policy on Environment has 
acknowledged the vulnerability of the entire semi-arid zone of Nigeria to desertification: 
The entire semi-arid zone of Nigeria lies approximately between latitude 110N and 140N and is 
affected by desertification. This zone has consistently and adversely been affected by all recorded 
droughts in the country’s recent history. The situation is aggravated by  the activities of an increasing 
human population – over-grazing, over-cultivation, and deforestation, which severely stress the 
natural support system. In many areas, sustainable-yield threshold of the vegetation and soils have 
been breached. (National Policy on Environment, 1999, p. 27).   
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 Three separate bills for an act to establish a national grazing route and reserve 
commission for managing grazing routes and reserves in all parts of the federation and other 
matters related therewith had been brought before the National Assembly (House of 
Representatives Web site). However, the proposed Act has generated public debate; with 
many groups protesting that the government should have no business in taking and 
converting it to a grazing route or reserve. Although Land Use Act vests all land in the hand 
of the state (Land Use Act, 1990), ethnic groups see the land in their territory as a collective 
heritage. Hence, those protesting argue that the proposed Act would give the Fulani access 
to the land belonging to other ethnic groups. The conflict between farmers and cattle 
breeders has continued to claim many lives, and is widely viewed as a divisive issue 
because of the sensitivity of religion and ethnicity in the country.        
5.2.4. Introduction of Islamic Banking. The introduction of Islamic banking in Nigeria 
recently sparked off public debate and controversy between Muslims and Christians in the 
country. The dust seemed to have settled down and “Nigeria’s first licenced Islamic bank, 
Jaiz Bank, has commenced full operations of non-interest commercial banking in Nigeria 
from three branches in Abuja, Kaduna and Kano” (Vanguard, 2012, February 15, para. 1).  
The study looked at how the issue of Islamic banking became divisive and brought to the 
fore the question of religious pluralism within a federal system. In particular, the positions 
of the two main religious communities, Christians and Muslims, on the matter were 
generally diametrically opposed to each other. The Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) 
Guidelines for the Regulation and Supervision of Institutions Offering Non-Interest 
Financial Services in Nigeria classified non-interest banking and finance into two 
categories: 1) Non-interest banking and finance based on Islamic commercial jurisprudence; 
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and 2) Non-interest banking and finance based on any other established non-interest 
principle. According to the guideline (Central Bank of Nigeria, n.d., p. 3):  
Islamic banking as a model of non-interest banking, serves the same purpose of providing financial 
services as do conventional financial institutions save that it operates in accordance with principles 
and rules of Islamic commercial jurisprudence that generally recognizes profit and loss sharin g and 
the prohibition of interest, as a model.  
Other non-permissible transactions include those involving any of the following:  
 uncertainty or ambiguity relating to the subject matter, terms or conditions;  
 gambling; 
 speculations; 
 unjust enrichment;  
 exploitation/unfair trade practices;  
 dealings in pork, alcohol, arms & ammunition, pornography and;  
 other transactions, products, goods or services which are not compliant with the rules and 
principles of Islamic commercial jurisprudence.  
 The former Governor of the CBN, Mallam Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, who is now the 
Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi II, championed the introduction of Islamic banking in 
Nigeria during his tenure at the apex bank. The then CBN governor spoke at several fora on 
the benefits of the non-interest banking and finance system, which Islamic banking is a part 
of. According to the governor, Islamic banking would bring about the inclusion of large 
numbers of unbanked and under-banked populations, particularly Muslims into the 
organised financial sector. The governor noted that “The efficacy of the Islamic finance in 
attracting liquidity to national economies especially through the Sukuk instruments 
structured for infrastructure development has also shown the contribution that Islamic 
finance can give to developing economies in building their much needed infrastructure” 
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(The Nation, 2013, November 6, para. 6). The CBN governor also stressed that although the 
Islamic banking would be based on Shari’a its financial products would be accessible to all, 
including non-Muslims. (Balogun, 2013, November 8). The Chairman of Jaiz Bank (the first 
Islamic bank in Nigeria), Alhaji Umar Mutallab, also urged Christians to see the bank as 
belonging to all Nigerians:  
We hope our brothers from the divide will see it as an ethical bank which is not meant to promote a 
particular religion. It is for all Nigerians and not Muslims alone. Once you have a viable project 
proposal which is ethical, which doesn’t cater for such things as liquor, gambling etc, it becomes a 
halal (lawful) project and would be looked into by the bank. (Vanguard, 2012, February 15, para. 8).                  
 Those who opposed the introduction of Islamic banking, especially Christian groups, 
argued that it violated the secularity of the Nigerian state (Komolafe, 2011, July 11). For 
example, the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) stated that:  
...we have continued to frown at the way the CBN governor who is paid by tax payers’ money is 
championing the course of Islamic banking in isolation of other non-interest banking as though that 
is the only form of non-interest banking. It is against the spirit of the Nigerian constitution.  (Eyoboka 
& Latona, 2011, July 30, para. 8).  
Using a questionnaire, the study tried to find out the perceptions of respondents regarding 
whether Islamic banking was in line with the need to accommodate diversity in a federal 
system.  
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Table 3 Perceptions of Nigerians on Whether Islamic Banking was Designed 
to Expand the Influence of Islam in the Country. 
  
Religion 
Total Christian Muslim 
Non-
Religious/ 
Religiously 
unaffiliated Other 
Introduction of Islamic banking 
was an attempt to expand the 
influence of Islam in the country 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 96 10 1 1 108 
% within 
Religion 
41.6% 9.2% 25.0% 50.0% 31.2% 
Agree Count 74 4 1 0 79 
% within 
Religion 
32.0% 3.7% 25.0% 0.0% 22.8% 
Undecided Count 23 13 0 1 37 
% within 
Religion 
10.0% 11.9% 0.0% 50.0% 10.7% 
Disagree Count 25 36 2 0 63 
% within 
Religion 
10.8% 33.0% 50.0% 0.0% 18.2% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 13 46 0 0 59 
% within 
Religion 
5.6% 42.2% 0.0% 0.0% 17.1% 
Total Count 231 109 4 2 346 
% within 
Religion 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Breakdown of respondents’ perceptions according to religious affiliation on whether the 
introduction of Islamic banking in Nigeria was an attempt to expand the influence of Islam in 
the country.  
 
As shown on Table 3, a large majority (73.6%) of Christian respondents suggested that the 
introduction of Islamic banking was an attempt by their Muslim compatriots to expand the 
influence of Islam in the country. In contrast, a huge majority of Muslim respondents 
(75.2%) suggested that the motive behind the introduction of Islamic banking had nothing to 
do with the idea of expanding the influence of Islam in the country.  
 When respondents were asked whether the introduction of Islamic banking was a 
religious solution to the problem of corporate greed in the financial sector the responses, 
once again, show disagreement between Muslims and Christians as indicated on Table 4. A 
great majority of Muslim respondents (76%) believed that Islamic banking is a religious 
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solution to the problem of corporate greed. On the other hand, 55.4% of Christian 
respondents disagree with the view that Islamic banking is a religious solution to corporate 
greed. It is noteworthy to point out that 25% of Christian respondents could neither agree 
nor disagree with the purported potential impact of Islamic banking on corporate greed.   
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Table 4 Nigerians’ Views on Whether Islamic Banking is an Ethical Device for 
Fighting Corporate Greed 
  
Religion 
Total Christian Muslim 
Non-Religious/ 
Religiously 
unaffiliated Other 
Islamic banking is a 
religious solution to 
the problem of 
corporate greed in 
the financial sector 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 18 60 0 0 78 
% within 
Religion 
7.8% 55.6% 0.0% 0.0% 22.6% 
Agree Count 27 22 4 1 54 
% within 
Religion 
11.7% 20.4% 100.0% 50.0% 15.7% 
Undecided Count 58 11 0 0 69 
% within 
Religion 
25.1% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 
Disagree Count 80 7 0 0 87 
% within 
Religion 
34.6% 6.5% 0.0% 0.0% 25.2% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 48 8 0 1 57 
% within 
Religion 
20.8% 7.4% 0.0% 50.0% 16.5% 
Total Count 231 108 4 2 345 
% within 
Religion 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Breakdown of respondents’ views by religion on whether Islamic banking is a solution 
to corporate greed.  
  
Respondents’ answers to an open-ended question that asked them to justify their support or 
opposition to Islamic banking in the country also yielded opposing views from Christians 
and Muslims. For example, one respondent, a Christian, argued that:  
Its title “Islamic banking” is one of the foremost issues because to a layman it empowers the 
Muslims. If you want to introduce an interest free banking or push out corporate greed in the 
financial sector, why would you call it “Islamic” banking? Why not “Christian” banking also? So no 
matter the idea behind it we should be careful of issues like this so as not to offend others.  
Another Christian respondent expressed the following opinion on the introduction of Islamic 
banking in the country: 
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Islamic banking is a business and it has to compete with others in the business world. B ut the danger 
in Nigeria is that there is always a thin line between the public sector and religion whenever Islam is 
involved. There may not be a surprise if the Islamic banking, in one way or the other, gets propped -
up by the public sector funding.    
In sharp contrast to the above views, a Muslim respondent argued that: “The current 
banking system is Western/Christian; so Islamic banking is also to find a space in the same 
country.” Another Muslim respondent argued that: “The introduction of Islamic banking is a 
way of propagating and complying with the laws guiding Islam as a way of life of 
Muslims.” A third Muslim respondent maintained that Islamic banking is in tandem with: 
“The constitutional right for all citizens to pursue happiness, including the less harmful 
financial services options.” 
5.2.5. Shari’a Crisis. The adoption of Shari’a Penal Code Law (SPCL) by twelve states in 
northern Nigeria generated debate and violent clashes between Muslims and Christians from 
1999 onwards. Figure 14 shows the twelve states in where Shari’a is effectively in force. 
The application of Shari’a Islamic jurisprudence relating to civil matters involving questions 
of Islamic personal law is enshrined in the Constitution of Nigeria. The Shari’a laws passed 
by the state Houses of Assembly extended the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts beyond personal 
law to cover other offences. Two experts gave this reflection on the new Shari’a laws 
adopted by the twelve states: 
The Shari’a courts in these states have jurisdiction over several new offences beyond personal law, 
including theft, unlawful sexual intercourse, robbery, defamation, and drinking alcohol. The Shari’a 
courts may impose punishments, pursuant to the provisions of the Shari’a Penal Code Law (SPCL), 
that include death; forfeiture and destruction of property; imprisonment; detention in a reformatory; 
fine; caning (flogging); amputation; retaliation; blood money; restitution; reprimand; public 
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disclosure; boycott; exhortation; compensation; closure of premises; and warning, among others. 
(Ibrahim & Lyman, 2004, pp. 3-4).   
 
Figure 14. The Twelve Shari’a States in Nigeria. 
The study observed that Shari’a has remained one of the issues that are, time and again, 
discussed among Nigerians as a challenge to Muslim-Christian relations in the country. The 
ongoing Boko Haram insurgency, which is delved into later, has brought the question of 
Shari’a once again to the front burner. In order to gauge whether the Shari’a issue has been 
handled according to the spirit of federalism, the study posed series of questions with five 
possible answers on a Likert scale. The first question asked respondents whether they agree 
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or disagree that the adoption of Shari’a by 12 states in northern Nigeria was in line with the 
principle of federalism.      
Table 5 Views of Nigerians on Whether New Shari’a Law is In Line with 
Principle of Federalism 
  
Religion 
Total Christian Muslim 
Non-Religious/ 
Religiously 
unaffiliated Other 
Shari’a is in 
line with 
principle of 
federalism 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 10 43 0 0 53 
% within 
Religion 
4.3% 39.4% 0.0% 0.0% 15.3% 
Agree Count 27 23 2 0 52 
% within 
Religion 
11.6% 21.1% 50.0% 0.0% 15.0% 
Undecided Count 54 17 1 0 72 
% within 
Religion 
23.3% 15.6% 25.0% 0.0% 20.7% 
Disagree Count 63 15 1 2 81 
% within 
Religion 
27.2% 13.8% 25.0% 100.0% 23.3% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 78 11 0 0 89 
% within 
Religion 
33.6% 10.1% 0.0% 0.0% 25.6% 
Total Count 232 109 4 2 347 
% within 
Religion 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Breakdown according to religious affiliation of respondents’ view on whether the 
adoption of new Shari’a law is in line with the principle of federalism. 
          
As shown in Table 5, majority (60.8%) of Christian respondents viewed the adoption of the 
new Shari’a law by the twelve northern states as incompatible with the principle of 
federalism, while a majority of Muslim respondents (60.5%) were of the opinion that it was 
in line with the principle of federalism. When asked whether Shari’a undermines the 
religious freedom of non-Muslims, respondents were divided in their opinions as shown in 
Table 6. Majority of Christian respondents (75.9%), out of which about half (49.6%) 
strongly, were of the opinion that Shari’a undermines the religious freedom of non-Muslims, 
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while majority of Muslim respondents (65.8%) did not think Shari’a infringes on the 
religious liberty of non-Muslims.     
Table 6 Nigerians’ Views on Whether Shari’a Undermines Religious Freedom 
of Non-Muslims 
  
Religion 
Total Christian Muslim 
Non-Religious/ 
Religiously 
unaffiliated Other 
Undermines 
Religious 
Freedom of 
non-Muslims 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 115 17 1 2 135 
% within 
Religion 
49.6% 15.7% 25.0% 100.0% 39.0% 
Agree Count 61 8 1 0 70 
% within 
Religion 
26.3% 7.4% 25.0% 0.0% 20.2% 
Undecided Count 30 12 0 0 42 
% within 
Religion 
12.9% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 
Disagree Count 19 30 2 0 51 
% within 
Religion 8.2% 27.8% 50.0% 0.0% 14.7% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 7 41 0 0 48 
% within 
Religion 
3.0% 38.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.9% 
Total Count 232 108 4 2 346 
% within 
Religion 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Breakdown according to religious affiliation of respondents’ views on whether 
Shari’a undermines the religious freedom of non-Muslims. 
  
The study also examined respondents’ perception about the motive behind the adoption of 
Shari’a by the twelve states. Again, the result, as shown in Table 7, indicates divergent 
views between Christians and Muslims. A significant majority (76.6%) of Christian 
respondents perceived that the motive behind the adoption of the new Shari’a law by the 
twelve states was to expand the influence of Islam in the country, while a majority of 
Muslim respondents (63.0%) did not agree that this was the motive behind the 
implementation of Shari’a by the twelve states.   
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Table 7 Nigerians' Perception on Whether the Motive of the New Shari’a Law 
was to Expand the Influence of Islam in the Country 
  
Religion 
Total Christian Muslim 
Non-Religious/ 
Religiously 
unaffiliated Other 
Shari’a 
meant to 
expand the 
political 
influence 
of Islam 
Strongly 
agree 
Count 98 11 1 1 111 
% within 
Religion 
42.4% 10.2% 25.0% 50.0% 32.2% 
Agree Count 79 9 1 0 89 
% within 
Religion 
34.2% 8.3% 25.0% 0.0% 25.8% 
Undecided Count 26 20 2 1 49 
% within 
Religion 
11.3% 18.5% 50.0% 50.0% 14.2% 
Disagree Count 18 34 0 0 52 
% within 
Religion 
7.8% 31.5% 0.0% 0.0% 15.1% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 10 34 0 0 44 
% within 
Religion 
4.3% 31.5% 0.0% 0.0% 12.8% 
Total Count 231 108 4 2 345 
% within 
Religion 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note. Breakdown of respondents’ perceptions according to religious affiliations on whether 
the motive behind the adoption of new Shari’a law was to expand the influence of Islam in 
the country.  
 
As the Shari’a debate in the country has sometimes been framed around the question of 
whether Nigeria is a secular or non-secular state, the study asked respondents whether the 
adoption of Shari’a was a pushback against secularism and Western influence. As Figure 15 
shows, overwhelming majority of Christian respondents shared the view that the adoption of 
the new Shari’a law by the twelve states was a strategy aimed at pushing back against the 
incursion of secularism and Western cultural influence. Muslim respondents were split on 
this question, with 41.6% agreeing, 34.3 disagreeing and 24.1% undecided on the 
suggestion that the adoption of the new Shari’a law was a pushback against secularism and 
Western cultural influence.     
258 
 
 
Figure 15. Nigerians' Perceptions according to religious affiliations on 
whether the adoption of new Shari’a law was a pushback against secularism 
and Western Influence. 
5.3. Boko Haram Insurgency. Boko Haram is the name given to an insurgent group, 
which claimed to be fighting to establish proper Shari’a according to the injunctions of the 
Quran, and to create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria. The group’s real name is Jama'atu 
Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s 
Teachings and Jihad). The group’s existence became known around 2002, although it was 
widely believed that the group’s formation might have begun even few years earlier. The 
study has observed the development of the Boko Haram insurgency and the challenge it 
posed to the Nigerian federalism in the last three years. This effort involved talking to 
259 
 
people living in the locations affected by the insurgency, including several respondents in 
the spiritual home of Boko Haram, Maiduguri, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The opportunity to speak directly with victims of 
the insurgency, and to participate in channelling relief materials and facilitating resettlement 
of victims, irrespective of their religious affiliations, through the Madagali-Gwoza Relief 
Efforts coordinated by Mr. Markus Gamache, a staff of the Church of the Brethren, Nigeria 
[Ekklesiyan Yan’uwa a Nigeria – EYN], with the support of the S.H.A.R.E. Foundation and 
the Balingen District Church, Germany, gave the researcher insights into the devastations 
inflicted on communities by the Boko Haram insurgency. Furthermore, the study examined 
the Boko Haram phenomenon by following the coverage of the insurgency in both 
mainstream and social media as well as watching videos occasionally released to the public 
by the group.  
  Boko Haram has metamorphosed from a little known sect to a dreaded insurgent 
group that has not only sustained fighting, but has also captured large swathes of territory 
and declared a caliphate (Punch, 2014, August 15). Boko Haram abducted more than 200 
young secondary school girls from Government Secondary School, Chibok in Borno State. 
More than six months since the news of the abduction shocked the world, 219 of the school 
girls remain missing. The efforts of the Nigerian Government and the international 
community have failed to secure the release of the girls. In a recent video released by the 
leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, he claimed that the girls, most of them Christians, 
have converted to Islam and were married off (Daily Trust, 2014, October 31). 
 Boko Haram was transformed from a sect to a terrorist group after 2009.  Dr. Ahmad 
Murtada of the Islamic Studies Department of Bayero University, Kano, has produced a 
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document, Boko Haram in Nigeria: Its Beginnings, Principles and Activities in Nigeria,” in 
which the scholar gave the most extensive background and analysis on Boko Haram that the 
study came across. Dr. Murtada’s work was based on the analysis of Boko Haram’s original 
writings, audio and video statements, in Arabic and Hausa. Boko Haram declared that its 
mission was to overthrow the Nigerian state, create an Islamic state in northern Nigeria 
governed by strict Islamic Shari’a law, abolish Western mode of education and eradicate 
Western influence. Dr. Murtada enumerated the following as the main principles of Boko 
Haram extracted from the teachings of the group, especially its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, 
who was killed extra-judiciaally in hands of the police during the groups first major 
confrontation with security forces in Maiduguri in 2009  (Murtada, 2012, p. 16-18):  
 Affirming Hakimiyyah for Allah only (highest political, legal and supreme 
authority belongs to God), and that democracy totally conflicts with Islam. 
Thus, the group holds politicians who participate in the democratic process as 
kuffar (infidel). 
 Members of the Boko Haram movement view themselves as the Firqat un-
Naji’ah (the saved sect), and are convinced that “they are reviving the spirit of 
jihad in Nigeria.” 
 Prohibit studying in the educational system because they believe: (a) the schools 
were established by missionaries as means of propagating Christianity in 
Nigeria. They argue that Islamic system of education had predated Western 
education in Nigeria, but it was relegated to the background after colonialists 
took over the country. Hence, Western influence has taken over all aspects of 
life, especially the education system, and Muslims are gradually corrupted by it 
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to become unbelievers. (b) The Western educational system allows mixing of 
the genders and un-Islamic mode of dressings. (c) Certain subjects, ideas and 
theories, such as Darwinist theory of evolution and the idea that rain is formed 
through the precipitation of condensed atmospheric water vapour, conflict with 
the teachings of Islam. 
 Boko Haram forbids employment under the present democratic Nigerian 
government in any capacity, including working for the security services or 
public service. Working for the government amounts to a total obedience to a 
system that is not in line with Allah’s teachings.  
In several interviews, Mohammed Yusuf affirmed those principles. For example in an 
interview with the BBC before he was killed, Mohammed Yusuf upheld those principles 
outlined by Murtada. 
 Boko Haram has now assumed a dimension that Nigerians described as “mysterious.”  
Since the killing of the sect’s founder in 2009, the movement resurfaced as a terrorist group 
carrying out attacks in different parts of northern Nigeria: they launched a wave of attacks 
against government and security targets; carried out bombing attacks against Christian 
churches and killing Christian worshippers; targeted and attacked Christian homes and 
pastors residences; attacked mosques and killed Muslim clerics, who spoke against their 
activities; planted bombs and killed unsuspecting members of the public, irrespective of 
religion, in major cities across the north and the FCT; bombed the UN building in Abuja; 
attacked the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja; staged several jail breaks to free their 
detained members; and engaged in intercepting and attacking motorists and commuters on 
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highways. The transformation of Boko Haram from an Islamic to fundamentalist movement 
to a full blown insurgent group, as observed by the study, is shown in Figure 16.   
 
Figure 16. Boko Haram model of insurgency. This illustrates the mission and 
changing patterns of operation of the group from 2010 to 2014. 
The Boko Haram insurgency has led to the displacement of many people across Borno, 
Adamawa and Yobe States. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
reported that the insurgency has spilled over of refugees into neighbouring Cameroon and 
Niger, where more than thousands of Nigerian refugees have sought asylum (UNHCR, 
2014, October 31). Further, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) has 
reported that as at 5
th
 June 2014, over 250,000 people had been internally displaced by the 
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Boko Haram insurgency (International Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013, June 5). The 
number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) would have increased considerably since 
between July and November 2014 Boko Haram captured more territories and forced more 
people to flee.   
 The relentlessness of the insurgents and their ability to hold ground against the 
Nigerian military have made many Nigerians to think that there is more to it than meets the 
eye. There are many speculations making round in private and public discourse that include 
suggestions that Boko Haram: is now a franchise used by sundry groups to pursue different 
objectives; was created by politicians who at one time needed the support of the group to 
propel themselves to political positions and later dumped the group; may be a tool in the 
hand of northern politicians, who have vowed to make Nigeria ungovernable for President 
Jonathan for violating the ruling party’s power rotation agreement between the north and 
south; may be a device used by the government to wreak havoc on the north; may be part of 
an Muslims’ agenda of getting rid of Christians in the north; and may be part of a global 
jihad waged by Islamists in different parts of the world. Study observed that the targets of 
the insurgents and patterns of their operation only cast cloud of mystery than prove any of 
the speculations right. The Nigerian federation is today territorially divided, with some 
portion of the country under the occupation of the insurgents, while government forces 
continue to battle to regain control.          
5.4. Ethno-Religious Identity Politics. Another area that the study examined to 
understand the prevailing political culture of federalism was identity politics. Identity 
politics has been observed to be a source of inter-group tension and violence in Nigeria. It is 
not a new phenomenon, but recent trends have been observed to heighten disunity among 
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Nigerians. Through participant observation, the study gained insights into the views of 
Nigerians concerning the implication of identity in Nigerian politics. The study observed in 
private and public conversations that in many instances when people expressed their 
preference for a particular candidate they based their support or choice on such identities as 
religion, ethnicity and region. This trend was observed specifically with regard to general 
elections in which candidates vie for positions at the federal level. This situation was 
observed in the political discourse leading to the 2011 presidential election and the results, 
and the post-election violence that occurred.  
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Figure 17. Results of the 2011 Presidential Election according to states won 
by leading candidates. 
The results of the 2011 presidential election shown in Figure 17 indicate the following 
patterns: The candidate of the ruling party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), who was 
the winner of the election, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan (58.89%), won all the states in southern 
Nigeria, except Osun State, and got seven states in the north as well as the FCT. The 
candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), who came second with 31.98%, 
General Mohammadu Buhari (rtd), a former military Head of State, won all the 12 Shari’a 
states in the north. Osun State was won by the candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria 
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(ACN), a retired police officer and former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu. President Jonathan is a Christian from the Ijaw 
minority ethnic group in the country’s oil-rich South-South, while Buhari is a Muslim from 
the Fulani ethnic group of the North-West.  
 As soon as the results were announced that Jonathan has won the presidential 
election, riots broke out in the twelve Shari’a states. A report by Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) documented that more than 800 people were killed (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 
May 17). A senior researcher at the HRW, Corinne Dufka, drew this conclusion about the 
elections: “The April elections were heralded among the fairest in Nigeria’s history, but 
they also were among the bloodiest” (Human Rights Watch, 2011, May 17, para. 3). The 
HRW’s report on the post-elections violence gave the following account of what happened:  
The presidential election divided the country along ethnic and religious lines. As election results 
trickled in on April 17, and it became clear that Buhari had lost, his supporters took to the streets of 
northern towns and cities to protest what they alleged to be the rigging of the results.  
 The protesters started burning tires, and the protests soon turned into riots. The rioting 
quickly degenerated into sectarian and ethnic bloodletting across the northern states. Muslim rioters 
targeted and killed Christians and members of ethnic groups from southern Nigeria, who were 
perceived to have supported the ruling party, burning their churches, shops, and homes. The rioters 
also attacked police stations and ruling party and electoral commission offices. In predominately 
Christian communities in Kaduna State, mobs of Christians retaliated by killing Muslims and burning 
their mosques and properties. (Human Rights Watch, 2011, May 17, para. 4 -5).  
 During the electioneering campaigns, the study observed that political discourses 
were laced with ethnic, religious and sectional sentiments. The background of this situation 
goes back to 2010 when President Umaru Musa Yar’adua died in office. President Yar’adua 
was a Muslim and a Fulani from Katsina State in the North-West. Following Yar’adua’s 
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death, the then Vice President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, was sworn in as President on May 6, 
2010. Some northern politicians and groups found this development unsettling and protested 
that the tenure of Yar’adua was a northern slot, and a northerner should have been made his 
replacement rather than Dr. Jonathan. For example, a leading politician from the north, who 
was a former Minister of Finance and Agriculture, Mallam Adamu Ciroma, insisted that 
under the agreement on rotational presidency, a northerner should have completed 
Yar’adua’s tenure. Ciroma was quoted in the Punch newspaper reiterating his position 
(Isenyo, 2014, August 9, para. 4-5): 
I was there when the party was moving the presidency between the north and the south. And this 
President was there when General (Olusegun) Obasanjo presided over the agreement in the PDP, 
which agreed that the movement of the Presidency from the North to South should be based on two 
terms. 
 President Obasanjo did his two terms on behalf of the South, and Yar’adua was doing his 
first term on behalf of the North but unfortunately, he died. And the PDP leaders, instead of agreeing 
on somebody from the North to complete Yar’adua’s term, they all went to ensure that the Vice 
President became the President; and since the leaders we made agreement with departed from th is 
agreement, I lost interest in Nigerian political affairs.                   
As President Jonathan declared intention to contest election to seek full term in the 
presidency, opposition by northern groups continued to grow. A group led by Mallam 
Adamu Ciroma, Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLF), sought and came up with a 
northern consensus candidate, the former Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, a Muslim and 
Fulani from Adamawa State, as their anointed aspirant (Vanguard, 2010, November 22). 
The NPLF appointed a committee of “wise men” to screen northern presidential aspirants of 
the ruling party and to select a consensus candidate. The committee vetted the following 
contenders before arriving at the choice of one: former military President, Ibrahim 
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Babangida; former National Security Adviser and now Minister of Defence, Aliyu Gusau; 
former Kwara State Governor and a serving senator, Bukola Saraki; and Atiku Abubakar.  
 
Figure 18. The official North-South political division of Nigeria. 
 The opposition of the NPLF to Mr. Jonathan’s presidential aspiration and their 
decision to field a northern consensus candidate irked politicians from other parts of the 
country. For example, a group known as Goodluck Jonathan for Nigeria 2011 decried the 
action of the NPLF as capable of worsening the North-South dichotomy. The political 
division of the country into North and South is shown in Figure 18. In a news conference, 
the Chairman of the group in the FCT, Engr. Charles Ezeani, described the NPLF’s action as 
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“retrogressive” and counterproductive to the vision of a united and indivisible Nigeria. 
Ezeani had this to say about the NPLF’s action, according to a Sunday Trust report 
(Lazarus, 2010, December 5, para. 4): 
[I]t is lamentable that 50 years after independence, some unpatriotic and reactionary elements 
masquerading as Northern leaders are dragging the nation backwards because of their selfish design 
to wield power. These crop of ethnic jingoists have held Nigeria hostage, destroyed our quest for 
progress and innovation. Malam Ciroma has worsened the North/south divide by his action.               
Ezeani asserted that his group viewed the idea of a northern consensus candidate as a 
reminder of Nigeria’s colonial past (Lazarus, 2010, December 5, para. 5): “sadly, we regard 
the clamour to rotate the presidency in the PDP between North and South as a carryover of 
Lord Lugard’s evil and selfish amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914.”  Similarly, in an interview 
with a reporter of The Nation newspaper, Senator Chris Ukpabi, a Second Republic 
lawmaker and PDP member from Abia State, described the NPLF’s agitation for power shift 
to the north as part of a historical calculation of the north: 
It is a laughing matter. They are merely playing out a script, which had been handed over to them by 
that our respected leader from the North, Sardauna of Sokoto. That is the script they are playing out. 
On the 12
th
 of October, 1960, that highly respected sage said this nation called Nigeria is their own 
private property bequeathed to them by their great grandfather, Usman Danfodio, and that they will 
resist any change in power. Take note, he said they will resist any change in power; that the 
minorities of the North will be manipulated while the South will be regarded as conquered territory.  
 This is the script they are playing out. Unfortunately, they cannot do that. How can they be 
talking about this now after how many years of Nigeria’s independence? The Northerners have ruled 
for 38 years. Others are entitled to be there. You can’t rule for 38 years and expect others to continue 
to look at you. Nobody will take it. (Ukpabi, 2013, August 29, p. 49).      
 The notion of a northern consensus candidate was not subscribed to by groups from 
the Middle Belt. As Figure 17 shows, President Jonathan got significant support from the 
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Middle Belt during the 2011 election. Some Middle Belt groups were even claiming that the 
insecurity in the Middle Belt was a revenge being meted to them for supporting a Christian 
southerner against a northern Muslim: 
They also sees (sic) the unprecedented killings of non-Muslims in places of worship by Islamists in 
the North, and incessant raids on their communities by al leged Fulani herdsmen as some kind of  
retaliation against them for voting, almost in one bloc, for President Jonathan Goodluck, in 201 1. 
(Binniyat, 2013, August 18, para. 4).  
A recent statement in the media by a Middle Belt group, through one of its members, Aminu 
Zang, also made the same claim (The Nation, 2014, March 20): 
The Middle Belt Dialogue (MBD) yesterday reviewed the attacks on its communities by supposedly 
Fulani herdsmen and accused the North of carrying out a vengeance on the zone over its lo ss of 
power to a southerner in the 2011 presidential election.  
 In a statement by Aminu Zang, for the MBD secretariat, the group claimed to have come to 
the conclusion that its “people are being punished for asserting their right to make free choice”.  
 It claimed to have heard from a leading Fulani analyst that the ‘North’ would not forgive the 
middle belt for taking sides with President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, to defeat General 
Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner, in the 2011 presidential elections.  
 The group alleged an attempt by the Miyettt Allah Cattles breeders, of plans to cower people 
of the Middle Belt into submission by either voting for Buhari or displacing them from the middle 
belt so that they would not be able to participate in the 2015 elections. 
It was outside the scope of this study to ascertain the veracity of the above claims that there 
is a correlation between the incessant attacks on Middle Belt communities and the support 
the people of the area gave to the incumbent President, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan.  
 A renowned Islamic cleric, Sheik Ahmad Gumi acknowledged in an interview that 
northern Christians should rule out the support of northern Muslims in the event that a 
particular political party fields a northern Christian as its candidate in the 2015 elections. 
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Sheik Gumi gave the following reason: “Because the Northern Christians, unfortunately for 
them, during the 2011 election … all went to Jonathan, they need to build the confidence 
back for the northerners to show that they believe in being northerners before they will be 
taken seriously” (Blueprint, 2014, February 17, para. 3). The Christian Association of 
Nigeria (CAN) in the FCT and the 19 northern states then replied Sheik Gumi by claiming 
that northern Christians have good reason to take the stance that they took because they are 
marginalized by their Muslim counterparts when it comes to appointment into public offices 
(National Mirror, 2014, February 20). The Executive Secretary of CAN for the 19 northern 
states and the FCT, Professor Daniel Babayi, made the following statement in reaction to 
Sheik Gumi’s utterance:  
Federal Government institutions in the Northern states have since become nogo areas for northern 
Christians. We call on the Federal Character Commission members to vis it places like the Ahmadu 
Bello University Teaching Hospital, the Police Colleges and Academy’s in the North and they will 
marvel at the degree of marginalisation of Christians in such institutions. (National Mirror, 2014, 
February 20, para. 6).       
In interview with Professor Daniel Babayi on 2
nd
 September 2014, the researcher probed the 
CAN reaction to the Gumi’s statement. This question was posed to the CAN official: Does 
CAN realize that Sheik Gumi might have stated the obvious going by what happened in 
2011 and the current political reality in the north? Babayi acknowledged that yes, 
unfortunately, that is the sorry state of relationship between northern Christians and 
northern Muslims, but that the statement credited to Gumi should not have come from him 
as a cleric rather such matter should be left in the hands of politicians.       
 Again, as the 2015 general elections drew near, the drums of identity politics were 
getting louder. The former president of Ijaw Youth Council and leader of the Niger Delta 
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Volunteer Force and ex-militant, Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo, responding to threats 
credited to some northern politicians that if power does not shift to the north Nigeria will be 
made “ungovernable” also issued a threat this threat in an exclusive interview with reporters 
posted on You Tube:  
Goodluck Jonathan will complete his tenure of two terms whether they like it or not. To us they don’t 
even exist. Because we pay them; he who pays the piper dictates the tune. We pay them; we feed 
them. They are parasites; they are a burden on us. They have no reason to be with us. They have no 
reason whatsoever to be with us... these invaders must be expelled from our land.  (Dokubo, 2013, 
May 12). 
Dokubo claimed that the Niger Delta, the region that produces most of Nigeria’s oil has the 
right to have its own, President Jonathan, to rule the country for eight years.  Figure 19 
shows the Niger Delta region of the country. 
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Figure 19. Constituent states of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta is defined by 
the bill establishing the Niger Delta Development Commission as 
synonymous to oil producing states.  
In reaction to Dokubo’s threat that “there will be no peace in the country, if Jonathan is 
denied a second term,” a northern politician and former member of the House of 
Representatives, Farouk Adamu Aliyu, in an interview with Leadership newspaper insisted 
that “it is either a northerner as President in 2015 or there will be no more Nigeria”  (Aliyu, 
2013, May 7). Northern groups are still insisting that the presidency must rotate to the north 
in 2015 (The Nation, 2014, June 1). As President Jonathan has indicated intention seek re-
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election (Adetayo, 2014, October 25), northern groups, notably the Northern Elders Forum 
and the Arewa Consultative Forum, have renewed their opposition to his bid for re-election. 
The study observed that political discourse in the country in both private and public 
domains tend to focus more on the identity – religion, ethnicity and geographical region – of 
the aspirants to the office of the President rather than who is able to do the job effectively.  
5.5. Muslim-Christian Power Struggle. Another area that the study examined with 
regard to the religious dimension of the prevailing political culture of federalism in Nigeria 
was Muslim-Christian power struggle. Nigeria is a multi-religious state, with Christianity 
and Islam as the major religions, and there are numerous traditional religions. There was no 
census data on the religious compositions of the Nigerian population. As a result, the 
estimates that were out there are contestable. Hence, it has become common to see each of 
the two major religious communities, Christians and Muslims, claiming to be the majority. 
It has been observed that it was in view of the sensitive nature of this contestation over 
which religious community is the majority in the country that the federal government 
decided to leave out religion and ethnicity in the last general census, which was conducted 
in 2006 (Otaru, 2014, October 20).  
 Several interviews with various social groups, including heads of churches and 
mosques, leaders of Christian and Muslim umbrella organisations, and women and youth 
groups, gave insights into the nature of Christian-Muslim relations and power struggle in the 
country. A senior leader of one of the major Muslim umbrella organisations described the 
situation as: “The sorry state of relationship between Muslims and Christians in this 
country.” Many respondents divulged that in the past the relationship between the adherents 
of the two major religions was not always characterised by tension and conflicts as it is 
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today. The same religious leader who described the relationship today as a “sorry state” of 
affairs, also characterised the past relationship as generally “amicable and affable,” with 
both sides “accepting the plurality of the Nigerian community.”  For this leader, and many 
other respondents, it was the return of the country to a democratic dispensation in 1999 that 
ushered in an era of politics wherein the “quest for power,” “quest for economic 
dominancy” and “competition between the two major faiths” have become the order of the 
day. Many Christian leaders also agreed that the relationship between the two faiths had 
been quite cordial and peaceful in the past. However, there were other respondents that 
claimed that Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria had always being characterised by 
mutual suspicion and the desire by one religion to dominate and proselytise.  
 The study inquired into the understanding of each religious community of what has 
made Muslim-Christian relations more problematic nowadays. The concerns and 
perceptions of each side are presented here. For instance, a respondent, a Bishop of one of 
the oldest denominations in the country, claimed that Muslims have an agenda to Islamize 
the country. The study found this perception to be common among majority of Christian 
respondents. The Bishop, for example, expressed his perception as follows: 
I believe that there is a target they are working towards achieving. The truth of the matter is that 
what we have seen in recent time is Islamization of Nigeria. That agenda of Islamization of Nigeria 
is working. And I think we must be able to build trust, peace and give level plain ground for Mu slims 
to play their religion and for Christians to play their religion. Otherwise, where one person thinks he 
must dominate, we are in problem. We are all aware of the issue of OIC [Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation]. We are all aware Nigeria registered as a member of OIC, and that is the indication of 
Islamization agenda.  
There was also a perception among Christians that the country was being projected as a 
Muslim country, and that Muslims were seeking to impose their religion on the country. For 
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instance, in a newspaper article entitled “Minister Nurudeen’s ‘Islamic Republic of 
Nigeria,’” Ochereome Nnanna, a columnist and deputy chairman of the Editorial Board of 
Vanguard newspaper, argued that the registration of Nigeria as a member of the OIC 
effectively creates the image that Nigeria is an Islamic country (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, 
para. 2-4): 
The surreptitious, nocturnal, and unconstitutional enrolment of Nigeria into that Islamic forum 
effectively put this country out as an “Islamic country”, at leas t by perception, though our 
Constitution is unequivocal that we are multi-religious without an official state religion.  
 The more appropriate thing was for our Moslem community, perhaps through the Nigeria 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, NSCIA, with the Sultan of Sokot (sic) as its head, to register 
with the OIC, attend its meetings, participate in its conventions and pocket all the benefits it is touted 
to heap upon its members. 
 That way, non-Muslims would not be bothered since the Christians also have their own 
international affiliations through their various church organs.  
Nnanna was commenting on the misunderstanding that arose after the Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nurudeen Mohammed, was alleged to have made a statement at a 
meeting of OIC in Saudi Arabia to the effect that Nigeria is an “Islamic State with the 
largest Christian population.” Christians, led by CAN President, condemned the purported 
statement. However, Dr. Mohammed clarified his position on the matter by stating that he 
was misquoted (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 8):  
What I did say rather (among other things) was, ‘The King had extended invitation to the fifty seven -
member states of the OIC, including his colleague and brother, Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, who 
mandated the Vice President to sit in for Nigeria…we are the largest Islamo-Christian country 
[emphasis added] in the world…  
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 The newspaper columnist was not only unsatisfied with the clarification given by the 
Minister, but found it even unsettling that the Saudi King and President Jonathan were 
referred to as brothers (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 10):  
Describing Jonathan as the king’s “brother and colleague” reminds one of Boko Haram’s demands 
that Jonathan must convert to Islam before they will stop their cowardly campaigns of terror. That 
Jonathan has become a “brother” to the king of the Muslim world could only be inferred from 
Nigeria’s membership of the OIC! In other words, though Mohammed denies calling Nigeria an 
Islamic nation, he names our President as one of the Muslim brothers! That does not look to me like 
much of a denial!    
Again, Nnanna raised issue with the Minister’s description of Nigeria as an “Islamo -
Christian country,” and insisted that Nigeria is constitutionally a secular state  (para. 11): 
Mohammed’s description of Nigeria as an “Islamo-Christian country” is a total misnomer and 
negation of our Constitution. He has dressed this country in borrowed robes. Nigeria is a secular 
country [emphasis added], not in the sense that it does not believe that God reigns in its affairs but in 
the sense that it has no official state religion. Nigeria is a country where all religions that respect our 
constitutional sovereignty are welcome to practice freely, but with a special preferential treatment for 
Christianity and Islam, the two majority religions. That does not make her an “Islamo -Christian” 
country, whatever the Minister means by that!  
In a focus group with a state leadership of a Christian umbrella organisation, one 
respondent, a lawyer and an official from the south, put the claim that Muslims were trying 
to impose their religion on the country as follows: 
The projecting that the whole Nigeria is a Muslim country, disregarding that the Middle Belt is 
Christian and the south is predominantly Christian, would not bring peace to this country. Since 
Nigeria got independence, there are lots of signs that you can make reference to that one religion 
wants to impose itself on the country.       
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Another issue that Christians also point out as indicative of the dominance of Islam in the 
country is the occurrence of the words “Islamic” and “Shari’a” in the Nigerian Constitution. 
For example, a leader of a Christian group, asserted that:  
The truth is, I can see, that there is basically something wrong with our constitution. If you check it 
most of the mention about religion has to do with Shari’a, but you would hardly hear anything about 
Christianity. So it means that Christians are second class citizens. Why must it be so? Because they 
are still insisting that Nigeria must be an Islamic country.     
The perception that the Nigerian Constitution was skewed in favour of Muslims took a 
centre state during the recently concluded National Conference. It was reported in local 
media that two representatives of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Bishop of Kafachan 
Diocese of Catholic Church, Joseph Bagobiri and Pastor Emmanuel Bosun from Ogun State 
contended that the way the constitution was skewed in favour of Islam and Muslims is 
unfair to Christians and Christianity in the country (Ogundele & Olokor, 2014, April 3). The 
Christian leaders decried that the Nigerian Constitution did not have a mention of the words 
“Christianity” and “church,” but “Islam” was repeatedly mentioned. The Christian argument 
was rebutted by Muslims, who argued that the Nigerian Constitution itself was a Christian 
document. For example, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, Argungu Usman 
Mohammed, contended that the Christian’s claim was baseless because, in his opinion, all 
courts in Nigeria, with the exception of Shari’a and customary courts, applied the Christian 
law. The media report quoted Justice Mohammed’s argument as follows (Ogundele & 
Olokor, 2014, April 3): 
When the British conquered northern Nigeria, they met two rel igions in that part of the country. 
Islamic and the customary religions were in place. They introduced their own common law. Common 
law is of Christian origin. They also introduced statute of general application which is also Christian 
law. They made these three laws to work together. They brought some provisions of the Islamic and 
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Customary laws which they said were contrary to principle of natural justice, equity and good 
conscience. The laws have continued to exist together.  
 I became a magistrate in 1966 and rose up to Supreme Court. I am an Islamic scholar. As a 
magistrate, I worked with the common law. As a High Court Judge, I worked with the common law.  
 I was at the Court of Appeal as a Justice of the common law and a justice of the Shariah.  
 A misleading report was given yesterday. To say that Nigerian constitution is an Islamic law 
is absolutely wrong. Nigerian Constitution is Christian. 
 Another divisive issue brought up by several Christian respondents was the question 
of almajiri model schools supported by the federal government. The Almajiri is a term that 
is used in northern Nigeria to refer to a Quranic pupil or student, who has been sent to 
another location to acquire Islamic education under a Quranic teacher. The children, who 
are often quite young, are sent hundreds of kilometres far from home and entrusted into the 
custody of Quaranic teachers (mallams). The almajiris are taught how to memorise the 
Quran. The description below by a reporter gives the background to why government 
stepped in to modernise the almajiri system: 
Normally, the Mallam or Islamic teacher is given a number of children to be tutored in Islamic 
knowledge: He moves these children away to a distant community in the urban centre. Thus, with the 
use of the whip and religious indoctrination by the Mallam, assisted by the old pupils, the Almajiris 
are made to quickly adjust to the new realities of their lives. The Almajiri, who is equipped with a 
bowl and clad in dirty clothing, move around begging for alms and food on the streets. 
 Similarly, the almajiri boys till the Mallam’s farms and feed his livestock and sometimes 
render domestic services and menial chores to various households in exchange for food and stipends. 
But the system was abused because when a child is in need, the Mallam sends him out to fend for 
himself and look for food and these kids engage in all sorts of things. These children are exposed to a 
different way of life and this exposure is happening to these Almajiris at a period when they are most 
vulnerable. So, left at the mercy of the vagaries of the streets, these adolescent kids with no parental 
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or social guidance are more likely to become social misfits with the likelihood of drifting into a life 
of crime. 
 The Mallam is not equipped financially to handle the functional needs of these kids, who are 
mostly between the ages of five and 15. The sheer number of the kids under him has already 
overwhelmed him and this is where the social disconnect sets in. (Aminu, 2012, April 12 , para. 3-5). 
It was due to the concern about the welfare and safety of the children that are enrolled in the 
almajiris system and the social problems associated with the almajiri phenomenon that 
some northern States and the Federal Government decided to introduce initiatives of 
creating modern almajiri schools. President Goodluck Jonathan supported the initiative and 
inaugurated the Almajiri Model Primary School in Sokoto. During the inauguration, the 
President declared the reason behind the initiative as follows (Aminu, 2012, April 11, para. 
6): 
We feel that we must modernise the almajiri system. The fact that majority of these children do not 
attend conventional education makes it worrisome. It was in view of that that I directed the minister 
of education to design an intervention programme for the Federal Government and states to address 
the issue.       
The President also noted that that there were about 9.5 million children in the almajiri 
system in the country, out of which the North-West alone accounts for more than 60% of the 
total population of almajiris in the country. The executive secretary of the Universal Basic 
Education Commission (UBEC), Dr. Dikko Suleiman stated on 16
th
 September 2014 that so 
far, the federal government has spent ₦8.5 billion (five billion naira) in equipping 154 
Almajiri schools, and that the annual Almajiri school enrolment stood at 17,000 (Vanguard, 
2014, September 16).  
 Many Christian respondents decried that the almajiris are vulnerable and likely to be 
used by conflict instigators, but they also opposed the initiative of the federal government in 
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helping to modernize the system and to take the children out of the streets. The Christian 
respondents that opposed the initiative insisted that since the federal government was 
putting resources into the initiative, the gesture should also be extended to their community, 
even though there is no similar system from the Christian side. For example, one respondent 
put their demand as follows: 
That the almajiri schools should be introduced in the north; we are saying what about our children? 
We have our children that are also less privileged. Christian children also need attention; and nothing 
has been done about it. I think it is a serious conflict driver. Why should the y institute something in 
the north, and the Christians too have less privileged children that need such attention, and nothing 
has been done?    
In an interview with a newspaper, the president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, 
Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, also expressed similar view about the almajiri school project 
(Oritsejafor, 2013, July 27, para. 8): 
Actually, in my opinion, Christians are being treated as second class citizens in virtually every way! 
Let me give you some examples because if I begin to tell you everything, you will not even have 
space to publish it. In the education sector, Almajiri schools are being built everywhere in many 
states of the North.  I don’t know how many of such schools, but everybody knows that in 2012, the 
Federal Government spent N5 billion to construct Almajiri schools.  
 The Almajiri schools are exclusively for Muslim children. There are millions of Christian 
children who cannot go to those schools. How are we giving those Christian children the same 
opportunity to be educated?  So automatically they have been made second class citizens.  
 Don’t forget that the schools which Christians used their money to build were taken over by 
government and the same government is using public funds to build special schools for Almaji ri 
Muslims. That shows that Christians are just second class citizens.  
 Government is running all those schools taken from Christians the way they want. Both 
Christians and Muslim go to those schools but the Almajiri schools are exclusively for Muslim 
children only. 
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According to the executive secretary of UBEC, besides the ₦8.5 billion that the federal 
government spent on Almajiri Model Schools, the government also spent ₦12 billion on 
building and equipping 30 schools under the girl-child education programme, and ₦6.4 
billion was spent on 74 schools for out of school boys (Vanguard, 2014, September 16). The 
girl-child and out of school education programmes are meant for everyone irrespective of 
religion. However, the Christian respondents did not acknowledge that, and raised issue 
with the almajiri school initiative. 
 Other complaints of marginalization of Christians raised by the CAN leader in the 
interview with Vanguard included: underrepresentation of Christians in government owned 
media houses, particularly the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA); “illegality” of Islamic 
banking; discrimination against Christians in admission into tertiary schools; ban on 
teaching of CRK (Christian Religious Knowledge) in public schools in some northern states; 
abduction and forceful conversion of Christian girls; and denial of Christians of the VC 
chair (Vice Chancellor position) of Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), Zaria. There were also 
some people who also point at the Arabic inscriptions on the Nigerian currencies as 
indication of Islamic influence on the country. For example, Nnanna argued that “the Arewa 
figurines and Arabic inscriptions (Ajami) on our N100, N200, N500 and N1000 currency 
notes; inscriptions known only to Northern Muslims which, for all I know, are making 
constitutionally objectionable proclamations” (Nnanna, 2012, August 30, para. 13).         
 Muslim respondents also expressed concern about some issues with regard to 
Muslim-Christian relations in the country. For example, some Muslim respondents asserted 
that Christians have a tendency to dominate in the area of politics. One respondent, a leader 
of a state chapter of a Muslim umbrella organisation, stated this:  
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It seems that from the Christian side there is always a tendency to dominate in terms of politics. May 
be they know the importance of governance, government and what it means in terms of patronage 
and what have you. Already key sectors like the security forces, the economy, and what have you, 
everything is completely in the hands of the Christians. I am giving all this to tell you the palpable 
fear in the minds of Muslims generally.          
In 2013, the House of Representatives had to intervene by ordering its Committee on 
Defence to look into the allegations of religious and ethnic lopsidedness in admission into 
the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). The Committee was ordered to carry out a forensic 
audit of admission process at the NDA for the past 10 years with a view to determining the 
veracity of the allegations that the Muslim community was “short-changed” (House of 
Representatives, 2013, October 24).  
 In a joint statement published in the Daily Trust newspaper, the Supreme Council of 
Shariah in Nigeria and the Council of Imams and Ulama of Kaduna State chapters decried 
that: “The result clearly shows that Muslims of Nigeria were systematically marginal ized, a 
plan we foresee is intended to gradually get rid of our Muslim youths from the armed forces 
and other security agencies in Nigeria” (Krish & Sule, 2013, October 24, para. 4). 
 The Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) released a rebut tal on the 
8
th
 October 2013 to the claim of marginalization of Christians by the president of the 
Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). In that statement, the highest Muslim umbrella 
organisation in the country, repudiated the claim by the CAN President, Pastor Ayo 
Oritsejafor, that Christians were marginalized in key appointments in the country (NSCIA, 
2013, October 8). NSCIA claimed that Muslims were the ones marginalized, citing 
examples of what the group described as: lopsidedness of recent recruitment in the Nigerian 
Defence Academy in favour of Christians – “The composition of that list through which 
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Christians dominate such admission list even in predominantly Muslim States is a clear 
reminder of ‘Rwanda Experience’” (para. 9); dominance of Christians in the composition of 
the Board of the Nigerian Television Authority; and the absence of a Muslim from southern 
Nigeria in the cabinet of the current federal government (Federal Executive Council). The 
NSCIA issued this warning to CAN: 
Given this dangerous trend and the random deliberate provocation by the current CAN President to 
add insult to injury; the NSCIA is left with no choice than to join issues with CAN by updating 
Nigerian Muslims with unassailable facts. Having tolerated CAN’s irritation for so long in the 
interest of peace and without any reciprocation, we are compelled to say ENOUGH IS 
ENOUGH [emphasis in original] and to henceforth resist  any unwarranted bullying and intimidation 
of Nigerian Muslims by the President of CAN... Why would anyone who claims to be a religious 
leader want to lead Nigeria into the ugly spectre of a religious war through belligerent utterances and 
false allegations just to gain vainglorious self-assertiveness? (NSCIA, 2013, October 8, para. 12).   
The Sultan of Sokoto and president-general of the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic 
Affairs (NSCIA) was reported in the media as saying, during a national prayer session 
organised by the NSCIA on the security situation in the country, that (The Nation, 2014, 
May 26, para. 8):  
The Muslims feel rightly so marginalised, the Muslims feel not being treated equally as equals in this 
country. Therefore, the Muslims want and also demand being treated with equality, justice and 
fairness and Insha Allah, things will turn around and be better for our country.        
The statement credited to the Sultan drew reaction from both the Muslim and Christian side.  
The Sunday Independent newspaper sampled the opinion of eminent Muslim and Christian 
leaders on the matter. For example, Dr. Mahfouz A. Adedimeji, the secretary-general of the 
University of Ilorin Muslim Community, defended the Sultan’s position by asserting that the 
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marginalization of Muslims in the country was obvious. Adedimeji argued that (Sunday 
Independent, 2014, June 8, para. 21-23): 
Muslims who constitute 50 per cent of the Nigerian population, according to the current edition of 
the CIA World Factbook, are about 38 per cent of the delegates in the ongoing national Conference. 
At a programme in Kaduna about two months ago, the Vice-President on behalf of the President said 
the membership would be reviewed or reconstituted to address the actual marginalization and 
lopsidedness in the composition. 
 This followed the complaint of the Muslims under the aegis of the Nigerian Supre me 
Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). Nothing has been done since then. The Federal Government 
itself knows that Muslims are being marginalised.  
 Muslims feel it though others may not think so. Horace Walpole said, “Life is a tragedy for 
those who feel but a comedy to those who think”. So those who do not think Muslims are 
marginalised do [not] feel what they are undergoing, how their communities are turned to battle -
fronts, how 3,335 corpses were deposited, as reported by the Associated Press, in only one hospital 
by the military in the first half of a year in Maiduguri.  
 Other complaints of marginalization of Muslims, according to Adedimeji, included: 
underrepresentation of Muslims in the appointments of special advisers and heads of federal 
government agencies and parastatals; replacement of Muslims in positions in many sectors 
by Christians – “when a Muslim completes his tenure in a position, he is often replaced by a 
Christian” (para. 25); underrepresentation of Muslims in appointments for chairmanship and 
membership of Boards of parastatals, such as Nigerian Television Authority, Voice of 
Nigeria, Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria, National Orientation Agency and Nigerian 
Films Corporation.  
 Another concern that was brought up by several Muslim respondents was what they 
described as the competition between the two religions. For example, one respondent, a 
Muslim leader, described the competition in the following way:  
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Islam is a complete way of life. There are certain things the Quran and the Hadith asked us to do, 
which are not in Christianity, but by the time you start to do them they would create conflict. Take 
for example, Muslims are supposed to pray five times a day whether we are at home or at work. So 
there are times when you are working in a place and you want to have a place, mosque, to pray. And 
that one can create conflict. Some Christians pray in the morning and some don’t bother to pray even 
in the afternoon, but because of that jealousy now they start look for a place to pray. So in atte mpt to 
get a place for Muslims to pray it creates problem. There is now an issue in one of the universities in 
the south, where there are more than five churches with pastors. They deny the Muslims place to 
build their mosque, just a place where they are going to pray.                 
Another area that Muslims perceived competition was pilgrimage. Muslims go to Hajj, 
while Christians go to Jerusalem. One Muslim respondent, an official of a Muslim umbrella 
organisation, asserted that:  
Look at pilgrimage alone. We are enjoined to visit Hajj at least once in our life time. There is 
nowhere in the Bible they [Christians] are asked to go to Jerusalem. Is not there, but because of 
jealousy they have also come up with a justification to look for government sponsor ship to visit 
Jerusalem. In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, it was not there; of recent they had to come up with the 
idea that since Muslims are going to Hajj let us find way so that we can visit Jerusalem. So if you 
obstruct that process there would be crisis. And they use state resources to do their own, even though 
we are hardly or not even using government resources to do Hajj.  
When some Christian leaders in a focus group discussion were asked if it was obligatory for 
Christians to go on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, they could not give a unified answer. One 
participant asserted that it was obligatory and that those who thought otherwise were 
ignorant of the Bible. Some participants tried to give justifications outside the position of 
the Bible, while others were not sure of the answer.  
 It was observed by the study that all tiers of government, including local Government 
councils, state governments and federal government, have been sponsoring citizens to go on 
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pilgrimage with state resources. At the state level, there are Pilgrims’ Welfare Boards. In 
some instances, there are separate Christian Pilgrim Welfare Board and Muslim Pilgrim 
Welfare Board. At the federal level, there are National Hajj Commission of Nigeria 
(NAHCON) and Nigerian Christian Pilgrim Commission (NCPC), which were both 
established by Acts of the parliament and fully funded by the Nigerian State. The two 
bodies report to the President of the Federal Republic. The study observed that despite the 
laid down procedure for sponsoring pilgrims, especially the application of the federal 
character, the selection of beneficiaries was at the discretion of the chief executive of each 
tier of government and those within the corridors of power. The study also observed that 
majority of the beneficiaries tend to be: politicians, their families and associates; religious 
leaders and their families; traditional rulers; and members of the society, who are directly or 
indirectly close to government’s functionaries. The governments usually pay for airlifting of 
pilgrims and living costs in the Holy Lands, and give them pocket allowance.  The 
Appropriation Bill 2014 of the Federal Government allocated the sum of ₦1,800,000,000 
for Muslim and Christian pilgrimage (Federal Government of Nigeria, 2014). This amount 
did not include the cost that each of the 36 State Governments, Federal Capital Territory and 
Local Government Councils would spend on pilgrimage from their respective budgets. 
 The study also observed that apart from the spending on pilgrimage, governments 
spend money on the celebration of religious festivities. For example, political officeholders 
give out gifts to religious leaders and religious communities during Christmas and Eid al-
Fitr celebrations. The study observed that some of the items given out by politicians during 
the religious festivities include rice, cows, money and clothes. In one office of  the Christian 
Association of Nigeria, the study observed many bags of rice, which bore the logo of one of 
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the political parties and the picture and name of a Muslim State Governor in 
commemoration of the end of the Ramadan, were stored. Christian Governors also 
reciprocate the gesture. Few examples of the government spending on religious festivities 
and activities reported in the media include: “Plateau Government Spends ₦42 Million on 
Eid-el-Kabir Gifts for Muslims” (Leadership, 2013, October 15); “Sokoto Government 
Earmarks ₦175 Million for Ramadan Feeding” (Vanguard, 2014, June 20); “Sallah: Borno 
to Slaughter 540 Bulls for the Poor” (Vanguard, 2013, October 11); “Okorocha celebrates 
Imo Workers, Offers Xmas Packages, Two Weeks Break” (Newswatch Times, 2013, 
December 19); “Bauchi Distributes Christmas Gifts Worth ₦34 Million to Christian 
Women” (Punch, 2013, December 25); “EFCC quizzes Kano govt officials over N50m 
Sallah gift” (Vanguard, 2010, January 20); “Jonathan’s [Christmas] cow gift to Bakare stirs 
debate” (Punch, 2013, December 31); and “Ilorin Sallah [Gift] Stampede: Death Toll Rises 
to 20” (This Day, 2013, October 18). In a recent newspaper write-up entitled “Christmas 
Corruption; Stop ‘selective’ charity; ‘A 2014 Cell phone Anticorruption Drive?’” the author 
lamented on the connection between the gifts public officials hand out during Christmas and 
corruption:  
Can we have a list of the bonuses presents, and cost, given and received this Christmas by all 
Nigeria’s top 5000 government employees –in the Presidency, NASS, State, LGAs, Directors in each 
ministry and agency. Even the private sector is involved. Christ’s name is now being used for a new 
massive corruption –‘Christmas Corruption’– the siphoning of funds for ‘Christmas Cheer’.  
(Marinho, 2014, January 1, p. 21).           
     The question of how Muslims and Christians perceive each other based on outer 
appearance was also brought up as a divisive issue. For example, some Christian 
respondents said that they are discriminated by Muslims in the north when they do not 
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appear in ways that are in line with Islamic dressing code. For example, one respondent, an 
official of a Christian umbrella organisation, claimed that in public universities in Muslim 
majority states, Christian girls are “forced” to adopt Islamic dress code, such as wearing 
hijab. Muslims also expressed concern concerning how they are perceived because of the 
way they dress. One Muslim leader, for example, shared this story: 
       Again, there are some Christians actually in the south that once you appear like this, if you wear 
a cap and kaftan, they have a perception that you are not an educated man. In Abuja here, few years 
ago, I went to a place in Area Eleven; I was looking for a hotel where someone I came to see was 
lodging, and I met a child, just about 7-8 years. I asked the child, “Where is this hotel?” I can’t 
remember the name. The boy looked at me and said I can’t speak Hausa. The boy told me he doesn’t 
speak Hausa. I was speaking English to him, oh! But because of the way I was dressed he believed 
that I cannot speak English. There was also a time I was approached by a newspaper vendor. He just 
came to me and showed me papers. I was looking at the Guardian. After I looked at the Guardian and 
didn’t buy he removed it and brought out a local Hausa newspaper. And I now asked him why are 
you doing this? He said may be I don’t understand English. These things are there for  a long time, 
particularly, Christians down south the way they look at Muslims.  
 The divisive issues enumerated above and the manners in which they were handled 
or perceived by Nigerians demonstrate the kind of prevailing political culture of federalism 
in the country. However, the study also examined the aspiration of Nigerians with regard to 
the future of their country and the search for common ground. The final section of this 
chapter presents the data on this aspect of political culture.     
5.6. Searching for a Common Ground: Interfaith Dialogue 
   The former secretary-general of the Yoruba Council of Elders, Dr. Kunle Olajide 
observed in an interview with The Nation newspaper,  that “Nigeria is more divided now 
than in 1960” (Olajide, 2014, August 4). Within this context, the study examined the 
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aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of the country. In an open-ended question 
on the questionnaire, respondents were asked to express their wish for the future of the 
country and where they would like to see the country in the next 5 to 10 years. One 
Christian respondent, aged between 25-34 years, for example, stated that: “My future wish 
for Nigeria is that I hope to see Nigerians will identify themselves as Nigerians not by their 
state or local government of origin.” A Muslim respondent from the North-East, aged 
between 45-54 years, wished to see: “A Nigeria where ethnic nationalism and religious 
bigotry are truly a thing of the past. To attain this almost utopian state, we must change the 
nature of people’s loyalty and sense of belongingness in favour of a corporate Nigeria.” 
Another Muslim respondent from the North East, aged between 25-34 years, stated this 
wish: “I wish that in the next 5-10 years Nigeria will become a peaceful nation and 
terrorism will be obsolete. I also hope that our political leaders will be less corrupt than they 
are at present.” A Muslim respondent from the North-East, with a bachelor degree 
qualification and aged between 35-44 years, stated: “I wish to see Nigeria become one of 
the greatest nations in the world, a country that treats its own citizens as equal, a country 
without poverty, injustice, corruption, unemployment, free education, and good social 
amenities.”  
 A Christian respondent from the South-South, with a PhD qualification and aged 
between 45-54 years, expressed the following wish:  
I wish to see a corrupt free Nigeria where there is respect for the rule of law, strong visionary 
leadership, where the will and intent of the masses count in elections, where ethno -religious conflicts 
are none existent and where there is true federalism with the federating units being strong to drive 
development at their own pace with the resources available to them.  
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A Christian respondent from the North-Central, aged between 55-64 years, with a master 
degree qualification, had this to say about his dream for Nigeria:  
If only our leaders have the mind of development, Nigeria will be a better place. We always cry that 
our colonial masters have cheated us or did wrong, but how long shall we continue to mourn after 53 
yrs? The good thing is that, with good mobilization and enlightenment, there will be positive change 
within 5-10 yrs as from now.   
A Muslim respondent from the North-Central, with a law (LLB) degree and aged between 
45-54, wished Nigeria to be corruption free, have improved economic situation and a 
purposeful leader: “My wish for my country Nigeria is to be free from corruption and have 
economic boost. I hope Nigerians could vote for a godly candidate that will re-align Nigeria 
our country.” A Muslim respondent from the North-West, with a master degree qualification 
and aged between 45-54 years, had this vision for the country: 
Nigeria should remain united forever, each region should cater for the needs of its people. The 
northern poverty has not been addressed by oil wealth and only independence from oil can liberate us 
from the malaise of laziness and initiate industry.  
 A Muslim respondent from the North-West, with a National Diploma (ND) 
qualification and aged between 18-24 years, outlined these wishes:  
The wish to see that every citizen is employed.  
The wish to see that electricity is constant.  
The wish to see that women are given the right to rule.  
The wish to see that poverty is being eradicated.  
The wish to see that education has circulated everywhere.  
In the 5-10 years, I will like to see that Nigeria is among the best countries in the whole world.         
 The wish of a Christian respondent from the South-East, with a bachelor degree 
qualification and aged between 35-44 years, is see that Nigerians work to change the 
country: 
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Just as the Americans will say “God bless America” so we are saying God bless Nigeria, but we will 
have to make it work by not being self-centred in all that we do both as leaders and followers. I wish 
to see a Nigeria where my children and grandchildren will be loved and cared for, a country that will 
stop killing innocent people, a country where the love for money will not surpass the love for a 
person. A country where if anyone is in danger even in the darkest and thickest forest he or she 
believes that someone out there, that is “Nigeria,” will find them and keep them safe like the 
Americans do. No citizen of America is ever forgotten no matter the situation. And the only way to 
do this is to first get the youths involved and think about them always, how to make laws by which 
they will benefit from and to financially and morally empower them.   
 The study also observed that in spite of the contestation and conflicts, there were 
many ongoing efforts in search for peace by civil society organisations, religious leaders 
and individuals. The study observed quite a good number of examples of tolerance and 
accommodation demonstrated by some Nigerians. There were many stories about some 
Christians and Muslims protecting each other during communal violence. There were also 
stories about good neighbourliness and friendship between Christians and Muslims. 
However, in general the divisiveness has permeated the social fabric of the Nigerian society.  
 Innumerable number of workshops, seminars and symposia had been organised in 
the country to promote understanding between Christians and Muslims, but the relationship 
between the two religious communities has become rather more problematic in the last few 
years. The researcher observed several peace promoting activities, including interfaith 
dialogue, as a participant or facilitator over the years. These initiatives have brought 
adherents of the two major faith groups in the country together and have helped to connect 
people at all strata of the society. Such relentless efforts in search of common ground have 
made modest difference, despite the increasing tension and conflicts. However, the study 
also found many instances where those taking part in such interfaith engagements held 
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views that contradicted the ones they professed in public. Through participant observation, 
the researcher discovered that even people who professed to be peacemakers were not 
immune from the bigotry and divisive sentiments that are common in the society, when they 
are in their comfort zone.  
The next chapter attempts to make sense of what the findings of the study reveal and 
imply in relation to the research questions. 
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  CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
6.1. Introduction  
 The aim of this mixed methods case study was to understand why the Nigerian state 
has remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts, despite having in place 
a federal system, which was specifically adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in 
diversity and peaceful coexistence among its ethnically, religiously and regionally diverse 
population. Taking a normative approach, the study inquired into how the prevailing 
political culture of federalism among Nigerians harnessed or hindered the peace-promoting 
and integrative function of federalism in the country. It was hoped that a better 
understanding of the perceptions, actions and attitudes of the population would provide 
insights about how a political culture of federalism shapes the peace-promoting and 
integrative function of federalism. 
 This study used a naturalistic inquiry approach to collect qualitative data using 
interviews, focus groups, document analysis and observation. The qualitative strand of the 
research was complemented by the use of quantitative data obtained from survey. Open-
ended questions on the questionnaire also generated qualitative data. The data were analysed 
and organised by categories and themes. The study was driven by the following five 
questions:  
1. How have the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of Nigerian population in 
relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues helped or hampered the peace-
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promoting and integrative function of federalism since the country’s return to 
democratic rule in 1999? 
2. What understandings of federalism drive the values, attitudes, actions and 
perceptions of the people in relation to the contentious issues?   
3. What historical events or experiences have shaped the prevailing culture of 
federalism among the people?  
4. Is the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity popular among Nigerians nowadays?  
5. What are the present aspirations of Nigerians with regard to the future of their 
country? 
 The previous chapter presented the results of this study by organizing the data from 
various sources into categories and themes to produce a readable narrative or thick 
descriptions. This chapter seeks to offer interpretative insights into these findings. The 
interpretation and discussion of the findings of the research is done in the light of what was 
already known about the peace-promoting function of federalism and political culture of 
federalism in the literature. The implications of these are intended to provide new 
understanding or fresh insights about how political culture of federalism shapes the 
supposed peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism. The chapter also includes 
a note concerning the effect of possible researcher bias in the interpretation of the findings. 
In addition, the strengths and limitations of this thesis are considered and suggestions for 
further research are presented. The chapter concludes by outlining the implications of the 
findings for peace and integration related federal theory, policy making and practice.  
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6.2. Findings of the study 
1. The primary finding of the research suggests that the values, attitudes, actions and 
perception of the people with regard to issues that were ethno-religiously contentious 
reinforced the centrifugal forces that tend to pull the state apart rather than strengthen 
federalism, which normally would act as a centripetal force binding the state together. 
This finding emanates from the expressed descriptions and indicated perspectives of 
respondents as well as the data obtained from other sources about several contentious 
issues enumerated in the previous chapter. As the results have shown, the values, 
attitudes, actions and perceptions exhibited by majority of respondents and those 
observed among the study population generally reflected inclinations to primordial 
cleavages.     
2. The second finding is that there is a widespread perception of federalism as a zero-sum 
game among the people. This was revealed by how respondents justified the claims and 
positions of their group about issues without due consideration to the views of others. 
For example, the claims and positions of Christians and Muslims over the contentious 
issues enumerated in the previous chapter tended to be mutually exclusive and devoid of 
analytic empathy. Similar traits were found among groups that are differentiated into 
“indigenes” and “settlers” as well as “majority” and “minority.”  
3. The third finding is that federalism appeared to be embraced more as a competition than 
cooperation. This was highlighted by the power struggle between Christians and 
Muslims, the different regions and diverse ethnic groups. Identity politics accompanied 
by episodes of violence like the one during the 2011 presidential election was a 
manifestation of this unhealthy competition and rivalry engendered by the power 
297 
 
struggle between Muslims and Christians. From the perspectives of the respondents 
analysed in the previous chapter, this struggle for power is driven by two key factors: 1) 
a political economy characterised by deeply entrenched neopatrimonialism and political 
culture of patronage; and 2) the fraught relationship between religion and state wherein 
the collision of religious values and demands constitute a challenge to secular 
constitutional democracy.     
4. The fourth finding is that there is an increasing culture of taking the law into one’s hand 
with regard to inter-group conflicts. Several respondents had no hard time justifying 
their violent stance and desire for revenge, if they would have the opportunity. From the 
perspectives of respondents, this tendency of taking the law into one’s hand is as a result 
of: a low confidence in the adjudicatory role of the judiciary in the face of perceptible 
sanctioned impunity; a long and sad history of accepting violence as a means of 
negotiation; and the religious indoctrination of violence as avenue of punishing direct or 
vicarious perpetrators of perceived provocation against one’s religion.  
5. The fifth finding is that the spatial differentiation of ethnic and religious identities and 
the discursive construction of indigene/settlers, majority/minority and Christian/Muslim 
dichotomies are in dissonance with the spirit of federalism, which normally upholds the 
rights of minorities, and go not only against the letters but also the spirit of the 
constitution. The tendency of majority groups to dominate minorities at different 
geographical scales and the reimagining of past misadventures and fear of domination by 
minorities sustains historic grievances and mistrust. For example, Middle Belters 
continued to feel that they need to resist the perceived hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani, 
who they considered as a ruling clan crowned by the British “colonial masters.”  The 
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resurgence of ethno-religious violence in the north is also creating the reimagining of the 
Sokoto jihad among Christians in the north, who perceived the events as a continuation 
of the jihad waged by the Fulanis under the leadership of Usman dan Fodio.  
6. The sixth finding of the study is that as ethno-religious tension and conflict increase, the 
lamentations over what many people perceived as a “forced marriage” between the 
disparage groups that make up Nigeria by the British became louder. For example, the 
centennial celebration kicked off by the Federal Government in January 2014 to mark 
the 100 years of the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates to form 
present day Nigeria by the British in 1914, sparked debates on the question of whether 
the political union created by the British was appropriate.              
7. The seventh finding is that religious nationalism appeared to be rising and assuming a 
trajectory of reducing the Nigerian federalism to a union of two religious communities, 
Christians and Muslims, and overshadowing the federating units. This development has 
reached a stage that the Federal Government must navigate this sensitive religious 
terrain carefully and make sure all its policies and legislations get the stamp of approval 
of the Christian and Muslim religious communities, without much to bother about the 
position of the federating units. With Muslims and Christians sometimes taking 
divergent positions on certain issues, as revealed by the data, it is certainly a delicate 
situation.  
8. The eighth finding of the study is that the Boko Haram Islamist insurgency is a direct 
violation of not only the federal constitution and territorial integrity of the Nigerian 
state, but an affront to all the values, norms, principles and ideals of federalism. Boko 
Haram’s rejection of Nigerian constitution and democracy, and avowed intention of 
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creating an Islamic state constitute a direct and major threat to Nigerian federalism. 
Already Boko Haram started following through on this threat by taking over towns and 
villages, and declaring a caliphate. Apart from the loss of territory to this armed terrorist 
group with a declared religious motive, the atrocities committed by the group, including 
the abduction of hundreds of innocent and defenceless school girls, women and young 
men, plundering of communities, killing of civilians, unprecedented displacement of 
people in the North-East region, forceful conversion of people into Islam, and carrying 
out of executions and amputations in the name of Shari’a, are despicable and 
unfathomable. 
9. The ninth and last finding of the study is that despite the contestations and divisiveness 
that characterise inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, there are many Nigerians who 
share the aspiration for a better life for themselves and for others, and dream of a future 
in which all citizens would co-exist peacefully. While a majority of respondents 
expressed the aspiration for a better Nigeria, their perceptions and views about most 
issues put forward to them to respond on revealed ethnic, religious or sectional parochial 
interests.  
6.3. Conclusion about Each Research Question 
 The first research question sought to know how the values, attitudes, actions and 
perceptions of Nigerian population in relation to key ethno-religiously contentious issues 
helped or hampered the peace-promoting and integrative function of federalism since the 
country’s return to democratic rule in 1999. The primary finding of the research suggests 
that the values, attitudes, actions and perception of the people with regard to issues that 
were ethno-religiously contentious reinforced the centrifugal forces that tend to pull the 
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state apart rather than strengthen federalism, which normally would act as a centripetal force 
binding the state together. This finding relates to Hartshorne’s (1950) functional model 
wherein he posited that: “The fundamental function of any state, as an organisation of a 
section of land and a section of people... is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the 
diverse regions of the state-area, into a single organised unit” (Hartshorne, 1950, p. 104). 
According Hartshorne, the state is able to succeed in this primary function when it 
overcomes the centrifugal forces that tend to break it apart with the binding (or cohesive) 
effect of the centripetal forces present in the state. As Flint and Taylor (2007, p. 132) noted, 
“Generally, federalism is interpreted as the most practical of Hartshorne’s centripetal forces 
in that it has to be consciously designed to fit a particular situation of diversity.” In this 
case, therefore, Nigerian federalism can be likened to Hartshorne’s centripetal force. 
However, those values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of respondents and those observed 
among the study population driven by parochial and primordial sentiments were antithetical 
to federalism because they led to poor handling of disagreements, uncompromising 
posturing and confrontations, with negative and destructive consequences.  This scenario 
confirms what Elazar (1987) meant when he argued that for a federal polity to be truly 
worth the name its people’s must “think federal.” 
 The fourth finding again addresses research question 1. The increasing culture of 
taking the law into one’s hand with regard to inter-group conflicts and the justification of 
violence are indications of low confidence in the adjudicatory role of the judiciary, an 
institution that is vital for the functioning of federalism. Such violent tendencies by groups, 
particularly religious zealots, ethnic militias and political thugs, have exacerbated tension 
and deepened division among the population.   
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 The second and third findings of the study speak to research question 2. The question 
sought to know the common understandings of federalism among citizens. These 
understandings drive the values, attitudes, actions and perceptions of the people in relation 
to the contentious issues and shape federalism. As Máiz (2013, p. 84) posited, federalism 
requires a set of attitudes and values, which are embodied in the shared political 
understanding that provides civic support for the federal system. The second finding of the 
study reveals that there is a widespread perception of federalism as a zero-sum game among 
the Nigerian people. This understanding was reflected in the mutually exclusive claims and 
positions of territorially concentrated, social, groups. The third finding of the study is that 
as a result of this view of federalism as a zero-sum game, federalism has been embraced 
more as a competition rather than cooperation. Unfortunately, the kind of competition that 
ensued among the different ethnic, religious and regional groups is not a healthy one that 
would spur innovation and progress, but unhealthy inter-group rivalry. It was real that many 
groups and individuals have suffered as a result of the actions and attitudes of other  people. 
However, in the claims and counter-claims about groups’ grievances, the common trait was 
mutual attributions and blaming of the other. No side demonstrated analytic empathy and 
the willingness to take its respective responsibility for what went wrong. In the absence of 
analytic empathy, each side held to its subjective understanding of conflicts that arose. This 
hindered the prospect for reflexive reframing of conflicts wherein the different subjective 
accounts of conflicts would be merged into an inter-subjective understanding, and by 
arriving at a common ground conflict parties could cooperatively engage in problem-solving 
towards an integrative solution that addresses their respective needs and aspirations (cf. 
Rothman, 1997).  
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 The understanding of federalism as a zero-sum game is a translation of the 
understanding of politics as a zero-sum game. The understanding of federalism as a zero-
sum game stemmed from citizens’ characterization of it as a political arrangement designed 
for the maintenance of the political economy. The centralization of the political economy, 
endemic corruption, neopatrimonialism and political culture of patronage feed and nurture 
the zero-sum understanding of federalism. Further, the fraught relationship between religion 
and state, which is manifesting in the struggle between Christians and Muslims in the 
country, is another factor behind the understanding of federalism as a zero-sum game. These 
understandings of federalism as a zero-sum game and as competitive rather than cooperation 
are at variance with federal political culture. For example, Frenkel (1986) argued that the 
willingness to consider politics not as a zero-sum game, where the alternatives are complete 
power and total powerlessness, is an essential element of political culture. Thus, Frenkel 
posited, that federalism is to be seen as a game of toleration, where each group must accord 
the others the non-interference it claims for itself, and embrace compromise and power-
sharing as appropriate mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts. Another scholar also 
shared the view when he asserted that “federalism implies a posture and an attitude toward 
social as well as political relationships, which leads to human interactions that emphasize 
coordinative rather than superior-subordinate relationships, negotiated cooperation, and 
sharing among parties (Elazar D. J., 1987, p. 78). The view of politics as a zero-sum game 
and the perception of federalism as competition rather than cooperation among Nigerians 
deviate from the deeper meaning of federalism as social solidarity, as explicated by Hueglin 
and Fenna (2010). 
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 The third research question sought to know the historical events and experiences that 
shaped political culture of federalism in Nigeria. Political culture is not developed in 
isolation of history and people’s experiences. Drawing from Afigbo (1991), this study has 
embraced a diachronic approach in tracing the roots of Nigerian federalism, and subscribes 
to the thesis that British socio-political engineering led Nigeria into federalism. By the same 
token, the study contends that the prevailing political culture of federalism among the 
Nigerian population has been shaped by historic events and experiences of the people. The 
fifth finding reveals that spatial differentiation of identities and the discursive construction 
of indigene/settlers, majority/minority, and Christian/Muslims as strategies of inclusion and 
exclusion, have underlying historical basis. These asymmetrical power relations have deep 
historical roots that remind people of, and perpetuate, domination and subjugation. This 
finding supports the position of Osaghae (1991) on the ethnic and religious discriminations 
associated with majority-minority dichotomy in Nigeria. The reimagining of the jihad and 
the colonial practice of indirect rule has become common among non-Muslim groups in the 
Middle Belt. This finding supports Turaki’s (2010) position that the fear and mistrust left 
behind by those historical events are still implicated in present conflicts. The sixth finding 
of the study also relates to research question 3. Nigerians have continued to revisit the 
amalgamation of 1914. For example, it has become common to hear individuals or groups 
blaming their woes as a result of the present state of affairs in the country on the British 
amalgamation of the Nigerian territories to form a single plurinational state. Among these 
voices of lamentations, there are those say that the country is maintaining unity at a high 
cost. The perception and lamentations that Nigeria is a product of a “forced marriage” 
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between incompatible partners got louder as ethno-religious tension and conflicts 
heightened (cf. Fwatshak & Ayuba, 2014).           
 Research question 4 sought to know if the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity is popular 
among Nigerians nowadays. The paradox of federalism is that it seeks at once to foster unity 
and diversity. Through federalism a union is created among federating units. Thus, the 
notion of pan-Nigerian unity implies loyalty to both the federating unit one belongs to and 
the federal union. As the literature has shown the concept of unity in a federal system is not 
to cause differences to disappear, but “the recognition of diversity as a defining 
characteristic of the polity” (Simeon, 2008, p. 58). The seventh finding of the study 
contributes to answering the research question 4. The finding shows that religious 
nationalism appeared to be rising and assuming a trajectory of reducing the Nigerian 
federalism to a union of two religious communities, Christians and Muslims, and 
overshadowing the federating units. As the literature acknowledged, in the past there were 
two types of nationalism, that is, pan-Nigerian and regionalist nationalism. This study found 
that nowadays the two major religious communities are behaving like the three regions were 
acting during the colonial period. Although federalism is designed to recognise group 
diversity, including ethnic, religious and regional differences, the federat ing units are 
supposed to be territorially defined groups that have special role in central decision making 
and possess certain autonomy (Frenkel, 1986). Therefore, in order for the religious 
communities to exert influence on the state, each appeared poised to claim space through 
spatialisation of religious identity. 
 The eighth finding also addresses research question 4. The Boko Haram Islamist 
insurgency and the group’s declaration of a caliphate over swathes of territory they captured 
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in the North-East region are an indication that the idea of a pan-Nigerian unity is an 
unsettled issue because groups like this are opposed to a federal system that recognizes 
religious diversity. Findings seven and eight, therefore, reveal that a civic concept of nation, 
which would serve as a rallying point for unity among Nigerians remains farfetched. The 
findings have brought to the fore the conclusion made by several studies on the role of 
religion and ethnicity in state-building. For example, Anthony Smith posited that “two of 
the nation’s most important cultural resources and traditions are constituted by ‘ethnicity 
and religion’” (Smith, 2003, p. 25). Similarly, Raune and Todd (2010a; 2010b) concluded in 
their study that religion and ethnicity intersect each other, and each can act as a powerful 
basis for identity, group formation and communal conflict. The works of Antonsich (2009) 
and Vujakovic (2005) shed light on the concept of nation. On one hand, there is a civic 
model of nation, which emphasizes common values (such as passion for liberty, sense of 
duty and commitment to tolerance and fair play), shared interests and upholding of the place 
of vital common institutions. On the other hand, there is a primordial or non-civic model, 
which defines a nation in ethno-religious terms. Drawing from this distinction, the idea of a 
pan-Nigerian unity rests on the development of the civic model, which has so far evaded the 
country.             
 Lastly, research question 5 sought to know the aspirations of Nigerians with regard 
to the future of the country. The ninth finding addresses this question. The finding reveals 
that despite the contestations and divisiveness that characterise inter-group relations, there 
are many Nigerians who share the aspiration for a better life for themselves and for others, 
and dream of a future in which all citizens would coexist peacefully. However, for many 
respondents, when it came to taking a stand on issues, ethnic, religious and sectional 
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parochial interests took the centre stage. It can, therefore, be contended that there is a 
disjuncture between aspirations and the political culture that people are socialized into.  
6.4. Conclusion about the Research Problem  
 The main preoccupation of this study was to understand why the Nigerian state has 
remained deeply divided and prone to ethno-religious conflicts despite having in place a 
federal system, which was adopted as a mechanism of fostering unity in diversity and 
peaceful coexistence among its regionally, ethnically and religiously diverse population.   
Based on the findings of the study in relation to the research questions, it can be concluded 
that there is a gap between the prevailing political culture of federalism and the designed 
aspiration of federalism for peace and integration in Nigeria. This is because there is an 
absence of a federative culture that can enable federalism to fulfil its peace-promoting and 
integrative function. The study, therefore, concludes that for federalism to succeed in the 
Nigerian context there has to be a peace-enabling federal political culture among the 
population. As the literature highlighted, federalism is more than just a constitutional and 
structural arrangement for shared rule and self-rule among territorially concentrated groups, 
but it is also a compact, a social solidarity, a way of thinking, and a way of doing things. As 
a compact, it is a morally binding agreement that demands the parties to be committed to it 
beyond the letters of the law (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). As a social solidarity, it implies 
compassion and sharing (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010). As a way of thinking it requires the 
population to “think federal” (Elazar, 1987). As a way of doing things, it requires citizens to 
internalize the values, principles, attitudes and norms that underlie a federal political 
culture, and act in ways that uphold those normative elements (Elazar, 1987; Rocher, 2009; 
Máiz, 2013; Rocher & Fafard, 2013).  
307 
 
6.5. Limitations of the Study 
 This research was undertaken as a case study of Nigerian federalism. While the case 
study design allowed considerable insights about the research problem to be gained, it can 
only permit transferability rather than generalization to other contexts. Also, being a mixed 
methods case study driven by a qualitative priority, implied a bias towards an inductive 
rather than deductive approach. Hence, the research was not oriented to establishing any 
causality, but was just focused on gaining new insights about the problem under 
investigation. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from the findings, despite the 
complementary use of quantitative techniques, only provide the basis for developing 
tentative hypothesis and not general conclusion on any hypothesis.   
6.6. Suggestions for Further Research  
1. There is a need for future research to investigate the nature of religious 
nationalism in Nigeria and its challenge to the federal idea.   
2. There is a need for future research to look into the impact of global resurgence of 
Islamism on religion and state relations as well as Muslim-Christian relations in 
Nigeria. 
3. There is also a need for research that would explore the relationship between 
Pentecostalism and religion and state relations as well as Christian-Muslim 
relations in Nigeria. 
4. Since Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, the country has become more 
deeply divided and more prone to violent conflicts. Future research may need to 
look into the relationship between federalism and democracy in the Nigerian 
context.  
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5. The limitation of this study as a case study foreshadows the need for comparative 
and multi-case studies in order to obtain generalizable conclusions about the 
relationship between political culture of federalism and the peace-promoting and 
integrative role of federalism, especially among erstwhile colonial African states.  
6.7. Implications for Policy and Practice 
 The findings of the research have implications that Nigerian policy makers and 
practitioners need to take into account. Therefore, the study offers the following 
recommendations to policy makers and practitioners: 
1. First, Nigerian policy makers need to pay greater attention to the normative 
dimension of federalism. As the findings of this study show, a well crafted legal 
document, which establishes a federal system and espouses values and principles of 
federalism, needs to resonate with the Nigerian people and be matched with a 
corresponding federal political culture. To this end, there is a need to start a national 
conversation about the values and principles of federalism. This conversation could 
be promoted through several avenues: schools, religious institutions, mainstream and 
social media, and civic society programmes.  
2. Nigeria is a colonial creation and Nigerian federalism emerged as a necessity for 
holding the disparate regions and peoples together. As this study notes, colonialism 
is often blamed for the problems that emerged in contemporary Nigeria . This is not 
out of place, but it has to be stated that British colonialism also brought many good 
things that if Nigerians had used very well the story would have been different today. 
The contribution of Nigerian leaders to the problem of state-building from the 
colonial, post-independence and present time has steadily increased for the worse. It 
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is high time Nigerian leaders undertook a soul-searching reflection and change their 
greedy and parochial attitudes to state affairs. Nigerian people must begin to hold 
their leaders to account.        
3. The relationship between religion and the state needs to be re-examined. 
Increasingly, as the study’s findings have shown, the two main religions, Christianity 
and Islam, are competing with each other in trying to increase their influence on the 
state. This development seems to be taking the shape of religious nationalism. As the 
study found, the two major religions appeared to be acting as the federating units and 
the voices of the states are becoming increasingly relegated. There is also the move 
by religious zealots to erode the secular character of the Nigerian state by trying to 
impose their own religious ideology and vision that are at variance with the 
principles of liberal democracy. There is, therefore, a need to safeguard the Nigerian 
state from the overreaching activities of religious zealots and to ensure that Nigeria 
remains a secular, civil and democratic state, which is the only framework that would 
be suitable for the country’s religious pluralism. 
4. Nigerian religious communities, including Christians, Muslims and adherents of 
traditional religions and nonreligious, should come together and develop a Nigerian 
Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms by learning from the South African 
Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms.   
5. The report of the just concluded National Conference should be subjected to a 
referendum. Nigerians should agree on a framework of coexistence that recognizes 
the plural character of the Nigerian state and the need for shared values .   
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6. Closely related to the second recommendation, the Nigerian government should 
repeal the laws establishing the pilgrimages commission, stop funding pilgrimage 
with public funds, and allow private the sector to facilitate the annual pilgrimages. 
Government officials should use their own personal money to sponsor themselves for 
pilgrimage. 
7. The findings of the study have shown that by the nature of the Nigerian political 
economy, the federalism is highly centralized. The struggle by ethnic, regional and 
religious groups to gain power at the centre at all cost is driven by this centralization 
of the political economy. This as well as patronage, neopatrimonialism and 
clientelism are driving corruption and fuelling inter-group conflicts. The political 
economy of dependence on oil is hurting the Nigerian state. There is a need to begin 
to explore ways of diversifying the Nigerian economy than maintaining it as a rentier 
state as it is now.   
8. The study found that there are historic grievances among Nigerians due to 
unresolved conflicts of the past or their scars. The memorialisation and reimagining 
of these painful experiences are affecting inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. 
There is need for a genuine reconciliation among the people. Justice Oputa Panel, 
which was commissioned by the Olusegun Obasanjo government to look into the 
human rights violations during the military, did not succeed in bringing total 
reconciliation as the recent happenings are indicating. Nigerian leaders need to get 
together and come up with a strategy for addressing grievances among the people. 
Such strategy should include avenue that would not be hijacked and turned into a 
theatrical play or party for the elites. 
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9. The relationship between northern “minorities” and the “majority” Hausa-Fulani 
partly holds the key to peace in the country. This relationship needs to be looked 
into. A conversation between the two groups needs to take place to increase 
understanding and remove mutual suspicion and mistrust between the two. The 
various northern associations that have become too politicized are not in position to 
facilitate this. There is a need for new apolitical platforms to be formed to facilitate 
such conversation.  
10. There is need to change the way politics is done in Nigeria. The political parties 
should be made to come together and sign a code of conduct that using religion and 
ethnicity to divide people is not acceptable, and there should be penalty for violating 
that code. 
11. Increasing violent dispositions appeared to be driven by a political culture in which 
grievances and agitation could only be addressed by government when groups resort 
to taking arms against the state or against one another. In order to save the country 
from the crisis plaguing it, this must be changed. To allow every region, every ethnic 
group and every religion to have a militia in order to secure its interest in the 
Nigerian state is a dangerous trend. The second factor driving a violent culture is the 
prevailing climate of impunity for those that violate the charter of mutual 
coexistence and inflicted pain on others. Federalism without rule of law is an 
aberration. Public office holders should demonstrate both physical and moral courage 
by subjecting themselves to the rule of law as well as enforcing it.  
12.  The federal and state governments should convene a national emergency meeting, as 
a matter of urgency, to discuss ways of mobilizing all the resources at their disposal 
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to end the ongoing Boko Haram Islamist insurgency and to begin the process of 
rebuilding the affected areas.  
13. The federal and state governments should leverage the commitment of civil society 
organisations, individuals and development partners in peacebuilding. There is a 
need for real investment in peace-generating efforts, processes and systemic 
supports. The few Nigerians that are involved in peacebuilding and in promoting 
inter-religious understanding should not give up, but strive to move beyond carrying 
out one-off events and media attracting activities to deep and sustained engagement.        
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Appendix 
 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
7 October 2013 
Dear sir/madam, 
 
I am a doctoral candidate undertaking a research project to understand the factors hindering 
the ability of Nigeria’s federalism to foster unity in diversity and to mitigate ethno -religious 
conflicts and divisive tendencies. To this end, I kindly request you to complete the 
following short questionnaire regarding your perception, opinion, attitude and preferences 
about federalism and national pluralism. It should take about 15 minutes of your time. 
Although your response is of the utmost importance to me, your participation in this survey 
is entirely voluntary.  
Please do not write your name or contact details on the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
remains anonymous, and information provided by you will be solely used for the purpose of 
this research.  
The result of this research will be published according to the University guideline for 
doctoral thesis. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Doctoral Researcher   
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PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY CHOOSING THE RELEVANT OPTION(S) OR 
WRITING DOWN YOUR ANSWER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED. 
Section A – Background/biographical information8 
This section of the questionnaire asks for background or biographical information. Although 
the researcher is aware of the sensitivity of such questions, the information in this section 
will make possible to compare group of respondents. Again, the researcher wishes to assure 
you that the responses will remain anonymous. Your cooperation is appreciated.  
Please mark your choice with a cross (x) 
 
1. Gender 
 
 
 
2. Age 
1 Under 18  
2 18 – 24 years  
3 25 – 34 years  
4 35 – 44 years  
5 45 – 54 years   
6 55 – 64 years   
7 65 years or older  
 
3. What is your religious affiliation? 
1 Christian  
2 Muslim  
3 Traditional Religion  
4 Non-Religious/Religiously unaffiliated  
5 Other (specify)  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 It is considered culturally more polite in this research setting to begin with asking for biodata before 
eliciting the respondent’s views on issues.   
1 Male  
2 Female  
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4. Please fill in the information below:  
1 State of Origin  
2 State of Residence  
 
5. Your highest educational qualification? 
1 Primary school certificate or lower  
2 Secondary school certificate  
3 National Diploma/NCE  
4 HND/Bachelor Degree  
5 Master Degree  
6 PhD  
 
 
 
Section B 
This section of the questionnaire explores your opinion and perception with regard to federalism in 
Nigeria. 
6. Do you agree or disagree that there is a need for a national conference to address the seeming 
disunity in the country? Please indicate your answer with a cross (x). (Mark one option only). 
1 Yes  
2 No  
3 Neither Agree nor Disagree  
  
  
358 
 
 
7. In your opinion, which of the following are the sources of disunity in the country? Please indicate 
your choice by marking a cross (x) in the appropriate boxes.  
 
Strongly 
agree  
1 
Agree 
2 
Undecided 
3 
Disagree  
4 
Strongly 
disagree 
5 
1 Political power sharing  
 
     
2 Economic imbalance and poverty  
 
     
3 
Revenue allocation and resource sharing.  
 
     
4 Muslim-Christian rivalry and struggle for 
supremacy. 
 
 
     
5 Resource control Agitations.  
 
     
6 Poor leadership.  
 
     
7 Corruption      
8 Violent religious extremism      
9 Ethnic chauvinism (a belligerent belief in the 
superiority of one’s ethnic group and looking down 
on others) 
     
10 
Other (please specify)      
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8. Arrange the following five identities in order of their importance to you.  
Allocating a 1 to the most important identity, a 2 to the second-most important and continue in this 
way until you allocate a 4 to the least important identity.  Use each number only once. 
Identity Rank  
Continent  
Nationality  
Ethnic Group  
Religion  
 
9. Which of the following are the reasons for recurrent ethno-religious conflicts in the country? (Mark 
a cross (x) to indicate your choice in the appropriate boxes. 
 
Strongly 
agree  
1 
Agree 
2 
Undecided 
3 
Disagree  
4 
Strongly 
disagree  
5 
1 Struggle for political 
domination 
     
2 Struggle for access to 
economic resources 
     
3 Desire to assert supremacy 
over other ethnic groups 
     
4 Desire to impose one religion 
over a part or the whole of the 
country 
     
5 Majority-minority struggle      
6 Other (please specify)      
 
10. In your opinion, why are ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria mainly concentrated in the North? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
 
11. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding federalism and the introduction of 
Islamic banking? Indicate your choice with a cross (x) in the appropriate box.  
 
Strongly 
agree  
1 
Agree 
2 
Undecided 
3 
Disagree  
4 
Strongly 
disagree 
5 
1 The introduction of Islamic banking is 
in line with the need to accommodate 
diversity in a federation  
     
2 The introduction of Islamic banking is 
an attempt to expand the influence of 
Islam in the country 
     
3 Islamic banking is a religious solution 
to the problem of corporate greed in 
the financial sector  
     
4 Islamic banking is part of a broad 
attempt to Islamize the country 
     
 
12. What other reason(s) do you have for your support or opposition to Islamic banking in the country? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………….........................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
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13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding federalism and the adoption of 
sharia law in Northern Nigeria?  
 
Strongly 
agree  
1 
Agree 
2 
Undecided 
3 
Disagree  
4 
Strongly 
disagree  
5 
1 The adoption of sharia by 12 states in Northern 
Nigeria is in line with the principle of 
federalism 
     
2 The adoption of sharia undermines the 
religious freedom of non-Muslims who are 
resident in those states 
     
3 The adoption of sharia penal code has 
increased tension between Muslims and 
Christians   
     
4 The adoption of sharia by the 12 states was 
meant to expand the political influence of 
Islam 
     
5 The adoption of sharia was a pushback  against 
secularism and Western influence  
     
 
Section C 
This section explores your attitude and preferences regarding key issues about federalism and the 
future of the country 
14. To what extent do you favour or oppose maintaining the present federal structure of Nigeria? Please 
indicate your choice with a cross in the appropriate box. (Mark only one option)  
Strongly favour 
1 
Favour 
2 
Undecided 
3 
Oppose 
4 
Strongly oppose 
5 
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If your answer to question 14 is ‘Oppose’ or ‘Strongly oppose’ kindly recommend what you would 
like to see as its replacement 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………...........
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................... 
 
 
15. In the light of the recent debate on Citizenship and State of Origin, what is your preference? Please 
select one by marking a cross (x) in the appropriate box. 
1 State of Origin  
2 State of Residence  
Kindly give your reason for your answer to this question 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………...  
16. Please express your wish for the future of Nigeria and where you would like to see your country in 
the next 5 to 10 years 
………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………
……………………………………………………………………………………….……………………
…………………………………………………………………………....................................................  
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire. Kindly return the questionnaire 
as specified in the cover letter. 
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Focus Group Discussion Guide 
Researcher opens the meeting with the following remark: 
Welcome and thank you for joining this group discussion, where we would talk about 
federalism and the question of unity in this country. This is a good opportunity for me to 
learn from your views and knowledge about these important issues. Your contributions to 
this discussion would also help others to better understanding these issues. Everything you 
say will be treated in confidence. Any reference or quotation of what has been said here 
would exclude the name or any description that would give clue of the person who said it. 
  
Before we begin to talk about these, may I kindly ask you to introduce yourself, your name, 
occupation and where you live?  
 
After the introduction: 
What are those things that you think hold Nigerians as one people? 
What are those things that you think tend to cause division and conflicts? 
 
The researcher continues probing and focusing the discussion so that information relevant to 
the research questions are obtained. The researcher would ensure everyone in the group has 
the chance to speak. The researcher would monitor the participants’ body language and 
sensitivity to make sure that the interaction is friendly, frank and credible.  
Wrap up: 
This has been a very fruitful and educative discussion. I thank each one of you for sparing 
your time to be here and for the important views that you shared here. 
